International Multiparty Mediation and Conflict Management by Vukovic, Sinisa

International Multiparty Mediation 
and Conflict Management
This volume aims to provide a detailed explanation of the effects of cooperation 
and coordination on international multiparty mediation in conflicts.
 Contemporary scholarship stresses that the crucial ingredients for a successful 
multiparty mediation are ‘consistency in interests’ and ‘cooperation and coordin-
ation’ between mediators. This book seeks to supplement that understanding by 
investigating how much the ‘consistency of interests’ and ‘cooperation and 
coordination’ affect the overall process, and what happens to the mediation 
process when mediating parties do not share the same idea and interest in finding 
a common solution. At the same time, it explores the obstacles in achieving 
coordination and coherence between various mediators in such an environment 
and how to surmount the problems that multiple mediators face when operating 
without a ‘common script’ in attempting to mediate a negotiated settlement.
 The study investigates three distinct mechanisms (both on the systemic and 
contextual level) that have the potential to deter defection from a (potential) 
member of the multiparty mediation coalition: geo- political shifts, changes in the 
conflict dynamics, and mediators’ ability to bargain for a cooperative relation-
ship. As the number of states and international actors that are involved in medi-
ation increases, a careful assessment is necessary not only of their relative 
institutional strengths and weaknesses, but also of how to promote com-
plementary efforts and how to synchronize the whole process when one actor is 
transferring the responsibilities for mediation to others.
 This book will be of much interest to students of mediation, conflict manage-
ment, war and conflict studies, security studies and IR.
Siniša Vuković is Assistant Professor at the School of Advanced International 
Studies (SAIS), Johns Hopkins University. He is also a visiting professor at the 
University of Amsterdam, Leiden University, Radboud University Nijmegen and 
the University for Peace. He has a PhD in international relations from Leiden 
University.





Georgetown University, Washington DC
Pamela Aall
United States Institute of Peace, Washington DC
This series will publish the best work in the field of security studies and conflict 
management. In particular, it will promote leading- edge work that straddles the 
divides between conflict management and security studies, between academics 
and practitioners, and between disciplines.
Negotiation and Conflict Management
I. William Zartman
Conflict Management and African Politics
Negotiation, mediation, and politics
Edited by Terrence Lyons and Gilbert M. Khadiagala
International Conflict Mediation
New approaches and findings
Edited by Jacob Bercovitch and Scott Sigmund Gartner
International Mediation in Civil Wars
Bargaining with bullets
Timothy D. Sisk
Conflict Transformation and Peacebuilding
Moving from violence to sustainable peace
Edited by Bruce Dayton and Louis Kriesberg
Theory and Practice of International Mediation
Selected essays
Jacob Bercovitch
UN Sanctions and Conflict
Responding to peace and security threats
Andrea Charron
Territorial Disputes and Conflict Management
The art of avoiding war
Rongxing Guo
Aid, Insurgencies and Conflict Transformation
When greed is good
Rob Kevlihan
Human Security in Turkey
Challenges for the 21st century
Edited by Alpaslan Özerdem and Füsun Özerdem
Understanding Complex Military Operations
A case study approach
Edited by Volker Franke, Karen Guttieri and Melanne A. Civic
Regional Organisations and Peacemaking
Challengers to the UN
Edited by Peter Wallensteen and Anders Bjurner
International Mediation Bias and Peacemaking
Taking sides in civil wars
Isak Svensson
Conflict Management in International Missions
A field guide
Olav Ofstad
International Multiparty Mediation and Conflict Management




Mediation and Conflict 
Management
Challenges of cooperation and coordination
Siniša Vuković
First published 2016 
by Routledge 
2 Park Square, Milton Park, Abingdon, Oxon OX14 4RN
and by Routledge 
52 Vanderbilt Avenue, New York, NY 10017
Routledge is an imprint of the Taylor & Francis Group, an informa business
© 2016 Siniša Vuković
The right of Siniša Vuković to be identified as author of this work has 
been asserted by him in accordance with sections 77 and 78 of the 
Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988.
The Open Access version of this book, available at www.taylorfrancis.com, 
has been made available under a Creative Commons Attribution-Non Commercial-No
Derivatives 4.0 license.
 
British Library Cataloguing-in-Publication Data  
A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library
Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data 
Vukovic, Siniša, 1973–
International multiparty mediation and conflict management : challenges 
of cooperation and coordination / Siniša Vukovic.
pages cm. – (Security and conflict management)
Includes bibliographical references and index.
1. Mediation, International. 2. Mediation, International–Case studies. 
3. Conflict management. 4. Conflict management–Case studies. I. Title. 
JZ6045.V85 2016
341.5'2–dc23 2015016775
ISBN: 978-1-138-80958-1 (hbk) 
ISBN: 978-1-315-74996-9 (ebk)
Typeset in Times New Roman 









1 Theory of international mediation 9





7 Sri Lanka 147














1.3 Manipulation (mediation with ‘muscle’) 28
2.1 Flowchart to success or failure 58
Tables
1.1 Types of power in international mediation 30
2.1 Game theoretical model 51
Acknowledgments
The present volume is a result of a post- doctoral research project “Modeling and 
Analyzing Multiparty Mediation Processes” supported by the Netherlands 
Organization for Scientific Research under the Rubicon research grant (file 
number 446–12–004). I am thankful to the Conflict Management Program of the 
Johns Hopkins University’s School of Advanced International Studies (SAIS) 
for hosting this research, and providing an exceptional working environment. I 
would like to express my most sincere gratitude to I. William Zartman and P. 
Terrence Hopmann for their continuous encouragement, patient guidance and 
useful critiques of my research, and to Madeleine O. Hosli and Paul Meerts for 
their generous advice and assistance in broadening the scope of my research and 
disseminating it at various research institutes around the world. I would like to 
extend my gratitude to Maria Groenveld- Savisaar for her outstanding work on 
the Sri Lankan case, to Jessica Kroezen in editing this volume, Isak Svesson for 
his valuable comments, and Ben Allen for his help in developing the game theor-
etical model during our research experience at the International Institute for 
Applied Systems Analysis (IIASA). The early empirical findings of this research 
were defended as a doctoral thesis at Leiden University’s Institute of Political 
Science. Last but not least, I thank my family for their unconditional support and 
encouragement to pursue my interests and follow my dreams. Any potential 
error of fact or interpretation in this manuscript is my sole responsibility.

Introduction
In an international system devoid of any central authority, mediation has often 
been advocated as being the most appropriate tactic in the realm of third- party 
conflict management. Traditional academic literature on international mediation 
derived most of its insights from labor- management disputes (Zartman 2008). 
These insights largely relied on the assumption that mediation is conducted by a 
single trustworthy third party that is does not have a stake in the conflict or its 
outcome. Over the past three decades, this traditional conceptualization of inter-
national mediation has experienced important advancements and change. For 
instance, as will be illustrated later in this book, over time, the issue of impartial-
ity has been challenged and several theories specified conditions under which a 
third party’s bias might not be a liability to the peace- process. Similarly, medi-
ation is no longer viewed as a mere dynamic of facilitating communication 
between conflicting parties, where third parties have very limited (if any) control 
over the conflict management process. Rather, mediators’ involvement is 
increasingly viewed to be pivotal in altering parties’ perceptions and preferences, 
and they do this not only by facilitating communication, but also by formulating 
viable solutions and incentivizing the parties to accept the terms that were ini-
tially unthinkable. As such, mediation is today defined simply as a process in 
which a third party helps conflicting sides to find a solution to their conflict that 
they cannot find themselves (Touval and Zartman 2006). Nevertheless, despite 
these important theoretical developments, the core assumption that mediation is 
conducted by a single third party still limits the practical applicability of various 
academic studies of international mediation.
 As numerous cases around the world have shown, international conflicts are 
increasingly being managed by more than one third party. Mediation increas-
ingly involves more than one third party, and the growing prevalence of this 
model makes it imperative that we understand the costs and benefits of this mul-
tiparty intervention. While much has been written about the damaging effects of 
uncooperative multiparty mediation have on a peace process, this book explores 
another perspective – the benefits both to the peace processes and to the third 
parties themselves of cooperative action. It bases its conclusion on insights from 
game theory and an in- depth review of five cases of mediation. Given the 
increasing pervasiveness of this model it is crucial to understand its practical and 
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theoretical ramifications. Although some studies have devoted their attention in 
unveiling the effects of uncooperative relations between multiple mediators, this 
book takes on a different focus: it looks at the potential benefits that cooperative 
behavior may generate both for the peace process and for the third parties them-
selves. The conclusions are drawn from insights developed through a game 
theoretical model and an in- depth analysis of five cases of mediation.
 Take this case, for example. Following the dissolution of the Soviet Union, in 
the early 1990s the United Nations Secretary General (UNSG) entered a peace-
making process aimed at mediating an escalating conflict between Georgia and 
the breakaway republic of Abkhazia. Alongside the UNSG was Russia, formally 
entrusted with the role of ‘facilitator.’ Russian interest in managing the conflict 
was a direct consequence of its desire to maintain its strong influence in its ‘near 
abroad.’ Furthermore, a group of Western states – the United States of America 
(US), the United Kingdom (UK), Germany and France – joined the UNSCG as 
‘Friends of Georgia.’ As the number of interested external actors increased, so 
did the complexity of the peacemaking process. The process was complex not 
only because of the long duration of the conflict’s destructive phase. In fact, the 
13 months of violence were suspended with a cease- fire agreement facilitated by 
Russia under the auspices of the UN. Russian influence in the region was soon 
reflected in the choice of peacekeeping troops that were dispatched to the war- 
affected areas: instead of UN troops, the peacekeeping operation was entrusted 
to Russian forces, formally under the mandate of the Commonwealth of Inde-
pendent States (CIS). The cease- fire agreement was never superseded by a com-
prehensive peace settlement. According to Whitefield there were two 
fundamental problems with the peacemaking process:
The first was the enduring importance to Russia of Georgia and the signifi-
cance of Abkhazia in relations between the two. The second was that differ-
ences between the principal external actors widened. To Russia’s evident 
frustration, the “western Friends” (long perceived as partial by the Abkhaz 
for their robust defence of Georgia’s territorial sovereignty) encouraged 
Georgia in aspirations that included one day joining NATO. No confidence 
in a negotiated solution could be built and a complex spiral of events 
descended downwards towards the open conflict seen between Georgia and 
Russia in August 2008.
(Whitefield 2010, 15)
Evidently, in the Georgia- Abkhazia conflict, incompatibility of interests between 
various external actors prevented the mediation process from resulting in a 
peaceful solution. A similar trend was also seen during the dissolution of the 
former Yugoslavia in the early 1990s when a variety of international actors tried 
to reduce the differences between the conflicting parties and bring them to a 
mutually acceptable agreement. The principal mediators came from the govern-
ments of the member states of the European Union (EU), the US and Russia, as 
well from various international organizations such as the United Nations and the 
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EU. The sheer number of international actors that took part in the peacemaking 
processes meant that most peacemaking activities were conducted collectively, 
either via formal frameworks of international organizations or in ad hoc formats 
such as the Contact Groups. Touval notes that:
[t]he collective endeavours pursued through the EC/EU, the UN and the 
Contact Group were encumbered with significant disadvantages. The partic-
ipating states often disagreed about the policy to be pursued, causing the 
disputants to doubt the credibility of the international organizations’ and 
Contact Group’s promises and threats. These weaknesses of the collective 
mediation efforts detracted significantly from their effectiveness.
(Touval 2002, 8)
The concept of international mediation generally refers to mediation activities 
conducted by various international actors with the aim of managing international 
conflicts on interstate (between countries) and intrastate (between governments 
and groups challenging their power) levels. Just as disputants in such conflicts 
can be both state and non- state actors, third- parties that might have an interest to 
mediate these conflicts can be just as diverse, and include: representatives of 
states (neighboring ones, global powers, states of medium and small relative 
size); representatives of global and regional international organizations; repre-
sentatives of global NGOs (which could include religious organizations, interest 
groups with an international agenda, etc.); and, finally, even individuals (such as 
Jimmy Carter, Desmond Tutu, Maarti Ahtisaari, etc.) who have an established 
international reputation in managing international conflicts and are able to act as 
mediators without a formal mandate from a particular state or international 
organization. Contemporary scholarship defines the processes in which a conflict 
is managed (i.e., mediated) by more than one third party as multiparty mediation 
(Crocker et al. 1999; Crocker et al. 2001). Existing literature on international 
mediation has often emphasized the benefits of having multiple mediators 
working in concert. As put by Zartman, “if a number of conciliators are available 
to the parties themselves and if a number of friends of the conflicting parties can 
coordinate their good offices and pressure, the chances of success are improved” 
(1989, 276). At present, several studies have outlined the potential benefits and 
liabilities associated with having multiple mediators (Crocker et al. 1999, 2001; 
Diehl and Lepgold 2003), the relationship between the size of the mediating 
coalition and its effectiveness (Böhmelt 2011) and the need to have a cooperative 
endeavor by multiple mediators in order to achieve success in the mediation 
process (Whitefield 2007; Böhmelt 2011; Hampson and Zartman 2011). There 
are a number of benefits that collective activities bring to the mediation process. 
When mediators decide to work together they can pool in their resources and 
create incentives that would otherwise be unavailable to a single party. At the 
same time, they can share the costs and burdens associated with the peace-
making process. Furthermore, depending on their capabilities, they can enter the 
process at a particular stage, when their leverage can be put to use most 
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effectively and by means of a coordinated effort, induce the conflicting parties to 
accept a negotiated agreement. However, all these benefits become elusive if the 
mediators do not have a shared understanding of how the conflict should be 
managed and what kind of outcome should be pursued. In such circumstances, 
the mediators may start sending mixed signals to the conflicting parties, start 
working at cross purposes and seriously jeopardize the effectiveness of the 
peacemaking process.
 With this in mind, contemporary studies of multiparty mediation are unanimous 
in their claim that cooperation is the key ingredient for successful multiparty medi-
ation. However, apart from having empirically confirmed that cooperation exerts a 
positive influence on multiparty mediation effectiveness (Böhmelt 2011, 874), the 
complexities of cooperation as a concept have not yet been scrutinized. As such, 
the studies mentioned above fall short in some areas. First of all, the concept of 
cooperation has often been seen as being synonymous with the concept of coordin-
ation, which has limited the analytical depth of some studies. Secondly, in each 
study, cooperation has been treated as a static phenomenon, on that does not 
change over time, but is observed in a binary manner: as present or not, throughout 
the entire process. Therefore, what these studies fail to integrate is the impact of a 
potential change in mediator attitudes that might occur over the course of the 
process. In other words, while in the beginning one mediator might show a clear 
intention to cooperate with the rest of the mediating coalition and thus contribute 
to the potential overall effectiveness of the process, along the way, as the mediat-
ing process unfolds, due to different circumstances, this attitude might change 
completely. Similarly, an initially non- cooperative mediator might eventually alter 
its preferences and decide to cooperate with the rest of the mediators. The fact that 
a mediator’s attitude might change from favoring cooperative to non- cooperative 
behavior and vice versa throughout the process will inevitably have an effect on 
the effectiveness of the mediating coalition.
 Although considerable progress has been made in studying multiparty medi-
ation, the process still poses several unanswered questions. Following the logic 
of earlier studies that challenged the traditional literature on the impartiality of 
mediators, contemporary research on multiparty mediation still lacks a clear 
emphasis on the particular self- interests that drive various mediators to get 
involved in managing the conflict. Third parties often publically invoke human-
itarian concerns as their sole motivation to act as mediators. However, given the 
considerable costs that mediation entails, it is reasonable to presume that medi-
ators are at least as motivated by self- interest as by humanitarian impulses 
(Touval and Zartman 1985, 8). Mediation represents a useful foreign policy tool 
that helps international actors promote specific self- interests (Touval 1992). As 
such, the investment of substantial material and non- material resources should 
not be seen as only being aimed at resolving a dispute; this investment is also 
made so that mediators might gain something from managing the dispute (Greig 
2005). Thus, just as a mediator’s involvement needs to be compatible with its 
self- interest, its choice to cooperate once it has committed to mediation also 
needs to be perceived as useful for the promotion of its self- interest.
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 International conflicts usually draw all sorts of outside actors into the medi-
ation process that are “just as numerous and frequently as diverse in their inter-
ests as the warring parties themselves” (Hampson and Zartman 2012, 133). Since 
each mediator will try to promote their own self- interest, the greater the number 
of participants in a multiplayer mediation effort, the greater the probability of 
conflicting interests and positions existing and the more complex the relationship 
between the parties will be (Crocker et al. 1999). Potential conflict of mediator 
interests will have a direct impact on the likelihood of achieving cooperation. In 
other words, compatibility or convergence of interests between mediators is a 
necessary precondition for the achievement of cooperation. The intention of this 
volume is to confer a special focus on the impact of ‘drop- outs’ – mediators that, 
due to various circumstances, believe that non- cooperative behavior is in their 
self- interest and as such choose not to cooperate with the rest of the mediating 
coalition – and potential factors that might change their general strategy/attitude 
from defection to cooperation. As a result, this book will emphasize the import-
ance of three basic factors – exogenous geo- political shifts, changes in conflict 
dynamics and bargaining for cooperation – that might induce mediators to alter 
their attitude from non- cooperative to cooperative.
 These factors have not been chosen randomly. Even though mediators enter 
the peacemaking process with the aim of affecting and altering the conflictual 
relations between the parties to a dispute, a potential incompatibility of inter-
ests in the mediating coalition generates a novel conflict between mediators 
that needs to be overcome. A conflict becomes ripe for resolution when the 
parties perceive that their unilateral and non- cooperative strategies are no 
longer yielding the expected results. As the parties become aware of the fact 
that they are stuck in a painful and unbearable stalemate, they may seek a way 
out of this predicament by pursuing a cooperative endeavor like engaging in 
negotiations (Zartman 2001). The aforementioned three factors are directly 
related to the process of ripening the conflict between mediators for resolu-
tion. Exogenous geo- political shifts, caused by pivotal political, social, eco-
nomic and/or natural events, might strongly affect an actor’s strategic 
priorities and encourage it to re- evaluate the guiding principles of its foreign 
policies. These may include the escalation of a parallel conflict, the occurrence 
of a disastrous natural or man- made event or a change in control at the level of 
political elites that present a novel formulation of foreign policy priorities for 
the mediators. Changes in conflict dynamics are directly related to the possib-
ility that some external actors might be directly involved in supporting the bel-
ligerent activities of one or more conflicting parties. As the costs of fighting 
increase, external supporters may start perceiving the continuation of confron-
tational strategies as being unsustainable. The perception of a ‘hurting stale-
mate’ may induce them to explore cooperation as an alternative means of 
achieving their goals. Finally, external actors may decide to incentivize non- 
cooperative third parties to assume a stance that is more favorable to com-
promise, by forming a ‘team of rivals’ through which mediators may negotiate 
the terms of their cooperation.
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 Once external actors achieve the necessary convergence of interests, the 
mediating coalition will then have to overcome the challenge of coordinating 
different mediators’ actions. While in earlier studies, the conceptual difference 
between coordination and cooperation was blurry at best, the research presented 
here will aim to avoid the analytical limitations associated with this lack of con-
ceptual clarity. When joining a mediating coalition, each mediator enters with a 
specific set of resources that could be used to leverage the disputants towards a 
mutually acceptable solution. The theory of international mediation defines these 
resources as power or leverage, which is ‘the ability to move a party in an 
intended direction’ (Touval and Zartman 2006, 436). This ability derives from 
the very fact that disputing sides need the mediators’ assistance to find a solution 
to their problems (Touval and Zartman 1985; Touval 1992). Earlier studies have 
shown that one of the most important comparative advantages of multiparty 
mediation efforts is in the dynamic created by various mediators pooling their 
resources, which allows for the creation of the necessary incentives for resolu-
tion that would have otherwise been unavailable from a single mediator (Crocker 
et al. 1999). The harmonious employment of various sources of leverage can be 
instrumental to the effectiveness of the mediation process – “where direct 
leverage is limited it may be borrowed from others” (Crocker et al. 1999, 40). 
Coordination is defined here as the method of synchronized usage of different 
sources of leverage and resources each mediator has at its disposal in the process 
in order to create incentives that are instrumental to successfully resolving the 
conflict. Since power/leverage is never employed aimlessly, the decision to use a 
particular type of leverage (depending on the mediator’s relative capacities) will 
be directly linked to the self- interest that the mediator aims to promote in the 
process.
 In essence, the aim of this volume is to explain in more detail the effects of 
cooperation and coordination on multiparty mediation. As previous studies have 
shown, the crucial challenges that must be overcome in multiparty mediation 
processes are (1) the achievement of adequate cooperation between the medi-
ators and (2) consequent coordination of their activities in the mediation process. 
While the two concepts share the common presumption that actors involved in 
the mediating coalition need to be in agreement as to how to resolve the conflict, 
there is still a clear difference between the two: a necessary prerequisite for a 
successful cooperation is that all parties recognize the mutual benefits of working 
together; once the parties perceive the benefits of working together, cooperation 
may lead to a coordinated endeavor which implies a more mechanical process of 
dividing labor effectively and clarifying who needs to do what, when and how.
 With all this in mind, the crucial ingredients for successful multiparty medi-
ation seem to be ‘consistency of interests’ and ‘cooperation and coordination’ 
between mediators. The aim of this book is to further expand the existing body 
of knowledge on multiparty mediation by answering a number of questions. First 
of all, how much do ‘consistency of interests’ and ‘cooperation and coordin-
ation’ affect the overall process? Given the dynamic nature of cooperation and 
the likelihood that a party will change its behavior from cooperative to 
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non- cooperative in the process of multiparty mediation, it is important to know 
whether or not the efforts that do not enjoy cooperation inevitably end in failure. 
Similarly, what happens to the mediation process when mediating parties do not 
share the same idea of and interests in a common solution? At the same time, the 
obstacles to achieving coordination and coherence between various mediators in 
such an environment will be explored and the question of how the problems that 
multiple mediators face can be surmounted when they operate without a 
‘common script’ in attempting to mediate a negotiated settlement. In other 
words, this study will investigate which mechanisms (both at the systemic and 
contextual level) have the potential to deter the defection of a (potential) member 
of the multiparty mediation coalition? Finally, as the number of states and inter-
national actors that are involved in mediation increases, a careful assessment is 
necessary not only of their relative institutional strengths and weaknesses, but 
also of how best to promote complementary efforts and how to synchronize the 
whole process when one actor transfers the responsibility for mediation to others. 
This book seeks to point out the importance of the self- interest that motivates 
third parties to get involved and to unveil the link between coordination and self-
 interest (also described as strategic interests) and the impact of these interactions 
on the overall effectiveness of the mediation process.
 Multiparty mediation is not a new theory of mediation, rather it is an advance-
ment of existing knowledge. Therefore, this volume will start by laying out a 
theoretical framework of mediation in Chapter 1. Existing literature will reflect 
the multi- causal nature of the mediation process, in which the interplay of a 
variety of factors (systemic and behavioral) directly affects the effectiveness of 
the process. The chapter will first provide an operational definition of inter-
national mediation and will highlight its most fundamental characteristics. 
Special attention is paid to the elusive notion of a mediator’s impartiality, fol-
lowed by a more nuanced discussion of two types of biases that mediators may 
bring to the process: bias of actor and bias of outcome. Furthermore, the chapter 
reflects on the various motives that induce the conflicting parties to accept medi-
ation and the interests that drive mediators to get involved. The discussion also 
addresses different types of third parties that may have an interest in getting 
involved in managing the conflict, the relevant leverage they possess and strat-
egies that they can employ in the process. The chapter also reflects on the intract-
able nature of conflicts that elicit mediation by external actors because the 
disputing sides are either unable or unwilling to find a solution on their own. 
Finally, the chapter concludes with an explanation of the various degrees of 
success in international mediation.
 Once the fundamental theoretical framework of international mediation has 
been described, the discussion will move on to the state of the art of multiparty 
mediation in Chapter 2. The chapter will start by discussing the potential bene-
fits and liabilities associated with multiparty mediation initiatives, the com-
parative advantages of multiparty mediation processes in light of their 
composition and the stage of the conflict cycle. The chapter will then address 
the most challenging task that any multiparty mediation endeavor is faced with: 
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the achievement of the necessary level of cooperation between multiple mediators 
and subsequent coordination of their mediating activities. Given the limitations of 
the literature with regard to cooperation and coordination, the core arguments will 
be expanded and illustrated with the help of a game theoretical model, developed 
in order to observe a general pattern of mediator behavior in multiparty medi-
ation. Reflecting on the insights from the model and existing multiparty mediation 
literature, the chapter will offer an argument that cooperation and coordination 
are not only instrumental to the peacemaking process, but are highly significant to 
mediators themselves and that such dynamics generate greater benefits than any 
strategy of defection.
 Furthermore, this chapter will explore potential mechanisms that can induce 
cooperation between the third- parties. As each mediator enters the process with 
a specific set of interests, preferences and alliances, in the case their interests 
become incompatible, the peacemaking process becomes further complicated by 
an emerging conflict between mediators. Expanding on the existing notions of 
ripeness theory (Zartman 1989a, 2001), this chapter will propose three distinct 
mechanisms that can ripen the conflict between mediators for resolution and 
promote cooperative behavior in the mediating coalition: exogenous geo- 
political shifts, changes in conflict dynamics, and bargaining for cooperation. 
Subsequently, the chapter will illustrate various mechanisms intended to facil-
itate coordination between mediators, and emphasize the relevance of leadership 
in multiparty mediation efforts.
 The insights from the proposed theoretical framework in Chapter 2 will be 
applied to the contexts of five cases of contemporary multiparty mediation 
(Chapters 3–7). While three cases that were selected had a successful outcome 
(Tajikistan, Namibia and Cambodia) and two of them failed (Sri Lanka and 
Kosovo), all the cases provide a comprehensive, structured and focused analysis 
(George and Bennett 2005; Beach and Pedersen 2012) of the effects of 
cooperation and coordination on the multiparty mediation process. The cases 
offer an abundance of empirical evidence of the various dynamics that have con-
tributed to the achievement of cooperation between mediators and of the effects 
of coordinated activities on the peacemaking process. The cases also show the 
dynamic nature of cooperation, as the parties may have altered their priorities 
throughout the process. As a consequence, these changes – either related to 
various exogenous geo- political shifts, the conflict dynamics on the ground or 
the fact that the external actors managed to negotiate their cooperation – had a 
significant impact on the conflicting parties and their behavior in the peace-
making process. The last chapter (Chapter 8) offers a summary of the core find-
ings of this research project and outlines the potential relevance of these findings 
in terms of policy making. It provides a discussion of various factors that could 
induce a change in mediator attitudes and promote cooperative behavior within 
the mediating coalition, which in turn has the capacity to improve the chances of 
successfully managing the conflict.
1 Theory of international 
mediation1
Conflict management repertoire
Conflicts are interactions in which two or more actors see their goals as being 
mutually incompatible. Despite the fact that, within the vast spectrum of all 
social processes, conflicts are seen as the most insidious and costly, they are not 
always violent and destructive. Rather, they may be waged according to the rules 
and procedures that parties have agreed to in advance. According to Kriesberg, 
these ‘constructive’ conflicts are especially common at the domestic level, where 
they tend to be regulated and channeled through existing political and judicial 
institutions and, as such, represent an essential feature of democracy (Kriesberg 
2003). Nevertheless, many conflicts are not managed in the context of preexist-
ing institutional arrangements. And this is particularly true for conflicts that 
occur at the international level, which may last for a long period of time during 
which the parties resort to destructive measures in order to advance their inter-
ests. In their fundamental form, destructive conflicts imply a methodical employ-
ment of various forms of violence, ranging from physical to cultural and 
structural2 (Galtung 1969, 1990; Crocker et al. 2005). Numerous studies have 
shown that human causalities and material damage, produced in such conflicts, 
are generally regarded as the most salient type of political costs a society can 
incur (Mueller 1973; Gartner and Segura 1998, 2000; Gartner et al. 2004). Not 
surprisingly, there is an increasing demand to manage conflicts coming from the 
same (political) actors that are involved in them, accompanied by pressures from 
both local and global civil society.
 Conflicts often produce high levels of distrust, resulting in a significant (if not 
complete) breakdown of communication. In these conditions, parties are fre-
quently either unable or unwilling to reach a mutually acceptable solution on 
their own. For this reason, conflicting parties might find it useful to delegate con-
flict management activities to a distinct third party. Broadly speaking, third- party 
intervention varies from joining the dispute (i.e., taking the side of one of the 
disputants) to managing one. Conflict management efforts may assume different 
forms and encompass a wide range of activities, the use of which depends on the 
extent of the third party’s commitment to managing the dispute. Frazier and 
Dixon have developed a useful taxonomy of conflict management activities and 
10  Theory of international mediation
identify five main forms: verbal actions, diplomatic approaches, judicial pro-
cesses, administrative assistance and the use of military force.
 Verbal actions represent the most passive form of conflict management and 
can be observed in various statements issued by third parties in which they urge 
the belligerents to end violence and resort to peaceful means in order to settle 
their dispute. Given the low cost of such efforts, in the period between 1946 and 
2000, verbal actions represented the bulk (nearly 44%) of all third- party activ-
ities (Frazier and Dixon 2006, 395). Nevertheless, as Frazier and Dixon argue, 
third parties activity was ‘not all talk,’ as diplomatic efforts (namely mediation) 
accounted for just over 40% of third- party activities (Frazier and Dixon 2006, 
395). The last three types – judicial processes (for example arbitration or the use 
of war crime tribunals), administrative assistance (such as humanitarian aid, 
election supervision and monitoring) and military intervention (such as military 
observation, peacekeeping and demobilization monitoring) – comprised a rather 
small fraction of third- party activities. As they imply increased levels of com-
mitment (in terms of financial costs or providing personnel and necessary logis-
tic support), the last three forms together amounted close to 16% of all conflict 
management activities.
 In practice, various methods of conflict management show a strong degree of 
interdependence. This is especially true of verbal actions and mediation efforts. 
Mediation efforts often follow up other conflict management activities, including 
previous mediation attempts. However, since verbal expressions also include 
third parties’ offers to mediate the dispute, mediation and verbal strategies com-
plement each other most often (Greig and Diehl 2012). According to Oswiak, 
third parties are most inclined to reuse less costly methods: while in more than 
50% of cases mediation efforts were followed by verbal action through which 
violence was denounced and parties were called to reach a cease- fire, mediators 
were more reluctant to resort to more costly strategies such as economic sanc-
tions or military intervention (Oswiak 2014).
 In line with its popularity in practice, mediation has also been deemed the 
most efficient method of managing conflicts through peaceful means in the aca-
demic literature.3 The growing academic interest in mediation was also fueled by 
the acknowledgment that a large number of internationalized conflicts were not 
as often and as easily handled by other modes of conflict management, such as 
legal tribunals, arbitration or the use of force. In fact, compared to other forms, 
mediation represents a relatively low- cost alternative to the options of doing 
nothing and a conducting a large- scale military intervention.
What is mediation?
Definitional characteristics
The popularity of mediation as a method of conflict management can be traced 
back to its definitional characteristics. Mediation represents a form of ‘assisted 
negotiation,’ in which an external actor enters the peacemaking process in order 
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to influence and alter the character of previous relations between the conflicting 
sides (Bercovitch and Jackson 2009). It is a voluntary, non- coercive and legally 
non- binding activity that is particularly practical given the intricate dynamics of 
international relations that are dominated by the principles of the preservation 
of actors’ independence and autonomy (Bercovitch 2005). Given its low degree of 
intrusiveness and ad- hoc nature, mediation allows the parties to maintain their 
autonomy throughout the decision- making process (Frazier and Dixon 2006; 
Greig and Diehl 2012). To use the argument put forward by Touval and Zartman, 
mediation should be understood as a “political process with no advance commit-
ment from the parties to accept mediator’s ideas” (Touval and Zartman 
2001, 427).
Elusive nature of mediator’s impartiality
While over time scholars have managed to reach an overwhelming consensus on 
the necessary characteristics that a mediator should possess in order to success-
fully assist the parties in reaching a solution, one issue has remained controver-
sial: mediator impartiality. Early studies that followed the logic of domestic 
mediation, considered impartiality to be a fundamental and even definitional 
characteristic of a mediator, as without it, one cannot even speak of mediation 
(Jackson 1952; Assefa 1987; Burton and Dukes 1990; Miall 1992; Hume 1994). 
According to these studies, there was a clear causal link between impartiality 
and mediation effectiveness: a mediator’s impartiality was essential to instilling 
confidence on the part of the conflicting sides, which was necessary to a media-
tor’s being accepted. This in turn, was fundamental to producing a successful 
outcome of the mediation. By relying purely on persuasion, mediators were sup-
posed to facilitate the impaired communication between the disputants and for-
mulate potential solutions based on the newly provided information. For 
instance, Raymond and Kegley (1985) defined mediation as an activity in which 
a third party helps the disputants to reach a voluntary agreement using facilita-
tive methods such as agenda setting, simplification of communication, clarifica-
tion of respective positions, issue ‘reconceptualization,’ bargaining facilitation 
and support for agreement. Similarly, for Moore (1986), mediation should be 
seen as an extension of the negotiation process, in which an ‘acceptable, impar-
tial and neutral’ third party, holding no ‘authoritative’ power, assists the conflict-
ing parties in reaching a mutually acceptable settlement.
 Insights derived from domestic mediation are still fundamental to our under-
standing of international mediation and there is a great deal of overlap in the 
theoretical understanding of both dynamics. The particular differences that can 
be found between the two processes are a direct result of the context in which 
they are conducted. In an international system that is devoid of a central author-
ity, various international actors conduct mediation activities in conditions that 
differ greatly from those found at the domestic level. Although there are still 
strong similarities between the processes of international and domestic medi-
ation, lack of a clear structure at the international level, where actors seek to 
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preserve their independence at all costs, has made international mediation efforts 
more susceptible to the particular self- interests that drive various international 
actors to get involved in mediating a particular international conflict. While in 
certain domestic settings mediation is per definition conducted by a single, trust-
worthy third party that has no stake in the dispute, international conflicts usually 
attract and bring into the mediation process different types of outside actors that 
are “just as numerous and frequently as diverse in their interests as the warring 
parties themselves” (Hampson and Zartman 2012, 133). As pointed out by Ber-
covitch and Jackson:
Mediators bring with them consciously or otherwise, ideas, knowledge, 
resources and interests, of their own or of the group they represent. Mediators 
often have their own assumptions and agendas about the conflict in question.
(Bercovitch and Jackson 2009, 35)
Types of bias
Preferences that mediators bring with them to the process are reflected in two 
types of bias. The first type of bias can be traced back to the interests that drive 
mediators to enter the process. The assumptions and agendas that the mediators 
have about the conflict may shape their preferences for the type of outcome that 
is being pursued through mediation. The bias of outcome might be seen as a 
serious source of problems in terms of bargaining dynamics, as it reduces the 
range of possible outcomes for the disputing sides. Nevertheless, this bias engen-
ders a higher degree of predictability for the process and a sense of direction for 
the parties. When Richard Holbrooke brought together representatives of the 
three warring factions in the Bosnian civil war to the Dayton air- force base, he 
immediately laid down his plan for the future of Bosnia – a unified country, 
within its existing borders, composed of two parts (entities) – which was used as 
a foundation for the subsequent negotiations between the parties (Holbrooke 
1998). His preferences eliminated the possibility of exploring options such as 
partition, integration of particular parts into the neighboring countries or a com-
plete redrawing of borders based on the principle of ethnicity (Touval 2002). 
Another illustrative case of bias of outcome is the Soviet mediation of the Indo- 
Pakistani dispute over Kashmir in 1966. While the Soviet Union had often been 
perceived as being biased toward India during the Krushchev administration, fol-
lowing his removal from power in 1965, the new Kosygin regime took a more 
balanced stance vis- à-vis the parties (Thornton 1985). During the talks in 
Tashkent in 1966, the Soviet Union had a strong strategic interest in ending the 
hostilities between India and Pakistan; however this interest had less to do with 
the actual conflict in Kashmir, and more to do with an increasing Chinese influ-
ence in the region. As pointed out by Beber, “Kosygin was biased toward 
Chinese influence in South Asia, but not biased toward either of the disputants 
negotiating at Tashkent” (Beber 2012, 417). Soviet commitment to mediate a 
cease- fire agreement and the withdrawal of troops to pre- war lines of control was 
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a direct result of its intention to limit the Chinese strategic standing and potential 
strengthening of ties between Beijing and Islamabad (Dixit 2002; Beber 2012). 
Lastly, bias of outcome is also reflected in the mediator’s mandates. The man-
dates dictate the manner in which a third party enters the dispute. They give 
guidance as to how the process should be conducted and, most importantly, what 
a mediator is expected to achieve. Insights from Jan Eliasson’s experience as a 
mediator show how practitioners and academics have somewhat different expec-
tations in terms of what the purpose of mediation is. In their analysis of Elias-
son’s mediation efforts, Svensson and Wallensteen note that “mediation does not 
always result in complete and durable peace agreements between the parties, [as] 
such an outcome may not even be the purpose of mediation” (Svensson and 
Wallensteen 2010, 109). In fact, Eliasson’s objectives generally included goals 
such as improvement and maintenance of communication channels between con-
flicting sides, alleviation of humanitarian crises and exploration of elements that 
could be used for a final agreement in possible future mediation activities.
 Mediators might also have close personal, political or economic relations with 
one of the disputants. Although this type of bias was outright rejected in the tra-
ditional literature as being a definitional incongruity, several studies have shown 
the potential benefits of having a mediator with close ties to one of the parties 
(Touval 1975; Zartman and Touval 1985; Carnevale and Arad 1996; Kydd 2003; 
Svensson 2014). A mediator’s bias of actor may be instrumental in cases charac-
terized by power asymmetry between the disputants. As argued by Kleiboer, 
biased mediators “might empower weaker parties in their interest of an equitable 
settlement to end human misery” (Kleiboer 1996, 370). Similarly, a biased medi-
ator might be acceptable to a disfavored party because that specific third party 
may be the only one capable of mustering the necessary resources to produce the 
incentives that could make a difference to the process. In other words, when a 
mediator has closer relations with the side that has a greater say over the 
outcome of the conflict, the less powerful conflicting side might expect that the 
mediator will use partiality to influence the other side and move it toward an 
agreement that would be unattainable through non- mediated negotiations. For 
instance, despite an unequivocal US bias in the Arab–Israeli conflict, the Arabs 
accepted US mediation efforts believing that such relations could be used to 
extract concessions from Israel (Touval 1975). In essence, disfavored sides 
accept biased mediators because they may be able to pressure their partners 
toward accepting a solution that would otherwise be unattainable. During the 
1979 hostage crisis, the US accepted Algerian mediation not because of its 
impartiality, but because it had an open access to the inner circle of Khomeini’s 
regime and was thus able to promise help in releasing the hostages (Touval and 
Zartman 2006, 433; Sick 1985). Similarly, without Venezuelan assistance the 
Colombian government would be unable to bring the Fuerzas Armadas Revolu-
cionarias de Colombia (FARC) to the peace process held in Havana. Venezuelan 
willingness to put its bias toward FARC to promote the peace talks was also 
conducive for a parallel and gradual warming up or relations between the gov-
ernments in Caracas and Bogota. In other words, mediation may be used to 
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improve relations between the disfavored party and the mediator. When the UK 
and the US mediated the dispute over the city of Triste between Italy and Yugo-
slavia in 1954, the process was largely conditioned by the Cold War, partisan 
attitude of the Western countries toward their allies in Italy (Campbell 1976). 
While the Yugoslav officials publicly protested the Anglo- American intention to 
give the northern part of Trieste to Italy, outside of the scrutiny of the public eye, 
the UK and the US used this process to improve their relations with Tito’s Yugo-
slavia in the aftermath of Yugoslav split from the Soviet sphere in 1948 
(Zartman and Berman 1982, 68; Favretto 2009, 256).
Credibility
The evident ambiguity of impartiality as a concept induced some scholars to 
shift their analytical focus from perceived impartiality to a more specific notion 
of perceived credibility of a mediator. According to this approach, while medi-
ators may preserve their biased attitude in the process and with it contribute to 
the eventual effectiveness of the process, they still need to be perceived as cred-
ible in order to be acceptable to the disputants. For Maoz and Terris, mediator 
credibility is the
extent to which disputants think that (1) the mediator’s offer is believable 
(i.e., the mediator is not bluffing and/or is not being deceived by the 
opponent) and (2) the mediator can deliver the offer (i.e., mediator can make 
the offer stick).
(Maoz and Terris 2009, 69)
According to their study, when mediation takes place, a mediator’s credibility is 
a feature that increases the likelihood of a partial or full settlement (Maoz and 
Terris 2009, 88). In order to be credible, a guarantor must fulfill at least three 
basic conditions: it must have a specific self- interest in upholding a promise; it 
must be willing to use force if necessary (and capable of punishing whoever vio-
lates the agreement); and to be able to signal resolve (Walter 1997). Hence, a 
direct interest that leads to a more unyielding presence by the third party makes 
the agreement more relevant to the conflicting parties, who would then be 
induced further to obey the contract (Bercovitch 2002).
 Mediator credibility is directly linked to mediator bias. If we look at conflicts as 
a result of incomplete information between the disputants, mediators’ ability to 
convey the necessary information about the parties’ preferences, capabilities and 
resolve becomes instrumental in managing the conflict (Fearon 1995, Powell 
2002). According to Kydd (2003), in order for this information to be believable, 
mediators must be biased toward one of the actors. His analysis shows that an 
unbiased mediator is seldom trusted in sending messages that might increase and 
decrease the likelihood of conflict. If the mediator only has a preference for ending 
hostilities, it will advise both sides to exercise restraint. Since the parties might 
anticipate the mediator’s preferences, they will not find their statements to be 
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credible. Mediators who are interested in persuading one of the parties to make a 
concession because the other side has strong resolve must be biased toward the 
side that is receiving the information in order to be successful (Kydd 2003, 607). 
During the last months of war in Bosnia, the success of the US initiative to halt the 
Bosniak and Croat offensives in the aftermath of NATO campaign against Serb 
military, was largely due to the misinformation about Serb regrouping and consoli-
dating that the US officials provided to their Bosniak and Croat partners. This 
information was instrumental to inducing the parties to explore negotiations as a 
viable alternative to fighting (Holbrooke 1998, Touval 2002).
Definition
It should be noted that although mediators seem to be acceptable despite their 
evident bias, some studies still remain suspicious of the generalizability of utility 
generated by the presence of a biased mediator. According to these studies, the 
conclusions about their effectiveness are still based on a limited number of cases 
and it is still the mediator’s technique (i.e., strategy) rather than his or her char-
acteristics (i.e., bias) that condition the final outcome of the process (Gent and 
Shannon 2011; Beber 2012). Nevertheless, and in summary, since mediator 
impartiality and neutrality do not represent the necessary prerequisites of a medi-
ator acceptance or of a successful outcome, mediation is best understood as a 
voluntary and legally non- binding negotiation process conducted in an ad- hoc 
manner through which an external actor assists the parties in reaching a solution 
that they are unable or unwilling to find themselves.4
Demand for mediation: when and why do disputants accept 
mediation?
Mediators are often initially faced with rejection by the disputing parties. Thus, 
as Zartman and Touval point out, “their first diplomatic effort must be to con-
vince the parties of the value of their services before mediation can get started” 
(Zartman and Touval 1996, 446). Rejection is a product of the suspicion and 
mutual mistrust that characterize many conflicts (Svensson and Wallensteen 
2010). Parties will engage with only those mediators they deem trustworthy and 
expect that the actors involved will reciprocate and not exploit one’s willingness 
to cooperate (Kydd 2006).
 Making the parties amenable to mediation is not an easy task. In order for medi-
ation to take place, parties need to perceive it as a reasonably attractive alternative 
to the continuation of belligerent activities. More specifically, disputants will 
accept a mediator’s offer to the extent that the expected utility of an agreement 
exceeds the expected utility of continued conflict (Maoz and Terris 2006). On the 
one hand, parties will accept mediation if they perceive it to be a process that may 
produce a better outcome than the one they can achieve by fighting. On the other 
hand, they would also expect that mediation might generate a better outcome than 
any solution that could be reached through direct negotiations.
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Ripening the conflict
The decision to manage a conflict is not unilateral, but rather a result of a careful 
analysis by all sides of whether or not a conflict has become “ripe” for resolution 
(Zartman 1989a, 2001). According to Zartman’s ripeness theory, the parties first 
need to perceive that they are locked in a ‘mutually hurting stalemate,’ which is 
an unbearable, painful and costly impasse experienced by both parties in which 
neither party is able to escalate the conflict unilaterally to achieve victory and in 
which both parties can expect an impending catastrophe if confrontational strat-
egies continue. Under such conditions, the parties begin to perceive negotiations 
as a preferable alternative to the continuation of belligerent activities and see 
them as a ‘way out’ of the impasse (Zartman 2001, 8). Both conditions – ‘mutu-
ally hurting stalemate’ and ‘way out’ – are based on the conflicting parties’ sub-
jective perceptions: they have to recognize that they are at a painful impasse (no 
matter what the ‘evidence’ on the ground says and/or how the situation is per-
ceived by other actors) and develop a sense of seeing a negotiated solution as an 
alternative to continued fighting. It should be noted, that the word ‘mutually’ 
does not imply symmetry; it only refers to the environment in which both parties 
feel the pain from the stalemate (Zartman and de Soto 2010, 13). Since ripeness 
is a perceptual condition, in order to foster subjective awareness of the present 
situation as ripe for resolution, parties might look for objective indicators of the 
rising costs of the conflict. These include information such as: the number and 
the makeup of causalities, number of refugees and internally displaced persons, 
increasing financial costs of sustaining the current strategies, material damage 
caused by the conflict, etc. At the same time, parties need to develop subjective 
perceptions of ripeness, which are often a reaction to objective events. Gener-
ally, subjective indicators can be deduced from parties’ statements, both official 
and unofficial. Parties may emphasize their exhaustion as a result of the ongoing 
conflict, recognition that confrontational activities are not yielding expected 
results, intention to re- evaluate positions and interests in the conflict and voice 
their concern that the ongoing conflict might further tarnish their international 
reputation and hurt their economies (Zartman and de Soto 2010, 15–18).
 Given the costs that conflicts generate, the absence of ripeness does not preclude 
action by third parties. As Zartman and de Soto emphasize, outside actors “can 
develop a policy of ripening, cultivating both objective and subjective elements of 
ripeness if these elements do not appear on their own” (Zartman and de Soto 2010, 
7). In order to ripen the stalemate and a provide a way out, third parties might 
employ various measures – diplomatic, economic and/or military – that may help 
to reframe the conflict and accentuate the attractiveness of mediation as an altern-
ative to fighting. These measures help parties perceive and understand how unbear-
able their stalemate is and, more importantly, that negotiations are the only way in 
which they can obtain certain benefits. Once the parties recognize negotiations as a 
way out, keeping them in the process is influenced by the mediators’ ability to 
foster the perception that negotiations generate ‘mutually enticing opportunities’ 
that would be unavailable outside of the process (Zartman 2001, 14).
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Costs of accepting mediation and devious objectives
Accepting mediation also generates costs (both domestic and international, tan-
gible and intangible in nature) for the conflicting parties. First of all, the parties 
may be apprehensive that their willingness to negotiate with ‘the enemy’ might 
be perceived as a sign of weakness and even be labelled as treason by their con-
stituencies. Secondly, the disputants can be enticed into making unexpected con-
cessions, by giving up a certain level of control over the process, which increases 
the overall level of uncertainty regarding a desired outcome. As a result they 
could end up accepting less than what was initially planned for a mutually 
acceptable outcome or face the degradation of having to establish political and 
economic ties with the mediator (Bercovitch and Gartner 2006).
 Thus, accepting mediation and even conducting the process should not be 
immediately conflated with the parties’ intentions to reach a peaceful solution. 
Even when mediation is under way, parties do not automatically abandon bellig-
erent activities. As noted by Sisk, violence often proves to be a useful off the 
table tactic, which the parties use to improve their bargaining position at 
the negotiating table by affecting the situation on the ground (Sisk 2009). The 
Colombian President Juan Manuel Santos, while strongly promoting the idea of 
a peace process with FARC also objected to sign a cease- fire agreement as a 
prelude to the peace talks in Havana. He explains this decision:
I made the decision not to accept a cease- fire before signing a peace con-
tract. If we agreed to a cease- fire there would be a reason for FARC to 
prolong negotiations eternally. And if by any chance those talks fail, I don’t 
want to be seen by history as another president who was naive and stupid 
and gave the guerrillas all the opportunity to gain strength and keep fighting. 
I know that a lot of people don’t understand how we can be talking in 
Havana while simultaneously fighting in Colombia. But in that respect, I 
follow the words of former Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin: I fight ter-
rorism as if there was no peace process, and I negotiate the peace process as 
if there was no terrorism.
(Spiegel 2014)
Evidently, the parties might use mediation for various ‘devious reasons’ that are 
unrelated to the achievement of a peace deal. According to Richmond, parties 
may use mediation as a stalling tactic that buys them time to regroup and reor-
ganize on the ground: by buying time they may postpone making costly conces-
sions; they may also see mediation as a platform through which their goals may 
gain international traction; mediation can serve as a mechanism through which 
they could gain more international allies; and the process could confer a higher 
degree of legitimacy for their claims and bargaining positions (Richmond 1998). 
For instance, the government of Rwanda’s acceptance of mediation in 1991 had 
nothing to do with accepting direct negotiations with RPF or reaching a com-
promise settlement, rather the government wanted to attract sympathy from the 
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international community and induce regional leaders to label RPF ’s incursions 
as an act of Ugandan aggression that impinged upon Rwandan sovereignty 
(Maundi et al. 2006, 52).
Advantages of accepting mediation
Mediation also yields a number of advantages for the parties. First of all, parties 
could use mediation as a convenient political cover for making unpopular deci-
sions, such as making necessary concessions to the other side that would be 
unimaginable in the absence of a third party. Mediators provide the necessary 
information to help the parties gain a more complete picture of the situation and 
better understand their opponents’ preferences, capabilities and resolve in the 
dispute. More importantly, mediators’ presence fosters the expectation that the 
utility of the agreement attainable through mediation exceeds the utility of an 
agreement that the parties could reach if they negotiated directly. Mediators can 
use their tangible and intangible resources in order to increase the costs of 
ongoing conflict, improve the attractiveness of a negotiated settlement and incen-
tivize the parties to be more amenable to compromise. At the same time, third 
parties could deliver guarantees of overseeing the implementation of the agree-
ment and provide assistance in the post- agreement phase. According to Beards-
ley, while these incentives might prove useful in terminating violence and 
reaching a peaceful agreement, if the third party does not maintain its commit-
ment in the long- run, these incentives might prove to be highly artificial and, as 
such, will foster re- escalation of violence (Beardsley 2011). For example, in the 
case of East Timor, the civil strife that inflamed the country in 2006 is directly 
linked to the fact that the UN Mission in Support of East Timor (UNMSET) was 
given a fixed mandate of three years and had to terminate its presence in 2005 
(Hood 2006).
Supply side of mediation: who and why mediates
Mediators are also subjected to certain costs. Mediators often provide logistical 
support for the peacemaking process: arranging a suitable location, accommoda-
tion for the parties, and other technical aspects pertinent to the talks. At the same 
time, along with material costs, mediators also invest their non- material capital 
in the peace process. As such, they may face strong reputational risks and criti-
cism in media (Princen 1992). Norwegian attempts to mediate the conflict in Sri 
Lanka were often criticized by pro- Sinhala groups that were concerned by the 
Norwegian empowerment and legitimization of the LTTE, which, in the eyes of 
the protesters, were largely a terrorist group. Despite the fact that their govern-
ment was also involved in the talks with the LTTE, the criticism was directed 
primarily at Norway (BBC 2004; IPS News 2006). On a similar note, mediators 
might face high domestic political costs for endorsing an unpopular settlement. 
As the case of Cambodia will illustrate, the US State Department was severely 
criticized by the American public and Congress once it was revealed that the 
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official US stance to support Prince Sihanouk and oppose the pro- Vietnamese 
Hun Sen faction, was indirectly empowering and legitimizing the controversial 
Khmer Rouge led by Pol Pot (Solomon 2000). Finally, the mediation process 
also requires considerable investments in personnel and logistics, which could 
prove to be burdensome as the peacemaking process becomes more protracted. 
Thus, an effective mediation process is strongly dependent upon the mediators’ 
motivations to get involved and a perception that the expected benefits exceed 
the potential costs of engaging in the process (Bercovitch and Schneider 2000).
 A mediator’s entry into the process is a result of a synchronized effort by the 
disputants and the third party. Mediators may be invited by the conflicting 
parties; they may offer their services themselves; or mediation may be based on 
a previously established arrangement between the disputants and specific exter-
nal actors. Whatever the mechanism through which the third parties become 
involved, they never do it aimlessly.
Humanitarian reasons and mediators’ self- interests
Publically, third parties often justify their involvement on humanitarian grounds. 
In situations in which escalation of a conflict could generate gross violations of 
human rights, mediators might face strong public pressure and develop a sense 
of moral imperative to intervene. Fear of genocide, forced displacement of popu-
lations and other severe human rights violations in Darfur propelled public 
opinion in the US and other Western countries to see external involvement in the 
conflict as a moral priority (Seymour 2014). It is not unusual that in such cir-
cumstances mediators become actors who are more interested in the fate of the 
civilian population than that of the conflicting parties themselves (Crocker et al. 
2004, 28). Although promoting peace and alleviating human suffering might not 
yield direct benefits and in some instances, actors mediating such conflicts do 
not have a strong strategic interest in the region, these actors may expect to 
benefit from improved international reputation and a strengthened role in inter-
national affairs. The Norwegian interest in mediating a variety of conflicts5 have 
boosted the country’s image of being an important international actor and a 
peacemaker whose influence exceeds that which its power position would predict 
(Greig and Diehl 2012, 82). As the following discussion will show, humanitarian 
concerns are at the core of the motivation of various actors to intervene. In the 
first place, these are international organizations and NGOs whose raison d’être 
is the promotion of the principles of international peace and security. In fact, just 
as conflicts can involve both state and non- state actors, the third parties that 
might have an interest in mediating these conflicts can be just as diverse and 
may include: representatives of states (neighboring ones, global powers, states of 
medium and small relative size), representatives of global and regional inter-
national organizations, representatives of global NGOs (which could include 
religious organizations, interest groups with an international agenda, various epi-
stemic communities, etc.), and finally even individuals (such as Jimmy Carter, 
Desmond Tutu, Maarti Ahtisaari, etc.) that have an established international 
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reputation in managing international conflicts and are able to act as mediators 
without a formal mandate from a particular state or international organization.
 Given the sheer variety of international actors, it would be implausible to 
expect that mediators only be driven by humanitarian concerns to intervene. 
Keeping in mind the considerable investment of resources that mediation calls 
for, it is reasonable to presume that mediators are no less motivated by self- 
interest than by humanitarian impulses (Touval and Zartman 1985, 8). Mediators 
play their role in negotiations and expend resources not only because they aim to 
resolve a dispute, but because they also seek to gain something from it (Greig 
2005). For many actors, international mediation is a useful foreign policy instru-
ment through which they can pursue some of their interests without creating too 
much opposition (Touval 1992). Essentially, a mediator’s involvement is driven 
by cost- benefit calculations. Young notes that “it is perfectly possible for situ-
ations to arise in which there is a distinct role for an intermediary but in which 
no third party finds it worth his while to assume this role” (Young 1972b, 55). 
Thus, the fact that a mediator has an interest in managing a dispute is a direct 
indication that it also has something at stake in that dispute.
States
For states, self- interest is reflected in attempts to produce settlements that will 
“increase the prospects of stability, deny their rivals opportunities for intervention, 
earn them the gratitude of one or both parties, or enable them to continue to have a 
role in future relations” (Zartman and Touval 1996, 446). First of all, the fear of 
spillover effects of an escalating conflict may prompt neighboring countries to get 
involved as mediators. States that are affected by an internal conflict may have dif-
ficulties controlling their borders in an effective way, which paves the way for 
various sources of regional instability such as the rapid influx of refugees, suspi-
cious cross- border activities and even incursions of rebel groups into the territory 
of neighboring countries. Secondly, from a foreign policy perspective, states may 
use mediation as a method of expanding their zone of influence or limiting the 
influence of rival states. Russian mediation in the zone of ‘near- abroad’ countries – 
such as in the context of conflicts between Georgia and breakaway regions of 
Abkhazia and South Ossetia, the Nagorno- Karabakh conflict between Armenia and 
Azerbaijan and the conflict between Moldova and secessionist region of Trans-
dniestria6 – is an indication of Moscow’s demarcation of its zone of influence. The 
US involvement in managing the Bosnian war following the inability of the Euro-
pean Community to broker a peaceful solution was a way for the US to affirm its 
relevance in Europe (Touval 2002). Frequent British and French involvement in 
their conflict- afflicted ex- colonies can be explained by their interest in maintaining 
political and economic influence in those countries. By acting as mediators, states 
may expect to earn gratitude from the conflicting parties and assume a more rel-
evant role in future regional dynamics. As the Norwegian and Algerian experiences 
show, this is especially significant for small and medium- sized states that have 
fewer foreign policy tools in their repertoire than global superpowers.
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International and regional organizations
Undoubtedly, the motives behind the involvement of international organizations 
(excluding military alliances) are much more complex. Rarely does an inter-
national organization have the leverage and resources its individual member 
states possess. Lacking these capabilities, it has to rely on its status as a global/
regional organization (i.e., the United Nations and the European Union), the 
legitimacy it derives from this status, its credibility as an international actor, the 
cohesiveness of its members, and mediators’ experience and persuasiveness 
(Fretter 2002, 98). In principle, the acceptability of international organizations as 
mediators is reflected in the possibility that conflicting sides can address their 
different opinions to all member states and potentially find support from within 
the organization. Many of the foundational charters and statutes of international 
organizations specify the promotion of peace and security (globally and/or 
regionally) as their primary focus. At the same time, these entities are also con-
strained by the particular interests of their member states. Despite the fact that 
the interests of member states might differ, the perceived legitimacy enjoyed by 
international organizations derives from two sources: the channeling and balan-
cing process by which the diverging interests of member states are consolidated 
and the norms and values that are recognized as commonly shared and promoted 
by these same member- states.
 The United Nations is unique in this regard. Though it lacks the coercive 
power and resources that its individual member states possess, ever since its 
establishment, the UN has gradually built a reputation of being an effective con-
flict manager (Holsti 1966; Butterworth 1978; Bercovitch 1996). Generally per-
ceived as a “bastion of international morality” (Fretter 2002, 100), the UN 
performs a dual role in international conflict management. On the one hand, it 
provides a multilateral channel for the international community to tackle the 
most intense international conflicts. On the other, it serves as a legitimizing 
agency for unilateral conflict management initiatives pursued by various state 
and non- state actors (Rubin 1992). More importantly, while individual state 
actors are generally not driven by altruistic motives to manage an ongoing 
dispute, due to its unique international role, the UN has faced greater pressure to 
achieve objectives that are not prioritized by other actors. Some of these object-
ives include the containment of escalating conflicts, reduction of human suffer-
ing, promotion of international law and the creation of an environment that 
would garner more constructive relationships between disputants in the near 
future (Bercovitch 1996). As such goals are largely associated with the most 
intractable international conflicts, which, in turn, are usually ignored by state 
actors, the UN is often assigned the role of mediator because no one else is 
willing (Crocker et al. 2004). Consequently, the effectiveness of the UN is con-
strained not only by its institutional characteristics (such as the voluntary nature 
of its membership, level of cohesion among its member states and reliance on 
members’ commitments to support UN’s initiatives) and the systemic features of 
the international arena that are dominated by the principles of state sovereignty 
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and of non- interference, but also by the contextual features of the most hostile 
and intractable conflicts (Fretter 2002). As a result, due to these constraints, the 
UN has often had to cope with mounting criticism of its inability to pursue 
desired objectives (Touval 1994).
 In light of this mounting criticism, the UN has frequently delegated peace-
making responsibilities to regional organizations, which, at the moment, are the 
most prevalent type of international organization (Pevehouse 2002). The UN 
Charter provides a list of peaceful means at the disposal of the parties whose 
ongoing conflict may threaten international peace and security. One of them sug-
gests that the parties should “resort to regional arrangements or agencies” (UN 
Charter 1945, Article 33/1), and they can do it “either on the initiative of the 
states concerned or by reference from the Security Council” (UN Charter 1945, 
Article 52/2). The rationale behind the devolution of peacemaking duties is 
based on a number of comparative advantages that characterize regional organi-
zations. First of all, promoting peace, security and stability is the raison d’être of 
many regional organizations. They often have specific procedures or specialized 
bodies mandated to assist their member states in peacefully settling disputes that 
arise. In some cases, regional organizations employ a variety of policies aimed at 
preventing the escalation of conflict. For instance, the Organization for Security 
and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) has established missions in conflict- affected 
members states and has provided them with capacity building assistance (includ-
ing institutional reform, education of public officials, monitoring elections, etc.) 
aimed at reducing the potential of conflict escalation. Secondly, these organiza-
tions commonly share the socio- political, economic and cultural character of the 
conflicting parties. As they are more sensitive to the realities on the ground, con-
flicting parties might be more amenable to allowing a regional organization to 
mediate their dispute than any other international actor (Bercovitch and Houston 
1996; Gartner 2013). Similarly, their involvement may seem less intrusive com-
pared to that of a powerful state whose motives, which many include influence 
reassertion or expansion, may seem too threatening to the conflicting parties. In 
light of their regional expertise, cultural sensitivity and institutional mechanisms, 
regional organizations have become increasingly involved in mediating inter-
national conflicts. A study conducted by Gartner shows that over the past three 
decades, their involvement in conflict management activities has nearly doubled 
(Gartner 2013, 32).
 While regional organizations may be able to signal the strong resolve of their 
member states in averting negative consequences of an escalating conflict, they 
also face a number of limitations. Regional organizations may lack credibility if 
they are perceived to be dominated by a strong regional actor. For instance, 
ECOWAS mediation efforts in Liberia were strongly hampered by Nigerian 
interests in the conflict. The Nigerian agenda was strongly resisted by Charles 
Taylor and his NPFL, who saw the process as a method of strengthening the 
position of Samuel Doe’s government (Maundi et al. 2006, 111). In other words, 
rebel groups might reject mediation from an organization in which the incum-
bent government has an established role and the ability to influence its interests. 
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Equally, the incumbent government may resist the involvement of a regional 
organization in which neighboring states, which may be suspected of supporting 
the rebel groups, have a stronger role. During the civil war in Burundi, Buyoya’s 
government was very suspicious of Tanzania and its president Nyerere’s inten-
tions as the lead mediator representing OAU. While the tensions between the 
two governments increased after a sanctions regime was imposed on Burundi, 
the mediation process was blocked only once the rebel CNDD/FDD forces 
moved their headquarters from Zaire to Tanzania (Maundi et al. 2006, 78).
Low- key mediators
The last group of potential third parties can be found in actors that are often 
labeled as ‘low- key mediators,’ such as private individuals and NGOs. These 
actors have no coercive power at the international level and rely in large part on 
being accepted as mediators due to their reputation as successful third parties 
whose primary interest is ending the conflict itself. Individuals that are not gov-
ernment officials or political actors might contribute to efforts to de- escalate the 
conflict, through their distinct capabilities, which may including drawing upon a 
developed network of contacts, and/or previous experience in mediation. The 
conflict in Aceh, between the Indonesian government and the Free Aceh Move-
ment, was mediated by Martti Ahtisaari who represented neither a state nor an 
international organization, but a Finish- based NGO Crisis Management Initi-
ative. He was accepted primarily due to his reputation as an experienced medi-
ator who had mediated conflicts in Namibia and Yugoslavia and because of his 
well- established network in the EU that would be instrumental in the implemen-
tation phase (Conciliation Resources 2008). Despite their limited resources, if 
accepted, these individuals and the NGOs they represent might help reduce the 
necessary momentum of unofficial talks between conflicting sides and pave the 
way for a more formal process. The Carter initiative in Sudan helped jumpstart 
subsequent mediation efforts by the US government. Carter’s involvement was 
based on the expectation that his prestige and influence would reassure the 
parties of the seriousness of the endeavor, the benefits of participation and the 
likelihood of some measure of mediation success (Mitchell 1993, 155). Sim-
ilarly, the Carter Center’s initiatives in Burundi (1995) and Congo (1999) laid 
the fundamental groundwork for subsequent mediation efforts by neighboring 
states, regional and international organizations (Maundi et al. 2006).
 NGOs represent a type of actor whose interests are “not as apparent or suspect 
as the primary players of power politics” (Zartman and Touval 1996, 450). They 
are usually associated with activities that are instrumental to any peacemaking 
process, that might range from various forms of humanitarian assistance (such as 
aiding the areas affected by the influx of refugees or those that were stricken by 
a natural disaster), monitoring and surveying the the extent to which human 
rights are upheld and contributing to long- term economic development projects 
(Dunn and Kriesberg 2002, 195). More importantly, they are often perceived as 
actors whose primary focus is “the pursuit of peace, including the promotion of 
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the philosophy and techniques of negotiation, conflict resolution, and nonvio-
lence” (Anderson 1996a, 344). The recent proliferation of international non- 
governmental organizations in various areas around the world has meant that 
they often find themselves embroiled in an emerging conflict while they are pur-
suing their specific mandates (Anderson 1996b).
 The ubiquity of development, humanitarian and religious NGOs in countries 
and regions affected by conflict has produced a very valuable entry point to con-
flicts. Apart from trying to alleviate the problems associated with violent conflicts, 
NGOs might also possess the necessary capacity, knowledge and expertise to 
initiate a dialogue between conflicting sides. Due to their long- term objectives in 
conflict prone areas, they may be very well placed to identify moments at which 
the conflict is ripe for mediation. Firstly, they can provide valuable contributions 
by conducting fact- finding missions, through which key stakeholders are identified 
and their interests and needs are defined. This information can be used to bring the 
situation into the international spotlight and mobilize different actors to take pre-
ventive steps in managing the emerging dispute before it erupts into violence. 
Simultaneously, NGOs can use their presence on the ground and exploit their 
developed relationships to induce creative thinking on the part of the conflicting 
sides, so that they might perceive peaceful negotiations as an attractive alternative 
to more belligerent activities. As they cannot muster the coercive inducements, 
neither carrots nor sticks, that are generally available to state actors, NGOs usually 
rely on emphasizing the significance of previously developed close ties with local 
actors and the provision of confidential and neutral spaces for discussion (Princen 
1992). As such, the conflicting sides that might be reluctant to accept the presence 
of more powerful state actors in the early stages of conflict (before it has escalated 
into violence) might find it more useful and less demanding to deal with non- 
governmental agencies (Dunn and Kriesberg 2002). Therefore, on the one hand, 
NGOs can be seen as actors able to generate the necessary momentum for the 
parties to accept mediation activities by more resourceful international actors if 
required in the future. On the other hand, their activities could complement track 
one diplomatic efforts and provide venues for lower- level stakeholders that have 
the ability to influence their decision makers involved in negotiating a compre-
hensive settlements. The United States Institute of Peace initiative in Tajikistan to 
forward Inter- Tajiki dialogue between lower- ranking officials from both the gov-
ernment and the opposition strongly influenced the official peacemaking process. 
One participant stated, “[a]fter six meetings of the Dialogue, it was no longer pos-
sible to argue credibly that negotiation between government and opposition was 
impossible” (Slim and Saunders 2001, 46). As mediation processes should not be 
regarded as completed once an agreement has been reached, the ultimate evidence 
of NGOs’ utility can be seen in their provision of highly valuable implementation 
assistance in the form of monitoring early elections, provision of capacity building 
assistance and developing programs aimed at long- term social reconciliation.
 Kriesberg notes that “the recognition of the special capabilities and limita-
tions of various kinds of providers combined with a careful assessment of the 
most appropriate response or combination of responses, can facilitate effective 
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cooperation in forming a comprehensive approach to bringing about constructive 
conflict outcomes” (Kriesberg 2002, quoted in Dunn and Kriesberg 2002, 211). 
Although the various roles, interests and actors might be less blurry in theory 
than in practice, it is important to note that each peacemaking activity is largely 
conditioned by an adequate mix of well- coordinated activities conducted by 
international actors that share a common goal in managing a given conflict. And 
in order to achieve the requisite level of cooperation and coordination among 
various actors, this analysis needs to depart by rightfully addressing each actor’s 
capabilities, interests and limitations in any conflict management activity.
The “how” in mediation: mediators’ strategies and leverage
The sole interest of the third party is not sufficient for the mediation procedure 
to be efficient. A mediator’s ability to influence the mediation process and 
deliver acceptable solutions is determined by the strategies and leverage that are 
available. In order to see a particular outcome materialize, mediators resort to 
different strategies. In the mediation literature, strategy is defined as “a broad 
plan of action designed to indicate which measures may be taken to achieve 
desired objectives in conflicts” while behavior refers to actual “tactics, tech-
niques, or instruments” at a mediator’s disposal (Bercovitch 2005, 113). The 
most accepted typology classifies the mediator’s behavior and corresponding 
strategies on an intervention scale and assesses the level of the mediator’s assert-
iveness in the peace process.
Facilitation/communication
At the low end of this scale are strategies labeled as communication (Touval and 
Zartman 1985; Zartman and Touval 1996) or facilitation (Bercovitch et al. 1991; 
Bercovitch and Houston 1996; Hopmann 1996; Wilkenfeld et al. 2005). Using this 
strategy, the mediator assumes a very passive role in the peacemaking process. As 
the name indicates, when acting as a communicator or facilitator, the mediator 
focuses primarily on assisting the parties in communicating more smoothly and 
facilitates their mutual collaboration while exercising modest control over the 
actual process of mediation. Given the high level of distrust that conflicts usually 
generate, disputing parties’ decisions are affected by incomplete information about 
their opponents’ preferences and capabilities, which prevents them from identify-
ing mutually acceptable alternatives to their belligerent relations (Fearon 1995; 
Powell 2002; Hopmann 2001; Beardsley et al. 2006). The mediator as facilitator or 
communicator provides the disputing sides with information that is essential to nar-
rowing down the differences between the parties and estimating the range of mutu-
ally acceptable outcomes. In other words, by employing facilitative and 
communicative strategies, mediators help the disputing parties recognize that they 
actually have compatible interests. Tactics that are implemented are inconspicuous. 
Mediators assist the parties in establishing contact, either directly or indirectly 
through shuttle diplomacy. They elucidate the overall situation for both sides, 
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identify pertinent issues and promote confidence- building measures, all of which 
help the parties recognize joint gains and the availability of mutually acceptable 
solutions through negotiations.
Formulation
Even when the parties recognize that they share a range of possible solutions, they 
still need to agree on a specific outcome within it. Given the high level of distrust 
that conflicts generate, conflicting parties might perceive potential solutions – even 
though they are actually within this range of mutually acceptable ones – as mutually 
exclusive, creating the necessary conditions for an impasse (Beardsley 2006, 63). 
Faced with zero- sum perceptions and hard- liner bargaining attitudes on the part of 
conflicting parties, mediators need to assume a more active role in the process. A 
strategy by which mediators help the parties redefine the issues and propose specific 
solutions is generally deemed formulation (Touval and Zartman 1985; Hopmann 
1996). For Zartman and Touval “formulas are the key to a negotiated solution to a 
conflict; they provide a common understanding of the problem and its solution or a 
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Figure 1.1 Facilitation/communication.
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shared notion of justice to govern an outcome” (Zartman and Touval 1996, 454). 
Since persuasion requires a certain level of involvement, the mediator not only acts 
as a communicator, but also needs to get involved much more directly in the 
process, by: offering innovative solutions that could downplay those commitments 
that constrain the parties, emphasizing that unilateral (i.e., belligerent) action is in 
no one’s interest and that the current stalemate requires immediate solutions.
 Facilitation and formulation are forms of integrative bargaining strategies that 
help the actors correctly identify solutions within the overlapping range of pos-
sible nonviolent outcomes (Beardsley et al. 2006, 63; see Carnevale 1986). In 
using these two strategies, parties gradually abandon zero- sum perceptions and 
engage in problem- solving approaches through which they recognize joint gains. 
In certain conflict, facilitating communication and formulating possible solutions 
is not enough for the parties to alter their positions and reach a compromise. As 
numerous studies have shown, less intrusive strategies are most successful in 
low- intensity conflicts in which parties are willing to settle, but are unable to 
communicate this willingness to each other (Bercovitch and Gartner 2006; 
Beardsley et al. 2006). However, in cases in which disputants lack the motiva-
tion to settle and show an unwillingness to compromise, a more powerful inter-
vention from a third party is needed (Rubin 1980; Hiltrop 1989; Carnevale and 
Pruitt 1992; Carnevale 2002; Sisk 2009; Bercovitch 2009).
Manipulative mediation ‘with muscle’
The most active strategy a mediator might use is referred to as ‘mediation with 
muscle’ or ‘power mediation’ (Fisher and Keashly 1991; Svensson 2007; Beards-
ley 2009). When mediating with muscle, the mediator becomes ‘a full participant’ 
who is able to affect the substance of the bargaining process by presenting incen-
tives or delivering ultimatums to the disputing sides (Bercovitch et al. 1991; Ber-
covitch and Houston 2009; Touval and Zartman 1985). According to Touval, in 
order to elicit concessions from conflicting parties, mediators are not only expected 
to offer suggestions and formulas pertinent to the substance of the dispute, but also 
to exercise influence by creating pressure and providing incentives to compromise 
(Touval 1982). The mediators may manipulate parties’ perceptions by resorting to 
threats to use coercive action (such as sanctions or military deployment) against 
them in order to increase the costs of non- compliance and continuation of conflict. 
At the same time, the mediators may also manipulate the perceptions of the parties 
by providing incentives in order to increase the attractiveness of a negotiated solu-
tion. These incentives may be of a material nature and include provisions of finan-
cial and humanitarian aid, development assistance, security guarantees and 
implementation monitoring; or less tangible incentives such as improvement of 
international reputation, legitimizing their cause, and/or enhancement of relations 
with particular external actors (Zartman 2009; Sisk 2009). Threats and promises, or 
carrots and sticks, are intended to alter the parties’ cost- benefit calculations and 
induce them to recognize viable alternatives within the rapidly developing range of 
mutually acceptable solutions (Beardsley et al. 2006,64).
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 There is an obvious difference between facilitation and formulation on the 
one side and manipulation on the other. The first two strategies employ a variety 
of methods (such as facilitating communication, distribution of useful informa-
tion and formulation of a viable solution) such that the disputants can identify an 
existing mutually acceptable solution within their range of available alternatives. 
The manipulative strategies, however, are used with the aim of enlarging the 
spectrum of possible solutions that both sides see as preferable to a continuing 
conflict. Despite their obvious differences, the three mediation strategies are not 
mutually exclusive. As Beardsley et al. note, “mediators always use facilitation 
in some fashion and rarely use manipulation without also engaging in formula-
tion,” however “many mediators will be limited to formulation and/or facilita-
tion due to a lack of resources, their own strategic decisions, or the context of 
the crisis” (Beardsley et al. 2006, 65). The US involvement in mediating con-
flicts in Northern Ireland and Bosnia show how a choice of strategy is not 
directly dependent on available resources only, but also on the context in which 
mediation takes place and the strategic interests that motivate the mediator to get 
involved. Despite the fact that Mitchell and Holbrooke represented the same 
entity, their approaches were considerably different: in a protracted, yet not 
highly violent conflict, involving US allies, Mitchell assumed a process- oriented 
approach, focused on facilitating communication and exploring joint gains; Hol-
brooke, on the other hand, resorted to threats and promises in order to promote 
his credibility and power in a highly violent and destructive conflict that was 
taking place in an area in which the US wanted to reaffirm its strategic relevance 
and limit its opponent’s influence (Curran et al. 2004).
Types of leverage
As international mediators are not just passive actors in charge of facilitating the 
communication between parties in conflict, but rather an active third party in the 
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Figure 1.3 Manipulation (mediation with ‘muscle’).
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process of managing the conflict, their specific characteristics and capabilities 
will have a direct impact on the mediation outcome. The relative extent of a 
mediator’s influence is generally associated with the resources available to them, 
which, in turn, are translated into leverage or power. Leverage in mediation is 
“the ability to move a party in an intended direction,” and derives from the very 
fact that disputing sides need the mediator’s assistance in finding solutions to 
their problems (Touval and Zartman 2006, 436). For Zartman and Touval 
“leverage is the ticket to mediation – third parties are only accepted as mediators 
if they are likely to produce an agreement or help the parties out of a predica-
ment, and for this they usually need leverage” (Zartman and Touval 1985, 40). 
Since leverage enhances the mediator’s ability to influence an outcome, medi-
ation could thus be seen as a “process involving the exercise of power” (Berco-
vitch et al. 1991, 15; Smith 1994, 446).
 Despite widespread acknowledgement of their being effective forms of 
leverage, carrots and sticks are not the only types of power related to the 
resources and relationships that a mediator might bring to the conflict. Carnevale 
(2002) identified two main forms of power, based on an actor’s ‘will and skill.’ 
On the one hand, there is the resource- based aspect of social power (strategic 
strength) and, on the other hand, there is the behavioral aspect of mediation (tac-
tical strength). According to this categorization, “strategic strength in mediation 
refers to what the mediator has, to what the mediator brings to the negotiation 
table; the tactical strength refers to what the mediator does at the negotiation 
table” (Carnevale 2002, 27–28). Tactical strength is exemplified in a mediator’s 
premeditated choice of specific techniques and the ability to follow a particular 
procedure. The mediator may develop a procedural framework that reduces 
uncertainties and enhances the trust between the parties. Throughout the process, 
they can use various techniques to build up momentum and keep the parties 
committed to compromise. For instance, Eliasson used to “wear- down” the 
parties by keeping them at the table for many hours (Svensson and Wallensteen 
2010, 67). They may control the communication in order to manage emotions 
between the parties and help them reduce their differences. Finally, tactical 
strength is also mirrored in a mediator’s ability to reduce the negative impres-
sions the parties have of each other and provide face saving measures if needed. 
Evidently, tactical strength is best reflected in facilitation and formulation 
strategies.
 Strategic strength may incorporate different types of social power. Using 
French and Raven’s (1959) classification of social power, Carnevale identified 
six types of power that mediators bring to the process: reward power, coercive 
power, legitimate power, expert power, referent power, information power, and 
relational power. As mentioned earlier, threats and incentives, which in Carne-
vale’s typology are referred to as reward and coercive power (2002, 29–30), are 
most commonly associated with powerful mediators and the manipulative strat-
egies they use. According to Inbar, “great power is simply in possession of more 
‘carrots and sticks’ needed to convince the parties to a dispute to resolve their 
differences than lesser prominent international mediators” (1991, 82). It should 
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be noted that coercion has often been linked with immediate short- term success 
and less stable outcomes in the long run. Along with the possibly insincere 
motives that drive parties to accept mediation and the obfuscated future of the 
bargaining environment, the artificiality of external coercive/reward leverage has 
been considered a significant liability to the longevity of the solutions achieved 
through mediation. While carrots and sticks may serve the purpose of increasing 
the costs of continuing conflict and promoting the attractiveness of a negotiated 
agreement, their long- term utility is conditioned by the mediator’s ‘credible 
commitment’ to maintain their presence during the implementation period. In 
other words, the newly created zone of possible agreements exists as long as the 
mediators maintain the incentives available to the parties. Thus, as argued by 
Beardsley, “leverage itself is thus not bad for a self- enforcing peace as long as 
the impact of that leverage does not wane and leave the actors with time incon-
sistency problems” (2011, 151).
 Given the evident limitations of coercive/reward leverage, mediators may 
resort to other forms of social power in an effort to co- opt the parties into 
cooperation. Not all international actors are able to muster hard power that can 
be used in mediation due to their varied resources and operational capabilities. 
Reiterating the voluntary nature of mediation, where actors may reject any solu-
tion and abandon the process at any moment, mediators may resort to ‘softer 
types’ of power in order to alter conflictual relations between the parties and 
guide them toward a negotiated solution. According to Nye, soft power is 
“getting other to want the outcomes you want,” and is based primarily on three 
resources: culture (in places where it is attractive to others), political values 
(when it lives up to them at home and abroad), and foreign policies (when they 
are seen as legitimate and having moral authority) (Nye 2008, 96; see also Nye 
2004, 2011).
 Within the realm of soft power, four non- material forms of French and 
Raven’s social power can be observed. These can be categorized as individual, 
semi- institutional and institutional forms of soft power. The power of expertise, 
which is based on a mediator’s special knowledge or a reputation for having that 
knowledge, together with the previously mentioned information power, “which 
makes compliance with mediator’s requests seem rational” (Carnevale 2002, 
29), are strongly related to the individual characteristics of the person that has 
been representing a particular international actor/body in the mediation process. 
On the other hand, referent power through which mediators lead by example, 
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represents a semi- institutionalized form of soft power as it is based on a third 
party’s status and prestige, but also on its charisma all of which can be used as 
tools of attraction (French and Raven 1959, 266). Lastly, legitimate power is an 
influence “driven by belief that the mediator has the right to prescribe behavior, 
and derives from a norm that has been accepted by the disputants” (Carnevale 
2002, 28). This influence is best observed when comparing different types of 
mediators: a mediation process performed by an international organization is 
generally deemed more legitimate and carries with it a higher authority than a 
process carried out by an individual state (Rubin 1992; Touval 1992; Fretter 
2002). This is directly related to nature of a mediator’s interest in managing the 
dispute. As previously mentioned, international organizations represent com-
posite entities, so their interests reflect a specific combination of the various 
interests of their members. This filtering process allows them to promote the 
image of an actor with a higher degree of legitimacy in prescribing behavior. 
While incentives associated with coercive/reward sources of power can be 
deemed artificial because the parties do not internalize them, soft power allows 
the mediator to ‘win the hearts and minds’ of the disputants so that they feel that 
they were not forced to accept a negotiated solution; rather they are the owners 
of the solution that was reached.
Contextual factors
Geopolitical conditions
To evaluate mediation activities, it is crucial to consider the overall context and 
conditions that surround the conflict. The first set of relevant contextual factors 
relates to the geopolitical conditions that govern international affairs. These fea-
tures are most resistant to any form of change and, as such, they create the oper-
ational framework within which conflict management activities are conducted. 
The distribution and balance of power between international actors together with 
modes of strategic alignment have a strong impact on the effectiveness of the 
mediation process. For instance, the support offered by allies or outside patrons 
may distort the perception of a hurting stalemate. By making the conflict more 
tolerable, outside support limits the attractiveness of a mediated solution, induces 
the parties to assume increasingly unyielding positions, thus contributing to the 
‘freezing’ of the conflict (Bercovitch 2005, 108). The conflict in Cyprus is an 
example of a situation in which the uncompromising support of external patrons 
induced the parties to view their stalemate as bearable.
Intractable nature of mediated conflicts
The second set of contextual factors is related to the nature of the conflict at 
hand. Mediation takes place in the most resistant cases, where parties are unable 
or unwilling to reach a solution on their own. These disputes tend to be long, 
complex and intense (Bercovitch and Jackson 2001; Beardsley 2010). Their 
32  Theory of international mediation
protracted and destructive nature, evidenced by recurrent acts of violence and 
the use of military means, contributes to the psychological manifestation of 
animosity, profound sentiments of fear and distrust, exaggerated stereotypes and 
misgiving among the parties involved. Parties’ identities become polarized, often 
linked to an existentialist struggle where the existence of ‘the other’ is a direct 
threat to one’s survival. The issues at stake in the conflict become embedded in 
each party’s identity. They create symbols and belief systems that reflect a dis-
tinct perception of the conflict and past events. Historical narratives are reaf-
firmed as the “new scars become old wounds” and proof of primordial hostility 
(Zartman 2005, 49). Positions and promoted solutions are conditioned by the 
parties’ zero- sum perceptions and competitive attitudes. Even if at one point 
there was a single salient solution, it lost its relevance due to the failure to imple-
ment it. With the passing of the time, conflict becomes engrained in peoples’ 
daily routines and such behavior even becomes institutionalized (Kriesberg 
2005). In such intractable conditions, the persistence of the status quo provides a 
unique opportunity for some parties to maintain their socio- political and eco-
nomic power. The increased saliency of issues, coupled with a conflict’s poten-
tially profitable nature, encourage leaders to accept higher costs. Sunk costs 
become sources of entrapment, which cannot easily be disregarded (Meerts 
2004). As a consequence, parties tend to be less inclined to compromise, making 
the mediator’s job even more challenging.
 Evidently, ripening the conflict is not an easy task. As Bercovitch pointed out, 
“to have any chances of success, and mediation effort requires resources, experi-
ence, strong political support, and a considerable measure of luck” (2005, 109). 
Thus, instead of randomly selecting cases to be mediated, conflicting parties and 
external actors link their decision to conduct mediation to the likelihood of 
success (Greig 2005, 249). Past mediation experience may pose a serious chal-
lenge to future mediation efforts. One the one hand, failed peacemaking fuels 
intractability: negotiations lose their appeal as a way out, parties engage in a 
dynamic of blaming each other for failure and mistrust becomes a norm (Kries-
berg 2005). On the other hand, mediation efforts are not isolated events: prior 
mediation experience or mediation history encourages future efforts, disputants 
establish a rapport with the mediator and develop a willingness to work with an 
outsider (Melin 2013, 88). In other words, while failed efforts might discourage 
parties from relying on mediation as an attractive alternative to confrontational 
strategies, past experience with mediation in other disputes increases the appeal 
of mediation as tool of conflict management.
 Chances of mediation success increase if the parties to the conflict are open 
democracies. Domestically these actors have institutionalized third- party 
involvement in conflict management and are more accustomed to negotiation 
and compromise. These factors make them more likely to accept the political 
costs of mediation (Dixon 1993). As the global community democratizes, even 
non- democracies have become more inclined to accept the democratic practices 
that mediation promotes. (McLaughlin Mitchell 2002; Crescenzi et al. 2011). 
Since shared democratic norms and practices between disputants and mediators 
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increase the effectiveness of mediation, the level of internationalization of the 
conflict also conditions the acceptability of mediation efforts. Mediation is thus 
more likely in interstate than intrastate conflicts because governments involved 
in civil wars might resist legitimizing the rebel cause by accepting mediation 
(Melin and Svensson 2009). Armed rebel groups are often labeled as terrorists 
by incumbent government officials and negotiating with terrorists is a high polit-
ical liability. As the case of Sri Lanka will show, the government in Colombo 
was unwilling to engage with the LTTE for decades because they were con-
sidered a terrorist organization and not a legitimate political force (Groeneveld- 
Savisaar and Vuković 2011). And the situation becomes even more complex and 
difficult to manage as actors on the ground start fragmenting, each faction com-
peting for a more legitimate role (Bakke et al. 2012). In principle, the incumbent 
government’s resistance to accept mediation decreases as the relative power of a 
rebel group increases. And its relative power is not only determined by the 
number of troops it controls; more nuanced indicators of its power include polit-
ical development, territorial control, access to natural resources and links with 
foreign allies (Clayton 2013).
 Resistance to accept mediation makes a conflict more protracted and fuels its 
intractability. And the longer an intractable conflict continues, the more resistant 
it becomes to mediation. According to Bercovitch and his colleagues, this 
vicious cycle is better managed in the early stages of the conflict before identi-
ties become polarized and new grievances emerge (Bercovitch et al. 1991, Ber-
covitch 2005). However, even when conflicts become very violent and mediators 
show willingness to mediate, disputants may still reject mediation because it 
might signal their readiness to bear increasing costs and their resolve to endure 
in their intentions (Melin et al. 2013). In other words, accepting mediation might 
be equated with showing weakness and might be difficult to sell to constituen-
cies. Thus, if not tackled in their early stages, intractable conflicts become very 
difficult to manage over time, becoming less and less tractable with every sub-
sequent mediation attempt. Empirical studies have shown that while initial 
efforts have a high probability of success (32%), after three or four attempts, 
mediation effectiveness starts to wane (23%) (Bercovitch et al. 1991, 13). In 
situations like this, it is more reasonable to aim for conflict management rather 
than resolution. As the latter implies not only the elimination of confrontational 
behavior, but also the addressing of the root causes and trigger mechanisms that 
generated the conflict in the first place, intractable conflicts in which issues and 
identities become strongly intertwined make the task of resolution very demand-
ing. Thus, the primary goal in addressing such a conflict is to manage it by con-
taining further escalation (Bercovitch 2005, 104). And this should not be 
understood as a half- baked approach. As Kriesberg notes, “a well- managed con-
flict may be a prelude to a fundamental transformation of the conflict” (Kries-
berg 2005, 75). Over time, many conflicts tend to dwindle in intensity for a 
variety of reasons. Parties might realize that their preferred goals have become 
unattainable or that the methods of achieving them have proved to be overly 
burdensome and costly. So, following the logic of ripeness theory, as the parties 
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start perceiving a painful impasse where unilateral actions are not yielding 
expected benefits, they may redefine their expectations and accept alternatives to 
fighting. Throughout this entire transformative process, mediation may prove to 
be of crucial importance and conducive to the achievement of different degrees 
of success.
Understanding degrees of success in international mediation
Most scholars agree that defining success is generally very difficult because the 
evidence of success or failure is almost always vague (Kriesberg 1991, Kleiboer 
1996, Bercovitch 2002). Despite an impressive body of literature on the topic of 
international mediation, the academic community has thus far been unable to 
reach a consensus on a comprehensive definition that would unequivocally delin-
eate how to recognize success in international mediation. Even when scholars 
use somewhat similar definitions, their analyses seem to discuss essentially quite 
different aspects of success. Academic conceptualizations of success have often 
suffered from definitions that appear to be quite arbitrary, developed on case- by-
case basis and are not based upon a solid theoretical foundation. Bercovitch elo-
quently described this problem as such:
Success in conflict management is an elusive quest. Often what appears as 
successful to one person may be seen as unsuccessful by others. Mediation 
may seem successful at one time only to be seen as totally unsuccessful 
months or years later.
(Bercovitch 2007, 301)
This conceptual confusion regarding success in international mediation should 
not come as a surprise. International mediation processes are not uniform and, as 
such, it is quite difficult to establish a one- size-fits- all set of criteria with which 
to assess achievement of the various objectives of mediation. Parties’ objectives 
and goals tend to change throughout the process, so measuring mediation success 
in terms of parties’ goals makes it impossible to formulate a consistent concep-
tualization of mediation success. On the other hand (and more importantly), so 
far empirical studies have overwhelmingly treated mediation outcomes – both 
success and failure – as dependent variables. The focus has rarely been on how 
to measure success, but rather on which factors influence the outcome of medi-
ation. The bulk of existing studies – particularly those that have explored corre-
lations between a variety of factors and mediation outcomes – have treated 
success as a dichotomous phenomenon, usually linked to the existence of a 
signed agreement. In other words, mediation was successful only if parties 
reached a formal agreement. The fact that the parties accepted mediation in the 
first place and issues related to the implementation of agreements are not incorp-
orated into an understanding of mediation success.
 Reaching an agreement is nothing short of a true accomplishment for any 
mediator. The formalized nature of agreements or settlements allows scholars 
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and practitioners alike to easily identify them and use them as an indicator of a 
successful bargaining outcome having been reached (Beardsley 2011, 75). 
However, using agreements as the sole indicator of success might not be suffi-
cient to explain the complex nature of the mediation process. Since mediation is 
a voluntary process and is conducted in the most resistant cases, its very occur-
rence can also be treated as a sign of success (Melin et al. 2013, 364). In other 
words, bringing the parties to the table is already an achievement, as it signals 
their readiness to explore alternatives to fighting. Although parties may use 
mediation for devious reasons, in order to truly alter confrontational relations, 
mediators need to highlight the utility of a negotiated agreement and find a way 
to incentivize the parties to commit to the process. Therefore, mediation success 
is best understood as a significant (or even essential) contribution to de- 
escalation of conflict, movement towards an acceptable agreement or reconcili-
ation, under the prevailing conditions (Kriesberg 1991, 20). Under this definition, 
mediation success can be observed as a dynamic phenomenon that corresponds 
to different stages of the mediation process (Greig and Diehl 2012, 104–145; see 
also Vuković 2014).
 The first stage focuses on getting the disputing parties to accept mediation. In 
preparing for mediation, third parties explore which parties are willing to discuss 
de- escalation and which parties must be excluded from the process in order to 
make the process more efficient. Pre- negotiation, as some scholars refer to it 
(Zartman 1989b; Stein 1989; Saunders 1996) is usually characterized by a 
‘turning point’ in the interaction between conflicting parties. At this point, 
parties are induced to reconsider viable peaceful alternatives to settle their 
dispute – thus making the mediation process more relevant and likely to take 
place (Stein 1989). In this phase, the mediators are faced with the challenging 
task of acquiring as much relevant information as possible and using this 
information to tailor an appropriate strategy in the following steps. This informa-
tion can be acquired through a variety of methods, ranging from fact- finding 
missions, diplomatic channels, intelligence reports and secondary sources. In 
gathering relevant information, mediators need to acquire more than the 
publically- stated positions that are usually formulated as a comprehensive set of 
maximalist solutions. More relevant to the mediation process is the information 
that unveils the parties’ fundamental interests and needs that they aim to achieve 
through conflict. Since this information is an indicator of why parties accept 
mediation, mediators may use it to increase the attractiveness of a negotiated 
solution and highlight the ineffectiveness of confrontational methods. Therefore, 
the first degree of success in international mediation is reflected in the media-
tor’s ability to transform conflictual relations and de- escalate the conflict by 
getting the parties to the table.
 The second stage of mediation is related to the achievement of a formal agree-
ment, regardless of its scope: whether it is a simple cease- fire or a compre-
hensive agreement, it just needs to be a product of a mediation process. Once the 
mediators have acquired the necessary information and the parties have accepted 
the peacemaking process as a ‘way out’ of their predicament, they may proceed 
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with the process in a more direct way. The parties start discussing the pertinent 
issues, which will potentially lead them toward de- escalation. This discussion is 
strongly conditioned by the information mediators acquired in the preparation 
stages. First of all, a lack of exploration in the preparation stage already becomes 
evident in the early phases of discussion and bargaining through inadequate pro-
posals, procedural features and strategies that mediators employ. Second, the 
mediator’s understanding of the issues at stake is reflected in a premeditated 
choice of how to conduct the talks. Depending on the nature of conflict and the 
characteristics of the parties, ‘strategic sequencing’ may start by addressing the 
most simple and least salient issues, gradually building up the momentum and 
trust required to tackle the most complex issues; or the parties may first be con-
fronted with the most difficult aspect and subsequently discuss the less complex 
issues (Lax and Sebenius 1991). Furthermore, the process may also follow the 
logic of ‘nothing is agreed until everything is agreed,’ where the parties engage 
in a bargaining process aimed at creating attractive tradeoffs and package deals 
by combining various issues that are in the negotiation agenda. Third, the medi-
ators need to have a very clear idea of who their negotiating partners are: they 
need to identify the most constructive ones and exclude those destructive ele-
ments that are less willing to engage in the de- escalation process. Finally, an 
active mediator needs to be able to control the situation and offer incentives to 
conflicting sides that might induce them to distance themselves from their initial 
positions and perceived alternatives and induce them to accept a negotiated 
agreement.
 Mediated conflicts are more likely to result in formal agreements than those 
that are not mediated (Beardsley 2011, 75; see also Bercovitch and Gartner 
2009). Depending on their primary scope and capacity to address the conflict’s 
underlying issues, agreements may take different forms. The least compre-
hensive form is a cease- fire agreement. As their primary aim is to stop the viol-
ence, they represent the first step in creating the momentum required to produce 
a more comprehensive settlement. However, while they are the simplest form of 
agreement to achieve, they are also the easiest to break. Due to the fragility of 
cease- fire agreements, some scholars remain skeptical as to whether or not their 
achievement can be considered a measure of success, especially when they are 
not followed by more far- reaching settlements (Greig and Diehl 2012, 105). 
Partial or robust agreements contain provisions that reflect a greater degree of 
convergence between the parties. With them, the parties indicate at least a formal 
willingness to alter their belligerent behavior and agree on specific measures that 
could solidify peaceful relations.
 Reaching an agreement brings us to the final stage of mediation: implementa-
tion. In this phase, mediation success is directly linked to the durability of the 
mediated settlements. Empirical studies show that mediators who commit them-
selves to maintaining their presence in the implementation phase strongly con-
tribute to an agreement’s longevity (Beardsley 2011, 151). In his phase, 
mediators seek to promote the utility of a negotiated agreement and gain support 
for the settlement from the constituencies. In order to increase the likelihood of 
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compliance, mediators confer legitimacy and credibility to what was agreed 
upon (Kriesberg 1991, 25). At the same time, in order to reduce uncertainty 
between the parties, mediators may prescribe detailed sets of guarantees related 
to the implementation of the agreement such as setting up demilitarized zones, 
drafting disarmament provisions and/or employing cease- fire and election- 
monitoring missions (Fortna 2003). Nevertheless, the durability of settlements 
should not only be naively associated with a mediator’s ‘will and skill.’ Conflict 
intensity and the nature of the issues at stake are often the primary reasons why 
some conflicts relapse into violence (Greig and Diehl 2012, 161). Although 
mediators might be called in to help improve communication between the parties 
and assist them in reframing the issues, thereby ripening the conflict for resolu-
tion through the creation of various inducements, their impact is highly 
dependent upon the parties’ willingness to compromise. Evidently, the three 
degrees of success are strongly linked, as the same factors that encourage parties 
to accept mediation have a strong influence on their readiness to reach a mutu-
ally acceptable solution and make it endure over time. Although they do not 
provide a single measure of success, they encompass the complexities of inter-
national mediation as a voluntary and legally non- binding process.
Notes
1 This chapter is based on Vuković (2011), Vuković (2014a) and Vuković (2014b).
2 Galtung argues that we may observe structural violence when “the violence is built into 
the structure and shows up as unequal power and consequently as unequal life chances” 
(Galtung 1969, 171). Furthermore, by cultural violence he means “those aspects of 
culture, the symbolic sphere of our existence – exemplified by religion and ideology, 
language and art, empirical science and formal science (logic, mathematics) – that can 
be used to justify or legitimize direct or structural violence” (Galtung 1990, 291).
3 See Ott 1972; Young 1972a; Bercovitch 1984; Touval and Zartman 1985; Holsti 1991; 
Bercovitch et al. 1991.
4 The present definition is derived from earlier formulations put forward by Zartman and 
Touval (2007, 438) and Bercovitch and Jackson (2009, 35).
5 Some of the most recent mediation activities included: facilitating the Oslo accords 
between Israel and the PLO (Bercovitch 1997), contributing to the achievement of the 
Comprehensive Peace Agreement in Sudan (Kelleher 2006) and mediating the conflicts 
in former Yugoslavia (Simić 1995) and Sri Lanka (Höglund and Svensson 2009).
6 See Danilov 1999; Hyde Smith 2005; Hill 2012.
2 Multiparty mediation1
State of the art
Definition
After a nearly two decade long decline, the number of conflicts around the 
world has begun to increase once again. These conflicts encompass a complex 
interchange of local and international dynamics coupled with an increased 
number of actors involved and the goals they bring with them. Most of the con-
flicts fought in recent years have been intra- state (i.e., civil wars) and one of the 
most noticeable trends in these conflicts has been the increased fragmentation 
of the conflicting parties (Themnér and Wallensteen 2013). This poses a serious 
challenge to any peacemaking process. The creation of various factions 
increases the number actors whose approval is needed for an agreement to be 
accepted and, as a consequence, reduces the range of possible solutions. Fur-
thermore, the multiplicity of actors opens the door to a more fluid set of alli-
ances posing a challenge to the negotiation process (Cunningham 2006). To 
make matters even more complex, these conflicts have been characterized by 
another conspicuous tendency, unprecedented since the end of World War II: 
they have been increasingly internationalized in the sense that they saw one or 
more external states contributing troops to one or all conflicting sides (Themnér 
and Wallensteen 2014). While in principle external actors may affect an 
ongoing conflict by trying to manage it or by joining one of the sides in the 
fight, often these actors also pursue a separate agenda that may not fully align 
with that of the actors they may officially or unofficially support. In these cases, 
their presence may compound the adverse effects of an increased number of 
participants on the peacemaking process. First of all, it may distort the parties’ 
assessment of the extent to which a mutually hurting stalemate exists, as the 
parties may believe that with external help they may still be able to escalate the 
conflict and achieve victory through unilateral action. At the same time, exter-
nal actors may have less of an incentive to negotiate because the costs of fight-
ing they bear are lower. Finally, their involvement brings a separate set of 
demands to the process, which need to be addressed in order for the conflict to 
be solved. By reducing the range of possible solutions and diminishing the 
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sense of ripeness, external involvement may contribute strongly to prolonging 
the conflict (Cunningham 2010).
 Evidently, in an international system that lacks an overarching authority, 
international conflicts often attract the involvement of actors with interests as 
divergent as the ones discernable between the conflicting parties themselves. As 
an increase in the use of mediation seems to be less a matter of choice and more 
a fact of life, the field of international mediation is becoming both diversified 
and crowded (Crocker et al. 1999). The traditional notion of mediation as a 
process primarily conducted by state representatives has been expanded by the 
continuous proliferation of new international actors that are willing and able to 
manage conflicts. Mediation activities are increasingly conducted by inter-
national and regional bodies, non- governmental organizations, local actors and 
eminent individuals. Contingent upon their relative capabilities and willingness 
to engage, these actors may enter the process at various stages and assume dif-
ferent roles that will have an impact on the overall outcome.
 Mediation activities conducted by multiple third parties are commonly 
referred to as multiparty mediation (Crocker et al. 1999, 230). They include 
sequential, simultaneous and composite involvement of more than one external 
actor in mediating a dispute. The mediation efforts in the former Yugoslavia are 
an excellent example of sequential multiparty mediation. During the conflict, 
one actor after another became involved, building upon previous (failed) 
attempts to mediate a solution. As a result, in the case of Bosnia alone, by the 
time peace was brokered in Dayton, 144 different third parties had acted as 
mediators (Greig and Diehl 2012, 77). Multiparty mediation may also occur 
simultaneously involving many different mediators with various institutional 
foundations on the ground at the same time. This was the case in the multilevel 
peace processes in Tajikistan and Burundi in which ‘track II’ peace initiatives 
of the local civil society and international NGOs worked in parallel with 
‘track I’ diplomatic efforts by neighboring states and international organizations 
such as the UN (Hara 1999; Saunders 1999; Iji 2001). Finally, multiparty medi-
ation refers to interventions by ad hoc composite bodies and coalitions. In con-
temporary international society, which is becoming increasingly multipolar, ad 
hoc coalitions continuously change shape. The archetypical ad hoc coalitions of 
states are now complemented by the participation of other international actors. 
Looking at the reasons why states form coalitions, Frazier and Dixon argue that 
they “provide states the opportunity to act outside of formal multilateral set-
tings but with some of the benefits of multilateralism such as legitimacy and 
pooling of resources” (Frazier and Dixon 2006, 391). At the same time, their 
multilateral composition might also be more appealing to the conflicting sides. 
Parties may perceive these groupings as not being subject to, guided by or in 
service of the interest of only one state. As each mediator enters the process 
with a particular set of resources and interests, the parties may perceive a coali-
tion’s activities as more balanced and sensitive to their interests (Gent and 
Shannon 2010).
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Advantages of multiparty mediation
Multiparty mediation has become a very practical solution to modern day conflicts, 
which require elevated levels of commitment in order to manage them. Since it is 
rare that a single entity (a state, an international/regional organization, an NGO or 
an eminent individual) is either willing or able to invest as much as is really 
required, forming or expanding an existing coalition with other interested actors 
represents an attractive alternative. First of all, not every mediator enters the 
process with the same level or type of leverage required to incentivize the parties to 
adopt a solution. Joining a multiparty effort allows actors to pool in their resources 
and skills and, as a consequence, increase the overall leverage that can be applied 
in the mediation process (Crocker et al. 2001, 59). Second, a collective effort 
reduces the costs of mediation for each individual external actor. Acting in the 
context of coalitions generates smaller shares of fiscal burden and political risk 
associated with mediation (Böhmelt 2012, 702; see also Beber 2010). Third, col-
lective actions are also perceived as being characterized by increased levels of 
legitimacy. In the most intractable conflicts, parties might strongly resist single- 
actor mediation because they may perceive it as being biased toward the other side. 
By expanding the number of actors, coalitions can include third parties that are 
sympathetic to the interests of all conflicting sides. As a consequence, the balance 
achieved increases the legitimacy of the process in the eyes of the conflicting sides. 
The projected legitimacy permits external actors to exercise their leverage with less 
resistance, adding to the overall effectiveness of the mediation process (see Tago 
2005). Fourth, the participation of influential regional and global actors in the 
mediating coalition can contribute to ‘restructuring’ both domestic and regional 
relationships that may hamper the achievement of a negotiated solution. Although 
mediators are often interested in preventing or reducing the negative externalities 
of an escalating conflict, their participation in the mediation process may serve as 
an important impetus for improving systemic relations between them. By working 
together on managing a conflict, external actors establish new relations that tran-
scend the dynamics of a particular conflict. As the case of Cambodia will show, 
external actors interested in managing the conflict developed momentum that 
helped them to move from confrontational to more constructive relations (see 
Solomon 1999; Crocker et al. 2001, 60).
 It should be noted that third parties participating in a multiparty mediating 
process might assume different roles and responsibilities. The nature of their 
involvement depends on their interests in the conflict and capabilities they can 
employ in the peacemaking process. On a scale of assertiveness ranging from 
low to high, third parties may be active supporters of a mediating process con-
ducted by other external actors, they could be co- chairs assisting the lead medi-
ator or they could be lead mediators themselves. Regardless of the level of 
assertiveness, each external actor’s contribution may prove to be pivotal to the 
process. Their cooperative involvement not only increases the legitimacy of the 
process, but also allows for their leverage to be used to create the crucial incen-
tives that have the potential to encourage the conflicting parties to reach a mutu-
ally acceptable solution.
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 Finally, a very significant advantage of multiparty mediation activities is the 
possibility that different mediators enter the process at a particular stage, accord-
ing to their resources and capabilities. According to Crocker, Hampson and Aall 
“when one avenue is blocked, the activities of another mediator or party provid-
ing ‘good offices’ can create a new opening in the negotiation process” (Crocker 
et al. 2001, 63). When the parties reach a deadlock in formal negotiations, under 
the scrutiny of the public eye, continuing the talks generates high political costs. 
In such circumstances, less formal talks can be mediated in a non- intrusive 
fashion, most commonly by low- key actors such as NGOs and eminent indi-
viduals. These talks may provide sufficient cover from domestic pressure and 
can create new opportunities for communication. The ability to extend the talks, 
by opening new channels through which relevant information can be exchanged 
and constructive proposals can be promoted, may help the process to break out 
of the impasse.
The conflict cycle and comparative advantage of different kinds of 
mediators
Crocker, Hampson and Aall offer a very detailed explanation of the comparative 
advantage different mediators may exploit depending on the stage of the conflict 
(Crocker et al. 1999, 2001, 2003). In the early phases of conflict, before parties 
resort to physical violence, combined interventions of non- official actors can 
help to defuse conflicts before they escalate (Crocker et al. 2001, 61). These situ-
ations are mainly characterized by diffuse political instability, systemic frustra-
tion, tension and suspicion between the parties, who have begun to develop 
animosity toward each other (see Lund 1996). Given the high level of uncer-
tainty, parties might be willing to talk to each other, but only through an inter-
mediary and only under certain conditions. First, they might be apprehensive 
about possible mediation activities conducted by other states and international 
organizations because their involvement can be perceived as interference in 
internal affairs. At the same time, a process mediated by such high- ranking inter-
national actors might internationalize and legitimize the cause of those actors 
that seek to contest the authority of the incumbent government. For these 
reasons, we can expect governments to be more responsive to initiatives that 
offer informal settings for communication, as such environments shield the 
parties from the pressure of their respective constituencies.
 However, these low- key actors often lack the necessary leverage to be 
effective. Opening new channels of communication might be used by the parties 
for devious reasons to buy time, consolidate their resources and gain inter-
national support for their cause. Lacking the necessary leverage, mediators might 
not be able to incentivize the parties to reach a mutually acceptable solution. As 
the conflict continues to escalate, parties become more reluctant to accept the 
involvement of outside actors. Their relationships and perceptions of each other 
become even more polarized and antagonistic. They resort to inflammatory rhet-
oric, start threatening to use physical force and reduce communication to a 
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minimum. As such, reestablishing communication becomes a priority. Once 
again, low- key mediators (i.e., NGOs) might be useful in establishing communi-
cation between the parties without making them lose face since publicly they 
might be committed to advancing policies that are more conflictual in nature 
(Crocker et al. 2003, 241).
 Once communication has been established, it is useful to introduce mediators 
that have coercive and reward power that can be used in a formal setting 
(Crocker et al. 2001, 62). The use of coercive threats and side payments by third 
parties might induce conflicting sides to change their preconceived options and 
convince them to turn away from violence. Without these incentives, parties will 
have little reason to participate in talks and will be more inclined to continue 
hostilities as a means of achieving an acceptable solution. Consequently, as the 
conflict continues to escalate and the use of violence becomes more systematic, 
the process might require an even stronger presence of mediators with ‘muscle’ 
to assert the necessary amount of pressure on parties and lead them away from 
deadlock. According to Crocker, Hampson and Aall, at this point it is expected 
that mediators develop inventive and plausible solutions for “confidence- 
building measures, cease fire monitoring, verification proposals,” to make sure 
that obligations are being met and other types of ‘political guarantees’ that facil-
itate addressing the most complex security issues pertinent to the parties 
(Crocker et al. 2003, 242). Under these circumstances success can only be 
achieved if mediators apply effective procedural control over the process. More 
importantly, if issues have not been addressed adequately during the negotiation 
process, this will most certainly cause problems in the implementation period. 
The participation of multiple mediators is not only beneficial due to the fact that 
they can lend leverage to the process during the negotiations; rather, depending 
on their relative capabilities, their involvement may be more crucial in the post- 
agreement phase when this leverage has to be used in practice. An inability to 
deliver incentives reduces the credibility of the mediation process, so it becomes 
crucial to avoid defection of the parties who can produce and put into effect 
various security guarantees, economic assistance and capacity building provi-
sions that were used to incentivize the parties in reaching a negotiated solution.
Liabilities of multiparty mediation
Free riding is a very common liability associated with multiparty mediation pro-
cesses. Many parties join the efforts because they do not have to bear the high 
costs of mediating alone and can still reap the benefits of a successful mediation. 
Since mediation activities are conducted in the most intractable cases, there is a 
strong possibility that some parties might avoid taking the blame when the 
process starts to fail. In such circumstances, the responsibility of tackling 
the most difficult issues is passed from one actor to another, often ending up in the 
hands of “the institution of last resort – the United Nations – which frequently 
has neither the resources nor the support of member states to shoulder the 
burden” (Crocker et al. 2001, 59).
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 While multiparty mediation permits cost sharing and pooling of leverage, 
these dynamics are strongly undermined if the parties enter the process without a 
shared understanding of the conflict and lack a shared sense of a possible 
solution (Crocker et al. 2001, 57). When mediators do not act on the basis of a 
shared script, they might send mixed signals to the parties. The parties may 
become confused about the strategies and resources that the mediators intend to 
use in order to incentivize them toward a solution. More importantly, the parties 
will lack a clear understanding of which solution is being promoted throughout 
the process. As the parties start developing the view that mediators might be 
working counterproductively, they might hijack the process for reasons other 
than reaching a negotiated solution. Alternatively, they may exploit this confu-
sion to stall and buy time. Parties might also use this opportunity to go forum 
shopping for a mediator offering a negotiation process that is favorable to their 
cause (Crocker et al. 2001, 57; see Pinfari 2013).
 Forum shopping poses a serious challenge to multiparty mediation processes. 
For instance, the UN Secretary General Ban Ki- Moon noted that “multiple actors 
competing for a mediation role create an opportunity for forum shopping as 
intermediaries are played off against each other. Such a fragmented international 
response reinforces fragmentation in the conflict and complicates resolution” 
(Ki- moon 2009). Similarly, in his report on “Strengthening the role of mediation 
in the peaceful settlement of disputes, conflict prevention and resolution,” the 
UN Secretary General emphasized that “competition and disagreement over 
strategy and funding have permitted parties to forum shop, therefore hampering 
peace efforts” (A/66/811 2012, pt. 15). As a solution, Annex I of the report enti-
tled “United Nations Guidance for Effective Mediation” emphasizes the import-
ance of coherence, coordination and complementarity of the mediation effort as 
the necessary ingredients for eliminating the negative effects of forum shopping 
and improving overall mediation effectiveness (A/66/811 2012, pt. 43–47).
Size and composition of the mediating coalition
Achieving coherence, coordination and complementarity becomes extremely dif-
ficult as the mediating coalition becomes enlarged. While some studies suggest 
that multilateralism increases the likelihood of reaching a negotiated solution 
(Frazier and Dixon 2006), there might be an inverse relationship between the 
number of mediators and the probability of creating and maintaining a synchro-
nized intervention strategy. Mediators participating in mediating coalitions not 
only differ in terms of the leverage at their disposal, they also bring with them 
diverging interests and understandings of the conflict. The more the number of 
mediators increases, the more likely it is that the coalition will be characterized 
by heterogeneous interests and the more complex the relationship between the 
parties will be (Crocker et al. 2003, 252). Böhmelt (2011) argues that with an 
increase in the number of mediators comes an increase in organizational costs 
necessary for the achievement and maintenance of cooperative efforts. Multipli-
cation of mediators requires organizational regulation through monitoring 
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mechanisms and sanctions regimes for non- compliance (Axelrod and Keohane 
1985, Fearon 1998, Touval 2010). So as the number of actors increases, so too 
will the difficulties in regulating their cooperation increase. Reflecting on the 
dynamic of borrowing leverage and increasing organizational costs, Böhmelt 
finds that both small and very large groups are less effective in mediating dis-
putes. On the one hand, a single mediator or a small group rarely has the neces-
sary amount of leverage to produce the crucial incentives for the parties in 
conflict. On the other hand, while the bigger coalitions are more likely to possess 
the necessary leverage, their size makes them more difficult to organize and pro-
duces a “greater heterogeneity of interests” (Böhmelt 2011, 877). Therefore, the 
expansion of the mediating coalition is certainly instrumental to the effective-
ness of mediation efforts until the moment the coalition becomes congested and 
difficult to organize and coordinate.
 Although coalitions composed of democratic states might promote the spirit 
of coherence, complementarity and coordination, these coalitions do not have a 
significant impact on mediation effectiveness. Böhmelt finds that chances of 
effective conflict resolution are not driven by regime type (Böhmelt 2011, 877). 
Shared norms in promoting peaceful methods of managing conflicts may actu-
ally contribute to the collective action problems and free riding seen in many 
democracies. Participation in a coalition of democracies makes collaborative 
behavior routine, promotes the exchange of crucial information and, most impor-
tantly, ensures predictability in decision- making processes. Under such con-
ditions, according to Böhmelt “the more democracies there are as third- party 
interveners in a dispute, the more likely these states will rely on their fraternal 
obligation and expect that other democracies will provide more leverage or 
resources for settling a conflict” (Böhmelt 2011, 877). As experience shows, on 
numerous occasions, multiparty mediation has been successful even when it was 
conducted by a coalition composed of democratic and non- democratic states. In 
some instances, the participation of non- democratic states was essential to deliv-
ering the incentives required for the parties to move toward a negotiated solu-
tion. Therefore, while convergence of interests and perceptions between 
mediators helps the process to overcome issues such as forum shopping and 
commitment problems, effective multiparty mediation is also contingent upon 
the mediator’s leverage, resources and the strategies applied in the process.
 There seems to be noticeable variety in the make- up of coalitions. According 
to data presented by Greig and Diehl (2012), international organizations are 
more inclined to join coalitions with likeminded international actors. Less than 
5% of all mediation activities conducted by international organizations included 
third parties with opposing interests. Working under the provisions present in 
Chapter VII of its Charter, the United Nations has been very active in strength-
ening its interaction with various regional organizations. It has established an 
office to the African Union and developed two mediation capacity- building pro-
grams (2009–2010 and 2011–2012) aimed at strengthening AU mediation capa-
cities. Similar work plans were set up with OAS and OIC in 2011. The UN has 
also worked very closely with ASEAN, the EU and the OSCE in exchanging 
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know- how, identifying areas of capacity building and establishing useful forms 
of cooperation (A/66/811 2012, pt. 45–49). At the same time, the UN has been 
very vocal in highlighting the importance of maintaining a partnership in 
mediation efforts. For this reason, the UN has conducted annual meetings with 
regional organizations at the expert level, developed a mediation support 
network of NGO representatives and formed the Group of Friends of Mediation, 
composed of 28 member states (A/66/811 2012, pt. 56–60). The UN took all 
these measures as a way of fostering coherent mediation activities and promot-
ing the need for keeping competing interests within mediation coalitions to a 
minimum.
 On the other hand, around 17% of multiparty state mediations are conducted 
by coalitions in which participating actors are engaged in balancing their biases 
(Greig and Diehl 2012, 75). The fact that multiparty state mediation is character-
ized by greater diversity compared to the efforts of international organizations 
does not mean that these efforts are predestined to fail. Certainly, it is difficult to 
imagine that a mediating effort could be successful if conducted by mediators 
with competing interests that do not wish to cooperate with each other. In cases 
in which mediators have competing interests and diverse alliances (relationships) 
with the parties to the conflict, meditation coalitions can be seen as ‘teams of 
rivals.’ In these circumstances, effective multiparty mediation is conducted by 
“negotiating teams that are not necessarily comprised of likeminded, ideological 
soul mates but are ‘teams of rivals’ who develop mutual respect and a common 
understanding that they share wider strategic interests and goals which go 
beyond the conflict in question” (Hampson and Zartman 2011, 134). Efficiency 
is dependent upon the mediators agreeing to work as a team. This attitude repres-
ents a clear signal of (initial) willingness to cooperate, despite the fact that they 
still harbor competing biases. The fact that they maintain diverging interests 
sends a signal to the parties to the conflict that their stakes might be secured (i.e., 
that they have an ally in the team of rivals), which increases the appeal of the 
mediating coalition. However, once accepted by the parties, mediators need to 
develop a sense that cooperation is both possible and useful for the advancement 
of their interests as well. While they may have diverging interests regarding a 
particular conflict, they could still develop a sense of convergence based on a 
broader set of strategic interests that govern their relations. This convergence 
opens the door to cooperation in the mediation process and subsequent coordin-
ation of mediator strategies and leverage.
Cooperation
Conceptualizing cooperation
With all this in mind, the crucial challenges that multiparty mediation processes 
have to overcome are the (1) achievement of adequate cooperation among the 
mediators themselves and (2) subsequent coordination of their activities in the 
mediation process. Many studies have already demonstrated how cooperative 
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and coordinated interactions between mediators improve mediation effectiveness 
(Zartman 1989a; Kriesberg 1996; Crocker et al. 1999, 2001, 2003; Whitefield 
2007; Diehl and Lepgold 2003; Iji 2005; Fisher 2006; Strimling 2006; Böhmelt 
2011; Beardsley 2011; Touval 2010; Hampson and Zartman 2011; Heldt 2013). 
Zartman encapsulates the general argument as follows:
Conflict management is best carried out in concert. If a number of concilia-
tors are available to the parties themselves and if a number of friends of the 
conflicting parties can coordinate their good offices and pressure, the 
chances of success are improved.
(emphases added, Zartman 1989a, 276)
Cooperation can be understood as “a situation where parties agree to work 
together to produce new gains for each of the participants that would be unavail-
able to them by unilateral action, at some cost” (Zartman and Touval 2010, 1). It 
implies a dynamic through which parties with competing interests decide to pool 
their resources and capabilities in order to achieve common gains. Cooperation 
is not coincidental. It represents a conscious and planned course of action 
through which participants reach an agreement to overcome their incompatibili-
ties by working together. When faced with incompatible goals, parties can take 
one of three courses of action: pursue unilateral action, enter a cooperative 
arrangement or not (re)acting at all. In international affairs, actors that are 
focused on preserving the autonomy of their actions may prefer to act alone and 
follow the maxim ‘unilaterally if possible, multilaterally if necessary’ (see 
Touval 2010). The decision to act unilaterally is directly related to the costs of 
cooperation: parties will decide to pursue unilateral action when the costs of 
cooperation outweigh the expected benefits. In other words, cooperation is pos-
sible when they perceive that it would cost them less to attain their goals by 
cooperating than to act alone (Zartman and Touval 2010, 5).
 The costs of cooperation are multifold. First of all, costs may reflect organiza-
tional externalities. While institutionalized multilateralism has the potential to 
reduce transaction costs by establishing predictable rules and procedures that 
foster coordinated activities (Keohane 1984, Ruggie 1993), ad hoc cooperative 
endeavors are much more costly. Outside of established regimes, which regulate 
cooperation, actors must agree, design and maintain the rules and procedures each 
time they decide to work together. These decisions are not, however, isolated 
from the wider network of interactions between the actors. In fact, one explana-
tion of why cooperation takes place is the existence of interdependence (Keohane 
and Nye 1977). Interdependence creates an environment full of precedents and 
established norms that are of heuristic value when it comes to formulating future 
(ad hoc) cooperative arrangements. Thus, the organizational costs of cooperation 
decrease as actors cooperate more over time. The second type of costs derives 
from the negotiation dynamics that are intrinsic to any cooperative activity. From 
the perspective of negotiation, cooperation is a process in which participating 
actors combine competing interests to obtain common ones (Hopmann 2010). 
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The creation of common interests is a result of a negotiation process through 
which the parties re- evaluate their original goals. By exchanging the necessary 
information about their interests and needs, parties redefine their incompatibilities 
and seek to create joint gains. Establishing joint gains requires parties to abandon 
their maximalist goals and formulate a solution on the basis of compromise that 
benefits all of them (Hopmann 2001). Essentially, in order to co- opt the opponent 
into realizing joint gains, a party needs to give something in return. They do this 
subject to the expectation that the other side will reciprocate. Thus by agreeing to 
cooperate, parties willingly settle for less than initially planned. They accept these 
costs once the benefits of cooperation outweigh them. On the one hand, they may 
be aware that their unilateral actions are not yielding the expected results. On the 
other hand, through the process of reframing, parties manage to create value that 
was not apparent in their initial assessment. More importantly, they realize that 
this value can be attained only through cooperative endeavors; in other words, the 
newly formulated value is contingent upon the cooperative participation of the 
other side. It should be noted that cooperation does not mean the abandonment of 
previous goals. On the contrary, it is a method of achieving (reframed) goals – 
which still reflect essential interests – through means other than confrontation 
(Zartman 2010). Also, it is important to emphasize that both costs and benefits are 
not only measured in terms of material means. For instance, when parties agree to 
cooperate, they acknowledge the other party’s interests as legitimate. Similarly, 
by cooperating, parties empathize with each other and recognize that each other’s 
well- being is mutually reinforcing and that they are codependent. Therefore, costs 
and benefits may also relate to various intangible assets such as security, auto-
nomy, reputation, etc.
 The creation of joint gains through cooperation is only possible if the parties 
are willing to reciprocate. Reciprocity represents an assurance that cooperative 
behavior will be rewarded with a similar behavior in the future. In an environ-
ment characterized by incomplete information, parties will reciprocate only on 
temporary and ad hoc basis, fearing defection from the other side. In conditions 
of such uncertainty, cheating represents a safety measure that parties apply in 
order to protect their interests (see Baldwin 1993). One way to overcome prob-
lems of incomplete information and promote the benefits of cooperation is 
through repetition. Axelrod finds that tit- for-tat strategy – reacting to the oppo-
nent’s strategy by employing the same one – allows parties to learn about the 
benefits of cooperation in a very short period of time, as their cooperative behav-
ior is reciprocated to produce joint gains (Axelrod 1984). However, tit- for-tat as a 
repetitive strategy also has the potential to generate and perpetuate conflict: once 
the actors start reciprocating confrontational behavior, they become entrapped in 
a spiral of conflict from which it becomes very difficult to escape. Evidently com-
munication represents a crucial component of cooperation: “the more reliable 
information of future reciprocity, the greater the chances of cooperation lasting” 
(Zartman and Touval 2010, 7; Strimling 2006). As mentioned previously, in order 
to avoid operational costs associated with defining and maintaining principles of 
cooperation, parties might decide to institutionalize their cooperative interactions. 
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By creating predictable and pre- arranged frameworks for communication, parties 
may contribute to a routinized dynamic of reciprocity that does not require imme-
diate returns. According to Hopmann,
Parties reciprocate cooperation, not so much because they expect an imme-
diate reward but because they have a relationship built upon trust in which 
they can expect the other to reciprocate whenever necessary at any indefi-
nite time in the future. In this sense, expectations of reciprocity and peaceful 
change have become a constitutive part of the relationship; they are expected 
as an inherent part of the relationship and not necessarily because of some 
expectation of immediate reward.
(Hopmann 2010, 103–104)
In other words, reciprocity is more than a simple process of giving something in 
order to get something immediately in return. Reciprocity takes place on the 
basis of a coordinated exchange between the parties. Cooperation and coordin-
ation are not two distinct phenomena; rather, coordination represents a subset 
dynamic of the larger cooperative process (Strimling 2006). While both 
cooperation and coordination imply that the actors involved need to have shared 
goals, there is still a very clear difference between the two phenomena. A pre-
condition of successful cooperation is that all parties recognize the shared bene-
fits of working in concert. Once acknowledged as beneficial, cooperation opens 
the doors to the dynamics of coordination, which involves the more mechanical 
aspects of dividing the labor effectively and clarifying who needs to do what, 
when and how. In other words coordination is the next step in the process of 
achieving full cooperation, as parties make sure that they do not cross purposes 
or stumble over each other in their efforts to accomplish their common goal.
Cooperation in multiparty mediation
In the realm of multiparty mediation, cooperation can be observed in its full 
complexity. In order to reach a successful outcome, cooperation needs to take 
place on three distinct yet highly interrelated levels. First, since the dynamics of 
the conflict impede the parties from negotiating directly (i.e., bilaterally), they 
have to choose to cooperate with third parties in order to find a mutually accept-
able solution. At the same time, since the conflict is mediated by a multitude of 
outside actors, these actors also need to come up with a ‘common script’ that 
will serve as a clear guideline for resolving the dispute. Thus all the third parties 
need to cooperate amongst themselves and reduce the possibility of sending 
mixed signals, which might jeopardize the management process. Finally, it 
should not be forgotten that each outside actor also has a specific interest in 
resolving the conflict and that this interest is directly related to the mediator’s 
relations with one (or both) disputing sides. For this reason, it is essential that 
cooperation take place on this third level, as this is the level at which outside 
actors acquire their added leverage.
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 When multiple mediators act in concert, they all face dual costs: those of 
cooperating plus the inevitable costs of mediation. Given the combined costs of 
multiparty mediation, for cooperation to take place, parties need to know that the 
benefits will outweigh the costs. It is not uncommon that at a certain point in the 
process of cooperating, a party decides to defect from the group. Defection may 
come in different forms – from procrastination to full abandonment of the 
process – but its distinct features in multiparty mediation processes are: a reluct-
ance to work together; non- recognition of joint gains; and an unwillingness to 
use the full potential of its leverage and resources to move the conflicting parties 
toward an agreement. So even while trying to establish a cooperative arrange-
ment parties may create new conflicts: they may realize how incompatible their 
perceptions of the conflict are; they may disagree about the distribution of costs 
and benefits; or they could object to the respective contributions cooperation 
requires (Zartman and Touval 2010, 3). Therefore, it becomes crucial to under-
stand not only why parties cooperate, but also how they arrive at it and how is it 
maintained.
Game theoretical model
In order to fully understand the complexities of achieving cooperation in a mul-
tiparty mediation effort, this section will first provide an abstraction of the 
process in the form of a game theoretical model. Game theoretic approaches are 
useful insofar as they allow us to analyze the decisions parties make regarding 
potential strategies available to them in the mediation process as they pursue the 
maximization of their expected utilities. Several studies of mediation have 
already benefited from the use of rational choice models (Kydd 2003, 2006; 
Maoz and Terris 2006). The intention here is to bring into play those findings to 
help us understand the general patterns that govern the relations between the 
parties and the specific decisions they make throughout the mediation process.
 Because one of the underlying assumptions is that the nature of cooperation 
can change over time, this model will utilize the dynamic Theory of Moves 
(ToM). Brams developed this theory in order to bring, “a dynamic dimension to 
the classical theory of games, which its founders characterized as ‘thoroughly 
static’ ” (von Neumann and Morgenstern 1944; 3rd edn, 1953, pg. 44 as quoted 
in Brams 1994, 1). The first rule of ToM is that a game must start at an outcome, 
called “initial state” (Brams 1994, 22). The assumption is that from this state, 
players can aspire to move to a better state by switching their strategies. As 
Brams explains it, “as they look ahead at their possible moves, the possible 
countermoves of other players, their own counter- countermoves, and so on, the 
players try to anticipate where play will terminate” (7). Thus, the game ends 
when, after a series of “alternating responses,” the player who has the next move 
decides not to switch its strategy (22). Another important rule of ToM is that a 
player will not move from an initial state if this move “leads to a less preferred 
final state; or returns play to the initial state” (27). Brams calls this rule “a 
rationality rule, because it provides the basis for players to determine whether 
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they can do better by moving from a state or remaining in it” (28). The last rule 
is that of “precedence,” and it implies that once a player makes a move “its 
move overrides the player who stays, so the outcome will be induced by a player 
who moves” (28). As each player looks ahead and makes rational calculations of 
where to move from each initial state, the process ends in outcomes that Brams 
calls nonmyopic equilibria or NME (33).
 Brams’ theory proves its applicability to the case of mediation by arguing 
that:
[s]ome decisions are made collectively by players in which case it would be 
reasonable to say that they choose strategies from scratch, either simultan-
eously or by coordinating their choices. But if say two countries are coord-
inating their choices, as when they agree to sign a treaty, the important 
question is what individualistic calculations led them to this point. The 
formality of jointly signing a treaty is the culmination of their negotiations, 
which covers up the move- countermove process that preceded it. This is 
precisely what ToM is designed to uncover.
(Brams 1994, 23)
Let us assume that there are two disputing sides – side A and side B – that are 
unable to negotiate a settlement themselves. The intractable nature of their con-
flict and the issues at stake draw attention from more than one outside actor that 
have an interest in managing the peace process. Again, for the purposes of sim-
plification, let us assume that we have (at least) three such players, each one with 
specific interests in the conflict, leverage they can exert in the peace process and 
relationships they have with other mediators and conflicting sides. Therefore, 
let’s presume that mediators 1 and 3 are biased mediators due to the particular 
nature of their relationship with parties to the dispute. Mediator 1 is biased 
toward party A, and has particular leverage over it, so as it is able to move party 
A in its intended direction. The same relationship exists between mediator 3 and 
party B. Conversely, mediator 2 is what scholarship refers to as a pure mediator 
that does not have a special relationship with either of the conflicting sides, but 
nevertheless has a strong interest in resolving the conflict (see Fisher and 
Keashly 1991). The model will assume that mediator 2 is the only actor that is 
unwilling to drop out of the process, while actors 1 and 3 might opt for this 
strategy and thus undermine cooperation within the mediating coalition.
 Under all these assumptions, the model prescribes four different scenarios. In the 
first scenario, all three mediators choose to cooperate throughout the process. In 
the second and the third scenarios, actors 1 and 3 respectively choose to defect from 
the group while still maintaining a biased relationship with either A or B. In the 
fourth scenario, both 1 and 3 choose to defect, leaving the entire mediating process 
to 2, though they once again maintain biased relations with conflicting sides.
 The model predicts that cooperation in the process of multiparty mediation can 
be explained using an inverted prisoner’s dilemma. This dilemma describes a situ-
ation in which the conflicting sides (A and B) become involved in the mediation 
Multiparty mediation  51
process, regardless of the action of the mediators. In other words, the mediation 
process will continue even if one mediator decides not to cooperate with the rest of 
the group. Using the Theory of Moves, we can interpret the model as follows 
(Table 2.1).
 Point (a) is a common starting point for all international conflicts. It is the 
moment at which a conflict assumes the necessary characteristics to encourage 
outside actors to become involved. Many studies have examined the phenomena, 
of who mediates and when and why it occurs (Bercovitch and Schneider 2000; 
Greig and Regan 2008). As the model shows, here mediation is conducted by 
one outside actor (number 2) that parties perceive as trustworthy and unbiased. 
At this point, each biased mediator chooses not to participate in mediation, while 
still maintaining a biased relationship with one of the conflicting sides. In this 
case, outside actors avoid both the costs of mediation and of cooperation. At the 
same time, they still maintain a special relationship with one of the parties to the 
dispute and thus still indirectly exercise some influence over the mediation 
process, which is being conducted by actor 2 alone. Theoretically speaking, this 
outcome is NME, because it creates greater benefits than any other, so in the 
event that the game starts at this point, rational actors would not move from it. 
Nonetheless, as only one mediator is involved in the process, we cannot speak of 
multiparty mediation taking place in this state.
 In the contemporary dynamics of international relations, we can expect to 
observe a proliferation of actors willing to step in and manage a conflict in 
accordance with their particular interests. Knowing that more benefits can be 
accrued by joining the mediation coalition, one actor might decide to opt for a 
cooperative strategy from the beginning. Thus, the game actually starts at point 
(b), when one biased mediator decides to start cooperating with mediator number 
2. In this state, the mediator that does not cooperate with the other two faces 
smaller benefits compared to the one that chose to cooperate (1,4) or (4,1). 
Nevertheless, in reality we often see that some actors purposefully choose not to 
cooperate with other mediators. Why would this be the case? Because their 
rationality is myopic, actors may fail to recognize that the game cannot revert to 
point (a), where a non- cooperative strategy would have created far greater bene-
fits. Here the choice of non- cooperation (point (a)) is compounded by the fact 
that some actors aim to use their biased position to influence the behavior of a 
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particular side in the conflict and consequently to spoil the mediation efforts of 
other actors. In fact, as the rule of ToM dictates, the next move is that of a player 
that does not yet cooperate and its next move cannot be to move the other player 
back to non- cooperative behavior. Thus they need to realize that the best they 
can hope to achieve given the game’s progress is a move to point (c).
 However appealing the non- cooperation decision might appear at a first 
glance, spoiling the process might actually backfire. When an outside actor 
decides not to cooperate while others are engaged in mediation, it undercuts its 
own potential to exercise influence over other actors involved in the mediation 
and loses the potential to create benefits for itself and its partner side in the con-
flict. While the biased mediator stays outside the coalition, the side it is support-
ing might still remain trapped in the process and it is to be expected that in such 
a situation, it is less likely that potential solutions will be to its advantage. When 
one side in the conflict is losing through mediation, so will its outside partners, 
even though they are officially not cooperating in the process. For example, their 
international reputation might be undermined, as might their leverage to influ-
ence future developments in the process. In such circumstances, both the non- 
cooperative outside actor and its partner party to the conflict will face far smaller 
benefits than those who opt to cooperate and potentially (through constructive 
dialogue and exercising necessary leverage) move the proposed solution to their 
advantage.
 Faced with a lower payoff, a rational second biased mediator decides to 
cooperate, which moves the game to its final state found at point (c), which is 
the outcome of the game and an NME. Even though in this case their utility is 
smaller than at point (a) (due to the costs of both mediating and cooperating), 
they will undeniably experience greater benefits than they would if they were not 
part of the mediating coalition. In such a setting, each mediator is able to exert a 
certain pressure on the process and bargain in favor of the side in the conflict 
with which they have special relations. Biased mediators attain important utility 
as their partner involved in the conflict gains through mediation. Thus, despite 
the costs of mediating and acting in concert, the second outside actor still 
manages to accrue greater benefits through coordinated activities than it would 
have if it opted for a strategy of defection, assuming that mutual defection is not 
an option. This is in line with the initial statement that cooperation implies the 
creation of new gains for each party that were unavailable to them by means of 
unilateral action, albeit at some cost.
 If interpreted in terms of classical game theory, cooperation represents a 
dominant strategy in this model and the Nash equilibrium is point (c) (2,2). ToM 
also provides a similar results, given that once the multiparty mediation starts, 
cooperative behavior produces higher payoffs than defection does and the final 
state is also at point (c). Overall, cooperation can be identified as a rational 
strategy that leads to non- myopic equilibria. Once a party chooses to cooperate, 
short- term goals that induced a party to defect are no longer a priority. Rather, 
for a rational outside party that received low payoffs from a strategy of defec-
tion, cooperation becomes a useful mechanism through which it is possible to 
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limit the other side’s utility. In other words, cooperation proves to be decidedly 
beneficial not only to the process, but to the parties themselves.
Insights from the model and relevance to the process
This model highlights that, for external actors, the employment of cooperative 
strategies is actually more beneficial than spoiling the process would be. In fact, 
even the cumulative costs of cooperating and mediating complemented by the 
potential benefits of acting as a spoiler still do not match the benefits generated by 
cooperative strategies. Since cooperation is decidedly beneficial not only to the 
process but to the mediators themselves, it is important to understand what should 
be done once an external actor opts to defect from a group. As noted by Sisk,
game theory contributes to mediation strategies through the finding that one 
can encourage moderation and deter ‘defection’ in bargaining relationships 
by not allowing a player to gain from a defection strategy, even if it imposes 
additional costs to cooperation to prevent a defector’s gain.
(Sisk 2009, 48; emphasis added)
Discouraging defection is not a simple task, as it implies direct interference in 
another party’s policy objectives. In this case, it is not enough just to issue a rep-
rimand for non- cooperative behavior or warn that such a strategy is not construc-
tive for the overall process of mediation and leave it at that. It is essential that 
the defecting party come to recognize the benefits of deciding to change its 
strategy and pursue cooperative strategies.
 In his analysis of international mediation in Zimbabwe, Stedman (1991) 
endorses a polycentric view and notes that both conflicting parties and mediators 
are rarely unitary actors. According to his study, because conflicting parties are 
often composed of various factions and splinter groups, an expectation that all of 
them perceive a ‘hurting stalemate’ is quite untenable. Rather it is the external 
actors that show interest in managing the conflict that are the real agents for-
warding that perception. In other words, the perception of ripeness often occurs 
first among the external actors and it is subsequently transposed from them to 
the conflicting sides. However, given the proliferation of mediators, in order to 
promote the perception of ripeness, it is crucial that they speak with a single 
voice (Stedman 1991, 242; see also Kleiboer 1994; Zartman 2001). Fostering a 
perception of ripeness between mediators can be seen as an essential ingredient 
in achieving the sense of urgency required to reach the necessary convergence of 
interests that would allow them to work together to manage the dispute. Existing 
theories on this topic focus primarily on the significance of inducing a percep-
tion of ripe moments on the part of the conflicting sides. Less is known about the 
mechanisms that generate a perception of ripeness among the external actors. 
Despite the fact that there are obvious differences in roles, capabilities and pref-
erences between actors internal and external to the conflict, existing notions of 
ripeness theory could be extended to mediators as well because their competing 
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interests that impede the achievement of cooperative endeavors create a new 
conflict that needs to be overcome. Managing the conflict between mediators 
depends on their ability to realize the inadequacy of unilateral action and recog-
nize the utility of cooperation.
 Specific foreign policy objectives never exist in a vacuum. They are embed-
ded in a broader set of strategic interests that each actor pursues on the inter-
national stage. In that sense, the motivation to manage a conflict is never an 
isolated decision; instead it should be seen as an element of a more complex 
network of strategic choices developed by each actor in the international arena. 
Significant developments on the systemic level caused by pivotal political, 
social, economic and/or natural events might strongly affect an actor’s strategic 
priorities and encourage them to re- evaluate the guiding principles of their 
foreign policies. Although such geo- political shifts are largely exogenous to the 
conflict that is being managed, they still have the potential to alter external 
actors’ interests in mediating the dispute. In some instances, these shifts may 
lead third parties to the point where their interests in managing the conflict con-
verge. For instance, conflicts taking place in close proximity to each other, at the 
same time will impact the disputants’ decision to accept mediation. According to 
Kriesberg, as a parallel conflict starts to intensify for one or more conflicting 
sides, the saliency of their previous conflict may decrease, making de- escalation 
possible (Kriesberg 1991, 20). During the hostage crisis of 1979, Iran’s uncom-
promising position during the first few months of Algerian mediation was altered 
as Iran entered a parallel conflict with Iraq. Sick noted that, “as the cost of the 
Iran- Iraq began to mount, this conflict probably increased pressure on the Iranian 
clerics to find a settlement” (Sick 1985, 50). A similar argument may be made 
for external actors. The presence of a parallel conflict that has the potential to 
affect the external actors’ strategic interests may influence their calculations 
about the ongoing dispute and induce them to find a solution through a 
cooperative multiparty mediation effort. A solution to the ongoing dispute pre-
vents them from overstretching their capacities by being involved and/or man-
aging several disputes at the same time.
 Similarly, disastrous events of natural or man- made origin can upset the 
established strategies of the conflicting sides: the more devastating these events 
are, the more costly an ongoing conflict may become, making a negotiated solu-
tion an attractive alternative. The peace talks between the government of Indone-
sia and the Aceh Free Movement reached a breakthrough following the 
destructive tsunami that hit the area in December 2004. The ‘tsunami effect’ 
“was a shake- up in circumstances that meant talks could begin again, on a new 
foundation” (Large and Aguswandi 2008, 10). Comparable events could also 
impact the external actors’ calculations about an ongoing conflict. If a non- 
cooperative external actor experiences a tragic event of large proportions, it 
might find it increasingly difficult and costly to maintain its confrontational atti-
tudes vis- à-vis other external actors in managing a specific dispute. At the same 
time, it might not be able to invest as much time and resources in a specific con-
flict anymore. Sharing the costs of conflict management with other external 
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actors becomes an appealing alternative, which, in turn, increases the likelihood 
of cooperative engagement between the mediators.
 Reframed policy objectives may also emerge with the arrival of a new polit-
ical elite. A change in leadership structure has the potential to foster the sub-
jective perception of a painful deadlock, which may not have been recognized 
previously despite the same objective circumstances (Stedman 1991). This was 
the case during the Beagle Channel dispute mediated by the Vatican. The con-
flict was successfully mediated only once the non- compromising military regime 
in Buenos Aires was replaced by the democratically- elected president Alfonsín, 
who ran on a platform of unequivocal support for a negotiated solution (Fournier 
1999, 65). Although changes in leadership can be useful indicators of an emerg-
ing sense of ripeness between the parties, interpreting these changes is never a 
straightforward task. As Zartman and de Soto note, “the reasons the new 
leadership gained power and any accompanying messages must be studied for 
signs of recognition that the conflict is in a stalemate and it hurts” (2010, 16). 
Without such unequivocal messages, the establishment of a new elite does not 
automatically mean that a sense of urgency to resolve a lingering conflict has 
been created. The new elite might not be able to produce an opening for negoti-
ations or might be deprived of the necessary ‘credentials’ to act on such a deli-
cate policy preference. At the same time, new elites might be even more 
reluctant to compromise, making a negotiated solution even more unlikely. 
Therefore, evaluating the new elite’s policy preferences is of great importance to 
knowing whether or not the parties are likely to find a way to resolve their dif-
ferences. This principle can be transposed onto a mediating coalition that experi-
ences difficulties reaching common ground on how to proceed with mediation. 
A change in leadership in one or more of interested external actors might bring 
to power an elite more willing to compromise with the rest of the international 
community. If they find the confrontational strategies of their predecessors to be 
too destructive and ill equipped to yield the expected benefits, they might be 
inclined to perceive cooperation with other third parties as a more attractive 
alternative and might thus formulate a new set of foreign policy objectives 
accordingly. On the other hand, a new elite that promotes a platform of further 
insistence on uncompromising policies will only reinforce the existing lack of 
cooperation and common ground between them and other international actors. 
Thus, to reiterate the earlier argument by Zartman and de Soto, in order to know 
whether or not the new elite will bring about change that will produce a more 
cooperative environment, it is important to know if it is sending signals of recog-
nition that the current situation is quite painful and unbearable. The new elite 
might be apprehensive about the domestic socio- political and economic con-
ditions or damaged international reputation created by the previous regime’s 
confrontational attitude. In these circumstances, improving relations with other 
international actors may generate gains that could be used to improve the 
domestic situation and repair a tarnished international image.
 Evidently, changes in foreign policy objectives induced by exogenous geo- 
political shifts have a trickle- down effect: the mediators’ decision to re- evaluate 
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their interests in the conflict is induced by factors that are external to it. 
However, the more the third parties expand their degree of involvement in the 
conflict, the more their interests become susceptible to the dynamics of the con-
flict. Those external actors that provide logistical and/or military support to one 
of the conflicting parties may experience mounting costs and losses more 
directly. Even though formally they might act as mediators or external actors 
supporting the mediation process, these actors could still employ violence as an 
off- the-table tactic in the same way conflicting parties do. Although a non- 
cooperative third party might find direct support of one of the sides in a conflict 
to be in line with its foreign policy objectives, as the conflict dynamics on the 
ground start to take their toll, the desirability of continuing the conflict may start 
to wane. In these circumstances, as confrontational strategies have resulted in 
higher costs than expected benefits, the non- cooperative third party might find 
that it is in its interest to re- evaluate its approach and seek the attainment of 
greater benefits via cooperation. It is important to emphasize that once external 
actors start experiencing a hurting stalemate, they can transmit this message to 
their partners, regardless of how they feel about it. As mentioned earlier, the 
involvement of an external supporter distorts the sense of ripeness among 
the parties (Cunningham 2010), so a message conveyed by outside allies that the 
conflict is ripe for a mediated solution directly contributes to the possibility that 
a conflicting party will reframe its approach to the conflict as well. For instance, 
it was the external supporters of the Patriotic Front and the Government of Rho-
desia who first felt the hurting stalemate and put pressure on the parties to agree 
to a mediated solution (Stedman 1991). They did this because, “the conflict was 
costing them good relations among other allies, notably other African states and 
the United States, and their reputation was suffering for not bringing the conflict 
to an end” (Zartman and de Soto 2010, 16).
 The Zimbabwean case clearly indicates that costs of an ongoing conflict are 
not only material in nature. In fact, as mentioned earlier in this chapter, reputa-
tional costs represent a significant aspect of the cost- benefit analysis that actors 
make prior to cooperating with others. The decision of the parties to the conflict 
to cooperate is also conditioned by the effects confrontational strategies will 
have on cooperation with their allies outside of the conflict. For example, the 
move from confrontation to cooperation that led to a settlement in South Africa 
in the early 1990s was made because confrontational strategies were isolating 
the parties from the rest of the international community. On the one hand, de 
Klerk’s government had begun to realize that non- cooperative, old regime pol-
icies were no longer able to generate the expected security and level of affluence 
for the minority and were contributing to further degradation of the regime’s 
international reputation and legitimacy (Zartman 1995, 148). On the other, the 
fall of the Soviet Union represented an important loss of international support 
for the African National Congress. According to Zartman,
To both, engagement in a cooperative strategy brought international support 
and approval. Although neither party’s goals changed in their pursuit of 
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their conflict, their means shifted to cooperation, induced by the need for 
cooperation within the international community, without which the confron-
tation tactics could and would have continued.
(Zartman 2010, 168)
Zartman refers to this as a ‘playback effect,’ which is “the impact of unilateral 
action on relations with third parties and potential allies in cooperation at other 
times and on other issues” (Zartman 2010, 164). While both exogenous geo- 
political shifts and changes of conflict dynamics imply that non- cooperative exter-
nal actors will change their strategies on their own initiative, the playback effect 
points to the possibility that the initiative for cooperation might come from the rest 
of the coalition. Zartman suggests that the “international community of relevant 
bystanders will cooperate among themselves to try to induce a conflicting member 
to shift to cooperation when it gets too confrontational in pursuing its conflict with 
another party” (Zartman 2010, 162). It is important to note that defection is a direct 
expression of an actor’s policy preferences, so one way of encouraging a mediator 
to abandon non- cooperative attitudes is to expose it to pressure exercised by the 
rest of the mediating coalition. However, since such coercion is costly and often 
used primarily toward conflicting parties, the coalition may also opt to engage the 
defecting mediator in a negotiating process. Here, a change in current behavior is 
achieved through incentives that make participation an attractive option. In other 
words, building a ‘team of rivals’ is dependent upon making the necessary trade-
offs (Hampson and Zartman 2011, 134). The difficulty of negotiating an effective 
cooperative arrangement increases with the number of participants. Therefore, it is 
often useful to narrow down the focus to specific issues and conduct the process 
only among the selected group of actors that have a direct stake in the particular 
issues at hand (Hampson 1995). The group may only be expanded by including 
actors that are able to contribute to the establishment of collective effort. There is 
no rule specifying where the process should take place. It may be conducted in an 
entirely ad hoc manner outside of the context of the existing multilateral arrange-
ments. At the same time, the issue could be placed on the agenda of an existing 
institution that allows for the negotiations to be still held within a small and 
selective group of actors (Touval 2010, 89). Regardless of where they take place, 
negotiations on cooperation are not only important because of the compromise 
required on specific issues, but also in terms of their ability to create pact- building 
relationships and a sense of shared decision making (Hampson 2010, Zartman and 
Touval 2010).
 Clearly, the responsibility for encouraging an external actor to adopt a shared 
idea of a solution and to opt for a cooperative strategy is often placed on the rest of 
the mediating coalition. More precisely, it is the actors who have a strong self- 
interest in the conflict’s outcome that generally take the initiative to negotiate with 
defectors. They do this in order to avoid the negative consequences of competing 
interests within the mediating coalition. Reflecting on the game theoretical model 
presented earlier, cooperation becomes possible when the mediators perceive it to 
be in their self- interest. The fact that some actors decide not to cooperate can be 
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explained in terms of myopic rationality. Mediators that see defection as their stra-
tegic choice are those that focus on short- term rather than long- term goals. 
However, the choice to defect will inevitably have an impact not only on the medi-
ating coalition, but also on the overall process, as it might encourage (at least) one 
disputing side to stop cooperating in the peace process. This dynamic is directly 
related to the fact that mediators often have a particular relationship with (at least) 
one of the disputing sides, which prompts them to get involved in the mediation 
process and correlates the pursuit of self- interest with the promotion of a partner 
state’s agenda. Therefore, when the mediating coalition is faced with a potential 
dropout from the group, mediators might need to negotiate with the dropout to find 
a compromise solution that can bridge their conflicting interests in order to (re)
establish a cooperative relationship. The outcome of this rapprochement will have 
a direct effect on the overall mediation effort. More specifically, if the mediators 
manage to reach an agreement with the dropout, the mediation process is more 
likely to be successful.
Coordination
Conceptualizing coordination
Even when multiple mediators manage to achieve a convergence of interests 














Figure 2.1 Flowchart to success or failure.
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activities often prove to be at odds. As indicated previously, one of the most 
challenging aspects of multiparty mediation is the problem of coordination. 
In the case of multiparty mediation, coordination prescribes a method of syn-
chronized usage of the different leverage and resources each mediator has at 
its disposal in the process in order to create the necessary incentives that 
would have been unavailable from a single mediator alone. A harmonious 
employment of various sources of leverage can be instrumental to the effec-
tiveness of the mediation process: where direct leverage is limited, it may be 
borrowed from others (Crocker et al. 1999, 40). A well- coordinated mediat-
ing coalition will be able to exploit the comparative advantage of all the 
mediators through a synchronized employment of different mediation strat-
egies. Coordination among mediators sends a strong signal to the disputing 
sides about their commitment to manage and resolve the conflict. Strong dedi-
cation to alleviating the problem will increase the credibility of the group, 
reduce the likelihood of sending mixed signals to the conflicting sides and 
minimizes the chances that the conflicting sides will go ‘forum shopping.’ As 
a result, there will be fewer opportunities for procrastination in achieving a 
negotiated settlement.
 Coordination implies different forms of exchange between the actors: 
information sharing, collaborative analysis and strategizing, resource sharing, 
formal partnerships and other means of synchronizing and/or integrating 
activities (Nan and Strimling 2006, 2). Its effectiveness depends on the recog-
nition of the different roles each external actor can play. A developed sense 
of each actor’s contribution to the process has to be clear from the outset. 
Understanding that each third party can assume a different role, relative to its 
interests and capabilities, creates a platform upon which their involvement 
can be coordinated. According to Kriesberg, mutual acknowledgement of 
each actor’s contributions coupled with an explicit differentiation of roles can 
reduce the hazards associated with having many intermediaries interfering 
with each other’s work (Kriesberg 1996, 351). At the same time, coordination 
requires a regulated exchange of information about the respective peacemak-
ing efforts and analysis of the conflict from the participating external actors’ 
perspectives (see Fisher 2006). This exchange is important not only in terms 
of preventing mediators from getting in each other’s way; it is also instrumen-
tal to creating coalitional memory and the promotion of a sense of learning 
from previous efforts. Many peacemaking efforts have suffered from the ill 
effects of uncoordinated activities because they lacked the ability to learn 
about best practices from previous efforts. An important limitation in this 
regard is the fact that mediators often do not engage for an extended period of 
time. If their experiences do not get transmitted to successive or competing 
third parties, this lack of exchange will contribute to more chaotic and incon-
sistent peacemaking efforts (Heldt 2013, 13). Finally, effective coordination 
requires collaborative strategizing and planning of specific individual and col-
lective initiatives based on shared analysis (Fisher 2006, 68).
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Leadership
A clear sense of leadership within the coalition helps avoid the detriments of an 
uncoordinated process. The responsibilities of a lead mediator are: “to set prior-
ities, to ensure those priorities are pursued by all the third- party actors involved, 
and to provide consistency across phases of a political process” (Jones 2002, 
111). Experience has shown that the choice of assigning (or assuming) the 
leadership role appears to be quite contextual and ad hoc in nature. Kriesberg 
points out that 
the choice of the person or organizations which take on the leadership or the 
coordinating role may be made by the adversaries themselves, by the inter-
mediaries, based on assessing who would have the interest and resources, or 
through a power struggle.
(Kriesberg 1996, 348)
Whitefield goes even further and claims that the appointment of leading actor is 
not done through a rational process: it is rather a combination of opportunity, 
conflicting parties’ demands, capabilities and resources of interested mediators 
to sustain that role and their credibility vis- à-vis other members of the inter-
national community (Whitefield 2010, 6). The difficulties of establishing a tem-
plate for selecting a lead mediator derive from the systemic features of 
international affairs. No actor, be it a powerful state or an international organiza-
tion, would ever be inclined to readily give up its authority or its maneuvering 
space in the mediation process (Jones 2002, 112). Despite these limitations, there 
are certain conditions under which a particular third party may be deemed most 
suitable to lead and coordinate mediation activities. The “UN Guidance for 
Effective Mediation” prescribes that the following aspects should be taken into 
account:
The decision regarding leadership should be reached through consultation 
between the relevant entities, taking into account the conflict context and 
based on comparative advantage. Proximity to the parties should be neither 
dismissed nor taken for granted as an automatic advantage. Acceptability of 
the mediating body and their mediator by the conflicting parties and the 
potential effectiveness of the mediation should be key considerations.
(A/66/811 2012, pt. 47)
Each external actor carries with it a distinct mix of interests and resources into 
the peacemaking process. These contributions get translated into comparative 
advantages once they become integrated into a coherent mediating strategy.
 The comparative advantage of powerful states derives from their ability to 
‘play heavy.’ According to Sisk, this implies the provision of strongly structured 
incentives and sanctions against the parties, promotion of diplomatic consistency 
through maintenance of communication and by sharing relevant information and, 
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if needed, acting as a guarantor in the implementation phase (Sisk 2009, 53). 
While the value of having a powerful state in the mediating coalition is quite 
clear, assigning the leadership role to it might prove to be counterproductive. 
Jones argues that “coordination by a major power will tend to be coordination in 
support of one party, as distinct from impartial support to the peace process itself ” 
(Jones 2002, 111). The liability of having a mediation process led by a powerful 
state that supports one of the conflicting parties is quite straightforward: the exter-
nal support only adds to the leverage of their partners in conflict and distorts their 
sense of urgency to reach a negotiated solution. However, as stated previously, 
the potential utility of a biased mediator derives from its ability to ‘deliver’ the 
conflicting party with which it has close ties to an agreement. So far, the record of 
powerful states leading the multiparty mediation processes has been mixed. On 
the one hand, the cases of Bosnia and Sierra Leone show how crucial the ‘heavy 
play’ of powerful states as lead mediators was. In the former, the US conducted 
effective ‘coercive diplomatic efforts’ that put an end to extreme hostilities after 
years of futile attempts made by the UN, the European Union and various 
regional powers (Touval 1996). In the latter, parallel to the largely ineffective UN 
coordination efforts, the UK government unofficially played the role of ‘lead 
state,’ mustering crucial financial support for the peace process and providing 
rapid deployment forces in critical periods (Jones 2002, 108). On the other hand, 
the examples of the Russian- led mediation between Georgia and the secessionist 
republic of Abkhazia (Whitefield 2010, 15) or the US involvement with the 
‘Quartet’ (the UN, the EU, the US and Russia) in the Middle East (Zartman 2010, 
178) show how mediation efforts led by powerful states can be ineffective in 
terms of producing a mutually acceptable solution.
 Political competition between powerful states at the international level has 
often damaged multiparty peacemaking efforts (e.g., the impact of the ‘tug of 
war’ between Russia and the US and its Western allies on the peacemaking pro-
cesses in Ukraine and Syria). In these conditions, lead mediators are also 
expected to ‘mediate between mediators.’ Since it is their responsibility to for-
mulate priorities and see that these priorities are implemented by the participat-
ing actors, in the event that external actors develop conflicting views on the 
distribution of priorities and relative responsibilities, the lead actor might have to 
first solve this dispute before returning to mediate the ongoing conflict on the 
ground. In order to do so, the lead mediator needs to possess the necessary 
authority (Jones 2002, 111). Although it is rare that any actor has absolute 
authority over all other participants, in recent years there has been a growing 
tendency to delegate the responsibility of leading a coordinated multiparty medi-
ation effort to actors that have the power to prescribe behavior based on their 
own legitimacy. In international mediation, legitimacy has often been associated 
with actions undertaken by international organizations, especially the UN 
(Touval 1992). Legitimacy can be understood as “a property of a rule or rule- 
making institution which itself exerts a pull toward compliance on those 
addressed normatively because those addressed believe that the rule or institu-
tion has come into being and operates in accordance with generally accepted 
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principles of right process” (Franck 1990, 24). The UN’s ‘aura of legitimacy’ 
reflects a perception that the UN is ‘the official representative of the world com-
munity’ and that its actions reflect that community’s consensus (Rubin 1992, 
265; Touval 1994, 52). Hurd explains this ‘symbolic power,’ by looking at the 
role of the UN Security Council: “The symbolic power of the Security Council 
is evident in the energy states expend on having the Council pay attention to 
issues of concern to them” (Hurd 2002, 39).
 The conferral of coordinating responsibilities to the UN is done not just because 
of its legitimate power, but also due to a number of more pragmatic reasons: 
powerful states often delegate this responsibility when confronted with the tough-
est cases, as they do not want to bear the costs of and take the blame for perpetu-
ating a conflict. Some of them also maintain a degree of influence over the 
decision- making process by means of the veto power in the Security Council, 
which inevitably limits the UN’s control over the process. As a result, knowing 
that they retain some influence, powerful states may borrow legitimacy from the 
UN. Evidently, the UN’s effectiveness is highly dependent upon the support of its 
member states. Whitefield argues that, “when UN mediation is widely supported, 
its representatives are well placed to convene and build support from relevant 
external actors” (Whitefield 2010, 7). For this reason, in his statement at the 
“Security Council High Level Debate on Mediation and the Settlement of Dis-
putes” the Secretary General Ban Ki- moon called on the Council to: (1) maintain 
unity over the common principles in resolving a conflict; (2) show readiness to use 
its leverage (e.g., sanctions); (3) demonstrate support for the lead mediator in order 
to avoid forum shopping; (4) and once the Council has agreed on how to manage a 
conflict to give the lead mediator the necessary space to work with the parties (Ki- 
moon 2008). This statement reflects the ongoing challenges that the UN is faced 
with when leading international multiparty mediation efforts: a near- constant pro-
liferation of international actors able and willing to get involved that bring with 
them competing interests, coupled with the dwindling authority of the UN, have 
limited the UN’s capacity to effectively conduct the task of coordinating mediation 
efforts (Jones 2002, 111).
Coordination mechanisms
So far, in order to avoid the detrimental effects associated with uncoordinated 
mediation, international actors have developed and used various formats that 
enhance their respective comparative advantage. UN mediation activities have 
generally been conducted by the office of the Secretary General and his Special 
Representatives (SRSG). If adequately supported by the member states, given 
the UN’s perceived legitimacy, activities coordinated by UN envoys are charac-
terized by both credibility and coherence. As mentioned previously in this 
chapter, the UN generally conducts mediation with likeminded actors. For this 
reason, their multiparty mediation activities have often had a title that includes 
the term ‘friends.’ Groups of Friends are “informal groups of states that are 
created to support the peacemaking efforts of the Secretary General and his 
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envoys” (Whitefield 2007, 9). They are established on the initiative of the UN 
secretariat and member states, with the intention of creating a framework for col-
laborative interaction. This interaction prescribes a coordinated effort of pooling 
the leverage of member states in order to assist the peacemaking efforts led by 
the UN secretariat. States are selected on the basis of their ability to keep the 
parties committed to the peacemaking process and are expected to be active in 
“coordinating Security Council and/or General Assembly action on the conflict 
in question” (Whitefield 2007, 10). Depending on their size, these groups are 
subdivided into two groups: (1) the smaller groups of interested states, are 
termed Friends of the Secretary- General; they are more flexible when it comes 
to their engagement, as they tend to participate in activities conducted both at the 
UN headquarters in New York and in the field; and (2) bigger groups, generally 
termed Friends of a country, due to their size conduct their activities primarily in 
New York offices (Whitefield 2007, 10). According to Prantl, the groups of 
friends give the impression of a revived concept of the advisory committees of 
the 1950s (Prantl 2006). The first group emerged in 1992, in the post- Cold War 
context, when the UN Secretariat assumed a leading role in mediating the con-
flict in El Salvador. The group initially consisted of Colombia, Venezuela, 
Mexico and Spain and was later joined by the United States. The original 
purpose of this group was twofold: it was put together to accommodate the inter-
ests of the rebel group Frente Farabundo Marti para la Liberación Nacional 
(FMLN) and to bypass the preponderant power of the US in the Security Council 
and balance it in an informal setting (Prantl 2005, 577). The format allowed the 
UN Secretariat to marginalize the impact of the Security Council, avoid potential 
deadlocks that could have been created in that setting and offer a way out of the 
conflict for the US by participating in the peacemaking process without becom-
ing an active participant (Prantl 2005, 577). The relative success of this endeavor 
prompted the UN secretariat to reapply the concept in various other crises, such 
as Haiti, Guatemala, Western Sahara and Georgia (see Prantl 2006; Whitefield 
2007).
 The comparative advantage of these informal groups is that they allow parti-
cipants to avoid the pitfalls of operating within an existing institutional arrange-
ment, where the distribution of power and decision- making processes have the 
potential to limit peacemaking effectiveness. While groups of friends are still 
selected by and operate closely with the UN secretariat, in some instances, states 
prefer to establish an ad hoc group completely detached from the existing insti-
tutional framework of the UN. Contact groups, as they are commonly referred 
to, bring together states interested in a particular conflict, including (but not 
limited to) the five permanent members of the Security Council, regional actors 
(both states and regional organizations) and other states that are able to con-
tribute to conflict management activities. The first such group was established in 
1977 to assist in the peacemaking process in Namibia. It was a reaction to the 
UN’s inability to manage the ongoing conflicts in South- West Africa. This 
inability was the result of a mounting pressure coming from recently decolo-
nized states that were outraged by the Western countries’ attitude toward South 
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African apartheid policies (Davies 2007). The three Western permanent members 
of the Security Council together with Canada and Germany, at that time non- 
permanent members, formed the Western Contact Group. Not only did the group 
choose to work outside the UN institutional framework, it also lacked any 
explicit mandate from the UN. In spite of this, the group maintained contact with 
the UN secretariat and pursued goals that were in line with the institution’s 
guiding principles and defined objectives. Prantl notes that the interaction 
between the contact group and the UN was quite constructive:
The cooperation between the Western Contact Group and the UN turned out 
to be crucial because the organization provided the seal of legitimacy to the 
Western initiative. The Western Contact Group and, later, after the adoption 
of the linkage approach, the United States alone sought to legitimize the 
substance of negotiations via the process of Council decision making.
(Prantl 2005, 576)
The Namibian experience was later replicated on several other occasions, includ-
ing Liberia, Bosnia and Mindanao. Even while working outside of the UN 
framework, contact groups still aspired to borrow legitimacy from the UN. They 
did this either by maintaining close contact with its Secretariat and/or by con-
ducting some of the discussions within the Security Council. The UN Secretar-
iat, on the other hand, granted this legitimacy knowing that SRSG’s peacemaking 
efforts – which were often conducted parallel to those of the contact group – are 
dependent on member states’ support. Nobel Peace Prize winner Martti 
Ahtisaari, UN Commissioner for Namibia at the time of the formation of the 
Western Contact Group, comments on the delicate relations between the UN and 
external actors that form contact groups:
Mediators need to be realistic and include the support from the major actors 
concerning a conflict: ‘There is a sort of realism involved that you need 
some of the major actors. If you can’t have their support, I would not even 
start a mediation exercise. . . .’ Whilst the international community does not 
need to stand 100 percent behind the mediator’s ideas, they need to support 
the process in general.
(Herrberg and Savaloainen 2009, 7)
These efforts point out a number of important factors that influence the effec-
tiveness of contact groups. If the members of the contact group are able to reach 
consensus about the methods and goals of their joint endeavor, the process will 
inevitably benefit from an increased level of influence and borrowed leverage. 
This consensus does not necessarily need to reflect an absolute symmetry of 
interests among all participating actors; it is inevitable that some interested states 
will pursue a more complex set of goals than others, especially if they are 
directly affected by an escalating conflict. Yet the real convergence that must be 
achieved within the group requires a shared interest in mediating a peaceful 
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solution that is acceptable to all sides and, more importantly, a clearly defined 
idea of what this solution should look like. Put differently, while each third party 
may maintain their potential bias of actor, the group requires the development of 
a common sense of a bias of outcome. The bias of actor may be exploited, 
together with other forms of leverage that each third party contributes to the col-
lective endeavor, to deliver the conflicting parties to the envisaged outcome.
 Overall it appears that unless there is a compatibility of interests between 
powerful states and other mediators (both international and/or regional organiza-
tions and small and/or medium- sized states) successful coordination of medi-
ation activities cannot take place, thereby undermining the chances of success. 
In light of this limitation, it appears that the crucial element of properly executed 
coordination in multiparty mediation is that the lead actor has the necessary 
degree of legitimate power to guide the mediating coalition’s activities and the 
necessary degree of compatibility of interests with major powers (Jones 2002, 
90). As the following case studies show, the lead actor being perceived as legiti-
mate increases the likelihood of mediation success. In cases where the mediation 
efforts were guided and coordinated by international organizations and small and 
medium- sized states, mediation success was still subject to the ability of those 
actors to construct a set of policies and preferences that were compatible with 
the interests of most powerful states that were involved as third parties in the 
peacemaking process. In other words, compatibility of interests between various 
actors increased the internal legitimacy of the mediating coalition. More impor-
tantly, the coalition’s external legitimacy was not challenged by the disputing 
sides because the coalition was able to act on the basis of a common platform.
Note
1 This chapter is based on Vuković (2012) and Vuković (2014a).
3 Tajikistan1
The lengthy peace process that put an end to a violent civil war in Tajikistan 
represents a fairly successful case of multiparty mediation in which the activ-
ities of external actors were “exceptionally well coordinated” (Barnes and 
Abdulaev 2001, 11). This was an extremely complex process in which the 
essential contributions to the resolution of the conflict came from a wide 
variety of actors. Most of the rounds of talks, supported by the OSCE, were 
held under the auspices of the UN, while observer states took turns hosting 
them, thus providing a substantial contribution toward reaching an agreement 
(Iji 2001). At the same time, the process also benefited from the participation 
of different non- state actors and was aided by a very dynamic second- track 
dialogue process2 that came out of the US–Soviet Dartmouth Conference 
(Rubin 1998; Saunders 1999).
 Nevertheless, among all the different mediators involved, Russia and Iran 
played a pivotal role in the peace process. According to Iji, “it was their collabo-
ration that moved the intractable conflict in Tajikistan toward a settlement” 
(2001, 365). Both countries had strong interests in the conflict and highly 
developed relationships with warring parties, the combination of which allowed 
them to assume the role of potentially effective third parties. Barnes and Abdul-
laev point out that “with an interest in the outcome of the war, they became in 
effect ‘secondary parties’ to the conflict . . . although they contributed initially to 
the war effort they later became vital resources to the peace process” (Barnes 
and Abdullaev 2001, 8). According to Hay, the main three reasons for the break-
through in the negotiations were: conflicting parties were exhausted from con-
tinuous fighting; Russia and Iran managed to reach a convergence of interests to 
promote peace in Tajikistan; and the security concerns created by the Taliban 
taking over of Kabul (Hay 2001, 39). These factors allowed for a UN- led and 
coordinated multiparty mediation effort to produce a mutually acceptable solu-
tion for the parties in conflict.
 Therefore, the peace process in Tajikistan potentially represents a case of 
multiparty mediation in which eventual success was directly dependent upon the 
interests of powerful neighboring states, regional geo- political conditions, and 
international organizations’ legitimate power to coordinate the activities of mul-
tiple third parties.
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The nature of conflict
Sources of intractability
Tajikistan’s physical geography (it is a landlocked, mountainous country) 
prompted the creation of several culturally diverse groupings. Although the 
majority of these groups are “a part of the Iranian cultural world and are pre-
dominately Sunni Muslims,” the mountainous terrain “has always made travel 
between different regions difficult . . . creating a significant obstacle to communi-
cation as well as social and economic integration” (Akiner and Barnes 2001, 18). 
The simplest distinction between the various ethno- cultural groupings in the 
country can be made between the populations that have lived in the flatlands in 
the northern part of the country, which “in ancient times were part of the rich 
urban- based culture of Transoxiana,” and populations that inhabited mountain-
ous areas in the rest of the county, which resulted in a creation of “strong local-
ized identities” (Akiner and Barnes 2001, 18).
 Until the USSR assumed control over the territory in the 1920s, there was 
almost no contact between the populations of these areas. The first decade of 
Soviet rule widened the gap between the different communities (Roy 2001). 
Especially important was the impact of different policies that were drafted in 
Moscow, which treated the northern part of the country quite differently than the 
rest. While the plains in the north were gradually industrialized and modernized, 
the mountainous regions were largely ignored and therefore populations that 
lived there not only maintained and strengthened their local identities, they also 
continued to live as their ancestors did for centuries. In principle, the most signi-
ficant political, social, and cultural traits of contemporary Tajikistan were formed 
during Soviet rule.
Development of deep feelings of distrust and mutual hatred
Already in the early 1920s, Basmachi fighters from the mountainous areas 
demonstrated their intent to stop the advancement of the Soviet Union into 
Central Asia. In order to suppress any form of resistance, “the Red Army mas-
sacred more than 10,000 Tajiks and Uzbeks between 1922 and 1926, according 
to official estimates” (Akiner and Barnes 2001, 19). Large parts of the popula-
tion found refuge in neighboring Afghanistan, in an attempt to escape “violent 
purges, forcible resettlement and collectivization, and religious persecution” 
(Idem). According to Akiner and Barnes, “these events had a lasting effect that 
contributed to the conflict dynamics which emerged during the civil war in the 
1990s” (2001, 19).
 In the early 1930s, the Soviet regime started promoting collectivization and 
industrialization policies, which required a forcible transfer of people from the 
central and eastern areas of the country to the north. While these policies produced 
the first migratory dynamic in the country’s history, there was no evidence of any 
integration between populations. Rather, such policies “generated conflict by 
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stimulating inter- group competition and sharpening perceptions of social differ-
ence” (Akiner and Barnes 2001, 19). Forced relocation and mixing of the people 
from different regions transformed the previously loose regional affiliations into a 
“more fixed group identity based on regional origin” (Roy 2001, 23).
 Despite continuous efforts by central authorities in Moscow to organize 
Tajikistan along secular- socialist lines, most of the population, particularly in the 
predominantly rural areas, maintained their clan loyalties and religious observ-
ances (Hiro 1998). According to Roy, “these networks have commonly been 
used to maximize access to and control over resources and they were translated 
into the political and administrative structures of the Soviet Union” (Roy 2001, 
23). Even the politics of the local Communist Party revolved around the regional 
divide. In a centralized, one- party rule system, the only method of career 
advancement was loyalty to the party elite. The party endorsed “administrative 
territorial divisions” and was “grouped around district, province and republic 
level committees” (Roy 2001, 23). The combination of established clan loyalties 
and party association was the source of political factionalism. While ideological 
differences were virtually non- existent, political division followed the territorial 
cleavage, which emphasized regional administrative divisions. For Roy, “this 
generated inter- regional antagonisms in the struggle for access to power, goods 
and other benefits” (2001, 23).
Internal characteristics of the conflicting sides and the creation of 
irreconcilable positions
From the beginning of the Soviet rule, the power in Tajikistan was concentrated 
within two regions – Sogd or Sughd, also referred to as Leninabad in the north, 
and Khatlon in the southeast. Leninabad was by far the region that produced the 
largest number of public officials. While representatives from other regions held 
various powerful positions in the Soviet system, “all the first secretaries of the 
Tajik Communist Party from 1946 to 1991 were Leninabadis” (Roy 2001, 23). 
Due to their administrative positions, apparatchiks from Leninabad were able to 
develop very strong ties with the ruling elite in Moscow and enjoyed the benefits 
of a much more advanced regional economy than the rest of the country.
 On the other hand, the politically completely marginalized and economically 
deprived southwestern region of Gorno- Badakhshan, bordering Afghanistan, 
became a breeding ground for clandestine Islamist movements. What started off 
as an underground network for Islamic worship that rejected the authority of the 
official state- controlled Islamic structures became a movement that slowly began 
assuming a political agenda. Despite some differences, 
by the early 1990s an alliance was formed between the leaders of the distinct 
Islamic factions who made up the Islamic Renaissance Party (IRP): the new 
radicals (led by Said Abdullo Nuri), and what was at the time Tajikistan’s offi-
cial religious establishment (led by Khoji Akbar Turajonzoda).
(Akiner and Barnes 2001, 20)
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 Throughout the 1980s, regional, political and economic disparity, turmoil in 
neighboring Afghanistan, and proliferation of opposition forces posed acute 
challenges to the authorities in Dushanbe. Along with Islamic movements, the 
underground political scene also generated various secular, socio- political move-
ments, such as the Democratic Party of Tajikistan (DPT), which initially had a 
very strong following. The first clear signs of popular dissatisfaction material-
ized in street riots in February 1990, at which point participants attacked ethnic 
Russians and other Europeans while shouting: “Long live the Islamic Republic 
of Tajikistan” (Hiro 1998, 20). However, while most people in Tajikistan con-
sidered Islam to be of crucial importance to their socio- cultural heritage, it 
seemed that “most did not support the creation of an Islamic state” (Akiner and 
Barnes 2001, 20). It appeared that even local religious leaders were not con-
vinced that movements such as the IPR represented the only and the best altern-
ative to the decaying one- party rule of the Communist Party.
 In principle, in the last two decades of the twentieth century, the political 
elites in Tajikistan failed to find adequate policies with which to tackle the 
mounting problems of inter- regional disparities. According to Abdullo, the 
crucial challenges that the country was facing as the Soviet system was eroding 
were “disparities that had arisen from the increasing economic role of southern 
population, the demographic structure of the population, ideological diversifica-
tion, and unequal participation in political decision- making in a country domi-
nated by a northern political elite” (Abdullo 2001, 48).
Employment of repressive measures
By 1989, inter- group skirmishes over the allocation of scarce resources escalated 
into violent clashes. Inter- ethnic confrontations between Tajiks and other ethnic 
groups – mainly Uzbeks and Kyrgyz – become more regular. After a series of 
protests, Tajik replaced Russian as the official language. This action drove large 
parts of the Russian minority to flee the country. Xenophobic sentiment con-
tinued to linger, and on several occasions sparked violent protests – such as 
those against the re- housing of Armenian refuges in Dushanbe (Abdullaev and 
Barnes 2001, 83).
 Following the dissolution of the USSR, the Tajik Supreme Soviet declared 
Tajikistan’s independence on September 9, 1991. At the same time, facing 
strong public pressure, the central authorities recognized and licensed several 
opposition movements such as IRP, the DPT, and the Rastakhiz (Resurgence) 
People’s Organization. A 14-day rally in Dushanbe “[brought] an estimated 
10,000 protesters on to the streets” calling for multiparty elections (Abdullaev 
and Barnes 2001, 83). All the opposition parties took part in the November 
1991 presidential elections, which were eventually won by the Communist 
Party’s candidate from the Leninabad region, Rahmon Naiyev. The election 
results were immediately contested by all opposition leaders who accused the 
ruling elite of rigging the process and taking advantage of disproportionate 
access to resources.
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 Following the election results, the opposition intensified its contestation of 
the communist regime and especially Naiyev’s decision to create a government 
consisting only of Leninabadis from Sughd and Kulyabis from the Khatlon 
region. In May 1992, demonstrations prompted Naiyev to exercise his emer-
gency powers and form a ‘presidential guard,’ which also consisted only of 
Leninabadis and Kulyabis. Attempts to counter the pressure from the opposition 
turned into a military confrontation that led to some deaths (Iji 2001, 360; 
Abdullaev and Barnes 2001, 83). As the situation deteriorated, Naiyev tried to 
appease the opposition by accommodating them within a coalition government. 
However this experiment was not long lived and only managed to outrage the 
neo- communist elite, driving the country into full- blown conflict. As Dushanbe 
was occupied by opposition forces, Naiyev urged the Community of Independent 
States (CIS) to send peacekeeping troops.
 For Russia, this situation was absolutely unacceptable. So without any hesita-
tion, it helped neo- communist forces from Kulyab reclaim Dushanbe and push 
the opposition forces toward the Tajiki- Afghan border. In the meantime, the dis-
satisfied communist elite replaced Rahmon Naiyev with Emomali Rakhmonov 
from Kulyab who formed a government predominantly composed of a loyal 
cadre from Leninabad and Kulyab. By the spring of 1993, the repercussions of 
the intense fighting were more than 30,000 dead and more than 300,000 dis-
placed (Hiro 1998).
Involvement of international actors and their interest in the 
conflict
Russia
In July 1993, 25 Russian border guards were killed during an offensive by 
opposition forces that took place along the border with Afghanistan. Moscow’s 
exasperation was best expressed by an irritated president Yeltzin, who publically 
questioned Russian policy objectives up to that point, asking: “Why did we not 
have a plan to protect this border, which everyone must understand is effectively 
Russia’s, not Tajikistan’s?” (Hiro 1998, 20). It was evident that the Kremlin’s 
strong line now regarded the Tajik–Afghan border as “an advanced Russian 
base” (despite the fact that it is 1,450 km from Russian territory) “that can protect 
Russia from the infiltration of guns, narcotics and Islamic fundamentalism” 
(Hiro 1995, 15). Already, in August 1993, the new doctrine was put into effect 
through Russian- Tajik military cooperation, which paved the way for 25,000 
Russian troops to be located in Tajikistan out of which 17,000 were positioned 
along the border with Afghanistan. The second step was taken in November 
1993, at which point the Tajiki government signed a document that subordinated 
its finances to Russia (idem). Tajikistan remained the only newly independent 
country in Central Asia that continued using the Russian ruble as the only offi-
cial currency. It was clear that the Tajiki government’s survival depended 
directly on Russian support.
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 Officially, the Russian military maintained a neutral stance in the Tajik civil 
war. However, there are numerous claims that “the army supported pro- 
government forces with vehicles, ammunition and weapons” (Abdullaev and 
Barnes 2001, 93). Again, officially the Russian government indicated a clear 
interest in maintaining and developing official relations only with the Tajiki gov-
ernment. However, from 1993, as many members of the opposition, especially 
those from the DPT, found refuge in Moscow, Russian officials started encour-
aging the parties to talk, and Russia subsequently acted as a key sponsor of the 
inter- Tajik negotiations (Abdullaev and Barnes 2001, 93).
Iran
In order to counterbalance the asymmetric power, the Islamic- democratic 
coalition sought external support from Iran. The special relationship between 
the two countries mainly revolved around cultural and religious issues: 
Tajikistan was the only new, Farsi- speaking Muslim country in Central Asia. 
However, despite implicit appeals to Iran, manifestations of Islamic slogans – 
that echoed the Iranian revolutionary days – were only a symbolic indicator of 
radicalization of the pro- Iranian Islamic agenda. In reality, the Islamic- 
democratic opposition “neither believed in the possibility or desirability of an 
Islamic alternative nor was it even united in a preference for and ideologically 
tainted political model for Tajikistan” (Mesbahi 1997, 143). The common 
agenda for the opposition forces was a pursuit of a democratic political system 
founded on a new constitution. From the beginning, it was absolutely clear to 
the authorities in Teheran that Tajikistan was not ‘ready’ for an Islamic 
revolution, due to its Soviet heritage which largely dissociated the population 
from Islam, and regional/clan fragmentation. At the same time, Iran was faced 
with wide- ranging and formidable regional and international consensus, pro-
moted by Russia and the US, on the issue of the Islamic threat and Iranian 
influence in Tajikistan (Mesbahi 1997, 148). Iran’s reluctance to fully promote 
an Islamic agenda in Tajikistan created problems for the opposition forces. 
Authorities in Teheran refused to provide armaments when they were most 
needed and, on occasion, failed to provide direct rhetorical support for the 
opposition through diplomatic means (Mesbahi 1997, 150). Nevertheless, Iran 
remained the biggest and most influential outside actor that voiced undisputed 
support for the opposition.
 Both Russia and Iran had obvious leverage over the conflicting sides. Ade-
quate use of such power represented a crucial resource that would allow the 
mediating coalition to produce the necessary incentives to leverage the govern-
ment and the United Tajiki Opposition (UTO) toward a mutually acceptable 
solution. However, in order to produce such incentives, biased mediators need to 
assume a cooperative attitude. Accordingly, while cooperating with other medi-
ators, biased mediators are useful as they can use their special relationship with 
one conflicting side to influence its behavior, positions, and perceptions thereby 
moving it toward an agreement.
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 Finally, reflecting on Russia and Iran’s formation and projection of interests 
vis- à-vis Tajikistan, the country was of great strategic importance for both 
regional powers. As indicated in the theoretical chapter, once third parties show 
an intent to cooperate with each other, in order to produce the necessary incen-
tives and successfully manage the conflict, third parties need to coordinate their 
activities and adequately use the leverage that is at their disposal in order to 
guide the parties toward a mutually acceptable solution. The intent to adequately 
apply necessary and available leverage is directly related to the strategic import-
ance of the country as perceived by the third parties involved. The stronger the 
mediators’ strategic interest in the conflict, the greater the chance of successful 
mediation through a coordinated effort by mediators in a coalition. The prospects 
of employing adequate (and necessary) leverage in order to steer the two con-
flicting sides toward an agreement will be explored further in the remainder of 
this chapter.
Involvement of the UN
According to Goryayev, “the UN was recognized as the leading international 
body driving the peace process and coordinating international responses to the 
crisis” (Goryayev 2001, 32; emphasis added). The UN already became involved 
in September of 1992, when it dispatched the first fact- finding mission to explore 
the conflict dynamics more closely. Once the mission reported in detail about the 
high level of violence – defining the turmoil as civil war – the UN decided to 
dispatch a new mission (in November 1992), which also interacted with repre-
sentatives of neighboring states. These first consultations paved the way for 
future cooperation between the UN and neighboring countries that were able to 
exert the necessary political, economic, and military influence over the conflict-
ing parties in order to move them toward a peaceful solution. By January 1993, 
the Secretary General established a small United Nations Mission of Observers 
in Tajikistan (UNMOT), mandated to monitor the situation on the ground and 
ascertain the positions of all concerned parties. The information provided by 
UNMOT prompted the Secretary General to appoint a full- time Special Envoy 
“mandated to concentrate on achieving a ceasefire and establishing the process 
of negotiations for a political solution” (Goryayev 2001, 34).
 Goryayev points out that “over a period of seven years, the Special Envoys/
Representatives and their staff were responsible for designing the negotiation 
process, maintaining contacts with all parties to the conflict and integrating the 
efforts of other countries and organizations” (2001, 34). While lacking muscle, 
the UN was able to provide leadership in coordinating the activities of various 
third parties (Iji 2001, 347). The mediation process showed that the Special 
Envoys were highly devoted to maintaining and strengthening their relations 
with the officials from the neighboring countries. Regular communication and 
consultations with the observer countries created an opportunity for the UN 
negotiating team to “inform the governments on the negotiations, to coordinate 
plans and actions, and to prepare for future rounds of talks” (Hay 2001, 40; 
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emphasis added). Such actions generated the requisite degree of trust in the 
activities conducted by the UN and assured the neighboring countries (particu-
larly Russia and Iran) that the UN- led negotiations would not endanger the inter-
ests they had in the region. According to Hay, “the consultations with observer 
governments kept them informed, engaged and confident that the Tajik delega-
tions and the mediators were taking their views and interests into account” (Hay 
2001, 42).
 Throughout the process, the UN mediating team was not only in charge of 
facilitating the communication between the belligerents, they were also in charge 
of formulating proposals and drafting the initial text of the agreement. In order 
to assure the interested states, and Russia and Iran in particular, the UN medi-
ators “often coordinated the compromise solutions they proposed” which “helped 
the observers to feel a sense of ownership over the negotiating process” (Hay 
2001, 43). These trust- building efforts generated reciprocal attitudes among the 
observing countries. For the UN mediators, it was crucial to have the support of 
the powerful states, especially Russia, which had strong military, political and 
economic interests in the region. For this reason, the UN team regularly informed 
and consulted the Security Council, which generated strong support for the 
SRSG’s mediating efforts from within the Security Council.
 While well equipped to perform the mediator roles of communicator and for-
mulator, the UN lacked ‘muscle’ in the mediation process. The only leverage it 
had was that of legitimacy. As pointed out by Iji, “the UN’s legitimate and moral 
authority served as a complement to the incentives supplied by Russia and Iran” 
(2001, 376). This was especially important when the two conflicting parties 
showed no interest in compromising. Under such critical conditions, UN mediators 
would stop the negotiation process and consult the neighboring countries’ officials 
– especially those from Russia and Iran – share their formulas, draft new propos-
als, and “request them to use their leverage with the parties to encourage them to 
compromise” (Hay 2001, 43). Therefore, the necessary conditions for successful 
coordination – the required level of legitimacy and compatibility of interests 
between the international organization and major powers – were present and 
greatly contributed to the success of the mediation process. However, in order to 
arrive at the required degree of cooperation, both major powers first needed to 
achieve a mutual convergence of interests. This was neither a simple nor a quick 
endeavor.
Multiparty mediation
Initial lack of cooperation between third parties
In the context of this disproportional constellation of forces, where the govern-
ment had the upper hand due to its support from Moscow and the opposition had 
failed to find similar support elsewhere, Russia saw an opportune moment to 
initiate inter- Tajik negotiations under UN auspices. Reflecting on the previously 
illustrated game theoretical model, at this point the multiparty mediation process 
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starts and the ‘game’ is at point (b), where the mediator indicates the intention of 
cooperating with other third parties – in this case Russia showing its intent to use 
the good offices of the UN – and manages to reap comparatively higher benefits 
than those third parties that are not part of the multiparty mediation endeavor – 
in this case, Iran. The benefits stem directly from the ability to guide and direct 
the process in a way that is compatible with the ‘cooperative’ mediator’s inter-
ests, particularly as these interests are not counterbalanced by the involvement of 
the other ‘non- cooperative’ mediator.
 Since the attacks on the border station in July 1993, in spite of the strong line 
assumed by the Russian army and President Yeltzin, the Russian ministry of 
foreign affairs was exploring the possibility of finding a settlement through 
negotiation. Acting as communicator and facilitator, Russia established direct 
contact with the opposition leaders that found refuge in Teheran. Resorting to 
shuttle diplomacy, Russian envoys managed to encourage both sides in the con-
flict to start negotiations (Gretsky 1995; Iji 2001).
 The first round of talks was held in Moscow between April 5–9, 1994. The 
two sides managed to agree on an agenda for the rounds of negotiation to follow, 
classifying three categories of issues that needed to be tackled: political settle-
ment, refugees and internally displaced persons, and the structure of the govern-
ment of Tajikistan (Iji 2001, 360). From the start, a substantial discrepancy over 
the ‘sequencing’3 of these issues emerged. The government wanted first to see 
the mutiny end and find a solution to the refugee problem, while the opposition 
called for an “all- party council to govern the country and the legalization of 
opposition parties” (Iji 2001, 360).
 The second round of talks was held in Teheran, between June 18–28, 1994. 
The key issue on the agenda was the achievement of a ceasefire. Despite the 
initial readiness to come to an understanding regarding the ceasefire, the parties 
failed to agree on a timeframe for its implementation. Once the talks had failed, 
the government abruptly decided to hold a referendum on the new constitution 
and presidential elections, scheduling both for September. Irritated by this move, 
the opposition intensified its military operations along the border with Afghani-
stan and the situation deteriorated even further.
 Russia was not happy with the ongoing conflict, especially as it was endan-
gering Russian troops located in the country. It decided to resort to manipulative 
strategies in order to force the government to sign a ceasefire agreement and to 
postpone the elections and referendum (Hay 2001). At the same time, Iranian 
diplomats used the same tactics with the opposition leaders. Shortly thereafter, a 
ceasefire was reached at a consultative meeting in Teheran in September 1994. 
According to Hay, the deputy foreign ministers of Russia and Iran “were instru-
mental in convincing the respective Tajik delegations to sign the Drat Agree-
ment on a Temporary Ceasefire prepared by the UN negotiating team” (Hay 
2001, 40). The compatibility of interests between two major powers, coupled 
with the coordinating efforts of the UN whose position did not run counter to 
those of the major powers, were the necessary conditions for achieving the 
agreement. The armistice was eventually extended until February 1995 during 
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the third round of talks in Islamabad, held between October 20–31, 1994 (Iji 
2001). This provides a clear example of how a cooperative and coordinated 
effort by biased third parties can produce sufficient incentives to leverage the 
disputants toward an agreement.
 However, despite these important contributions to achieving a cessation of hos-
tilities, Russia was still not fully committed to brokering a negotiated solution to 
the conflict. According to Iji “Moscow helped jump- start the negotiations, move 
them forward, and focus the attention of the parties on talking rather than fighting, 
but was not prepared to pressure Rakhmonov strongly enough to accept power 
sharing with the opposition” (2001, 366). This attitude sent mixed signals to its 
partners in Dushanbe that were focused on regaining power through new elections 
(presidential in November 1994 and parliamentary in February 1995) and a refer-
endum on the constitution (February 1995) that excluded the participation of the 
opposition parties. The government’s decision reduced the already fragile confi-
dence the opposition had in the peace process, so the spotlight once again shifted 
toward the frontlines. Evidently, the lack of the strong presence of Iran in this 
phase of the process had a direct negative effect on the opposition forces. They 
were clearly experiencing comparatively lower payoffs from the peace process (as 
predicted by the game- theoretical model), which in turn induced them to resort to 
violence in order to improve their negotiating position.
 As the belligerent activities escalated, the two conflicting sides agreed to meet 
in Moscow in April 1995 to discuss the possibility of extending the armistice. 
The opposition accepted the talks under the condition that they would lead to 
more substantial negotiation over a potential political settlement. On the eve of 
this meeting, Russian Foreign Minister Kozyrev issued a statement addressed to 
Russians living outside Russia which included the following: “we have at our 
disposal an arsenal of methods to defend our compatriots” (Hiro 1995, 15). The 
opposition understood this as a direct warning and walked out of the UN- chaired 
meeting. Motivated by this unyielding Russian position, Tajik President 
Rakhmonov reacted in a self- assured tone and offered to meet the opposition 
leader, Said Nuri, from IRP, “any time, anywhere” (Hiro 1995, 14).
 After this statement was issued, a series of summits and rounds of talks were 
held. On most of these occasions, these talks only served as an outlet for both 
sides to channel their disagreement without achieving any substantial progress. 
Evidently, the government still had an upper hand in the peace process, espe-
cially given the overwhelming role of their Russian partners. They were, 
however, hurting on the battlefield, as the opposition resorted to violence to 
distort the status quo balance of power at the negotiating table where they were 
still experiencing lower payoffs. Again the lack of a substantial Iranian presence 
in the peace process was hurting the UTO.
 Of the series of summits and rounds of talks, the agreements on refugees and 
prisoners of war achieved during the fourth round of talks in Almaty (May 
22–June 1, 1995) are worthy of mention. Another important event was the 
signing of the Protocol on the Fundamental Principles for Establishing Peace and 
National Accord in Tajikistan, which was the result of the Rakhmonov–Nuri 
76  Tajikistan
summit facilitated by Iran in Teheran on July 19, following indirect talks through 
the UN envoy. This protocol served to “[delineate] the road to and the overall 
shape of a final settlement” (Iji 2001, 362). Despite Iran’s contribution to draft-
ing the protocol, its mediation potential was still not fully realized. Teheran still 
maintained financial and political support in addition to their somewhat clandes-
tine military assistance to the Islamic- democratic coalition. Iran’s biggest hope 
was to create “an effective contestant against the Rakhmonov regime, although 
Teheran continued to be very careful to maintain good relations with the govern-
ment side” (Iji 2001, 366). While both sides in the conflict started sending 
signals of readiness to start negotiating on political issues, fighting on the ground 
never actually stopped. Evidently, the conflicting sides used violence as an off- 
the-table tactic, in order to improve their bargaining position.4 As the situation 
deteriorated, the subsequent (fifth) round of talks held in Ashgabat, Turkmeni-
stan – November 30, 1995 and between July 8–21, 1996 – focused mainly 
(again) on finding an agreement on a ceasefire.
 It was evident that neither side was fully committed to negotiating a peace 
agreement. Even though the peace process had been underway for more than two 
years, high levels of mutual distrust still existed. The opposition questioned the 
legitimacy of the neo- communists’ participation in negotiations as an official 
government, given the alleged electoral fraud that had taken place over time. Its 
military success throughout the conflict was impressive, proving to Iran that its 
support was worthwhile. On the other hand, the government did not recognize 
opposition forces as an equal partner with whom they would not only negotiate, 
but also eventually share power. The government did not have to look far to find 
support for its claims. Russia was “most unlikely to let Tajik Islamist share 
power in a country which it regards as crucial to its own security” (Hiro 1996, 
14). Clearly, while outside support was still available for their respective unilat-
eral solutions, the Tajik parties participated in negotiations only ‘half- heartedly’ 
(Iji 2001, 366).
 As argued earlier, when the mediating coalition is faced with conflicting inter-
ests, if one mediator decides to defect from the group dynamic, this will have an 
important impact on the dynamics of the peace process between negotiators. At 
the same time, Russia and Iran still did not have a shared idea of a potential solu-
tion to the conflict, which would have helped them to push the parties toward a 
peaceful solution to their dispute. If mediators do not reach a convergence of 
interests, the conflicting sides will be induced to defect from negotiations, 
making it more likely that the peace process will fail. In the case of Tajikistan, 
this was unequivocally indicated by the unyielding positions of both the govern-
ment and the UTO. Neither side was inclined to show any intent to compromise 
and abandon maximalist claims in the peacemaking process.
Convergence of interests between third parties
Just when the peace process was approaching a severe deadlock in September 
1996, violent events in nearby Afghanistan produced sufficient cause for Russia 
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and Iran to settle the conflict in Tajikistan (Abdullaev and Babakhanov 1998; 
Abdullo 2001). The storming of Kabul was the ‘last straw’ that induced Russia 
to rethink its policy objectives that supported a military solution to the conflict. 
By then, the neo- communist regime in Dushanbe was in a state of serious decay, 
while the opposition forces were gaining momentum on the battlefield. Acknow-
ledging the weakening of its military forces and its inability to fight Muslim 
insurgents – a lesson learned in a 20-month long conflict in Chechnya in 
1995–1996 – Russia determined “the cost of further military involvement in 
Tajikistan to be too high” (Iji 2001, 366). Since the Tajik–Afghan border was 
still considered to be ‘a Russian border,’ Moscow urgently needed a stable 
Tajikistan to serve as a buffer zone against the threat of Islamic fundamentalism 
coming from Afghanistan (Iji 2001, 367).
 Iran was also prompted to modify its policy objectives in Tajikistan. Despite 
the temporary military success of the opposition forces, it was already clear to 
Teheran that the chances of an armed seizure of power were extremely small. 
And even in that case, in the eyes of policy makers in Teheran, Tajikistan was 
never ready to be modeled into an Islamic state. For this reason, Iran was always 
very careful to maintain a relationship with the government in Dushanbe, at least 
in terms of the cultural and religious dimensions. According to several obser-
vers, “Iran attached more importance to the maintenance of good relations with 
Russia than to the creation of an Islamic state in Tajikistan” (Iji 2001, 367). In 
fact, just in order to preserve good relations with authorities in Moscow, Teheran 
never provided all the assistance requested by the opposition forces (Mesbahi 
1997). So when the Taliban militia gained power in Afghanistan, Iran immedi-
ately realized that the conflict in Tajikistan needed to be resolved as soon as pos-
sible. For Iran, a stable Tajikistan represented a solid shield against the regime in 
Afghanistan the existence of which was “adverse to their interests because of 
geopolitical, ethnic and religious reasons” (Iji 2001, 367).
 Given these novel developments, the two lead states had a converging interest 
in resolving the conflict in Tajikistan. In this case, both Russia and Iran shared an 
idea of the final outcome of the conflict: the final agreement should be based on a 
power- sharing arrangement between the government and the opposition (Hiro 
1998). As Iji noted, “such coincidence of interests and positions rendered possible 
the joint mediation by Russia and Iran in the Tajik conflict.  . . . Once Russia and 
Iran became serious about settling the conflict through a cooperative mediation 
effort, the negotiation began to gain momentum” (Iji 2001, 368).
 In fact, both states took the conflict resolution process much more seriously. 
Using the particular leverage at their disposal as biased mediators and lead states, 
they resorted to manipulative strategies in order to move both conflicting sides 
toward an agreement. In cases in which outside actors have a strong strategic 
interest in a country or region, which prompts them to manage a conflict, the 
stronger the mediators’ strategic interest in the conflict, the greater the chances of 
successful mediation through a coordinated effort by mediators in a coalition. As 
indicated previously, Tajikistan possessed all the characteristics of a strategically 
important zone for both Russia and Iran. Therefore, well- coordinated action taken 
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by both Russia and Iran soon brought results. Both conflicting sides, exhausted by 
continuous fighting, saw a military solution to the conflict as an unattainable goal. 
Eventually, as their sponsor states definitely stopped providing assistance for 
military action, both the government and the opposition started taking the option of 
actually negotiating a solution much more seriously. Thus, Rakhmonov and Nuri, 
each one experiencing increasing pressure from the outside patron states, agreed to 
meet and discuss the most delicate issues of the peace agreement. By December 
1996, they managed to find a mutually acceptable formula for peace. In the follow-
ing rounds of talks, hosted by Iran (Teheran, January 6–19, 1997) and Russia 
(Moscow, February 26–March 8, 1997), thanks to the well- synchronized activities 
of powerful states, the parties managed to overcome all their differences in opinion, 
agreed to make important concessions regarding the future power- sharing arrange-
ment, and paved the way to the actual peace agreement which was signed on June 
27, 1997 in Moscow. According to Hay,
the personal contribution of Russian Foreign Minister Primakov and his 
deputy Mr. Pashtukov, were invaluable for reaching agreement on the 
Protocol on Military Issues in March 1997, one of the most important docu-
ments of the process. The direct involvement of Iranian Foreign Minister 
Velayati facilitated the signing of Protocol on Refugees in January 1997.
(Hay 2001, 40)
What was even more remarkable was the fact that Russia and Iran were not only 
focused on putting pressure on the negotiators, they also used all necessary 
means to create a proper atmosphere for the negotiations. Of particular import-
ance for them was the isolation of the spoilers5 who had problems accepting the 
proposed power- sharing solution. An unprecedented demonstration of Russian 
dedication to achieving and upholding the peace settlement happened in August 
1997, when Russian air forces bombed a garrison of governmental forces led by 
generals unhappy with the peace agreement and the power- sharing arrangement 
it prescribed. Evidently, Moscow was “deadly serious” about helping 
Rakhmonov implement the peace treaty (Hiro 1997, 14).
 Looking back at the game theoretical model, the apparent convergence of 
interests moved the process to point (c). In other words, the process reached the 
NME. The convergence of interests was a direct result of a series of factors. Evi-
dently, a strong geo- political shift will induce the defecting mediator to change 
its strategy and engage in a cooperative meditation effort to manage the conflict. 
The storming of Kabul by Taliban forces represented a serious geopolitical chal-
lenge for both Russia and Iran. While the Tajik civil war could be treated as an 
isolated conflict that could be contained within a region without any fear of it 
spilling over to other countries, neither third party showed any intent to push for 
a more peaceful solution to the dispute. However, the projected and feared spill-
over effect stemming from Afghanistan induced Russia and Iran to rethink their 
policies toward the region and thus find a stronger interest in stabilizing the situ-
ation in Tajikistan as soon as possible. Therefore, the convergence of interests 
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between two mediators was the direct effect of a serious geo- political change in 
the region and the causal link between Taliban occupation of Kabul and Russia 
and Iran’s convergence of interests can be deduced.
 At the same time, an increase in the cost of supporting a war induced the 
defecting mediator to change its strategy and engage in a cooperative meditation 
effort to manage the conflict. Both Russia and Iran found the costs of perpetu-
ating the war unbearable and not in their self- interest. As indicated previously, 
Russia in particular was harmed by the ongoing warfare and this realization 
directly induced Moscow officials to rethink their policies regarding the peace 
process in Tajikistan. Therefore, the causal linkage between increasing costs of 
supporting warfare and convergence of interests between third parties can be 
observed. Once Russia and Iran realized that a military solution to the conflict 
was unattainable, they were able to reformulate their policies toward their part-
ners, using specific power at their disposal, and leverage them through a 
cooperative endeavor to find a mutually acceptable solution. While Iran was less 
affected by the costs of war, it was more prone to rethink its policies toward the 
conflict due to the ineffectiveness of its strategy to produce any outcome that 
was in line with its self- interest. The same can be said about Russia’s change of 
attitude: when a mediator’s defecting strategy produces high costs in the medi-
ation process for the state it supports, this will induce the defecting mediator to 
change its strategy and engage in a cooperative meditation effort to manage the 
conflict.
Notes
1 An earlier version of this chapter was published as a case study in Vuković (2012).
2 Saunders (1999) identifies three distinct yet highly interrelated levels of peacemaking 
and peacebuilding processes that took place in Tajikistan. While each level was instru-
mental for the achievement of a peaceful solution, this chapter primarily focuses on the 
“level I” or “track- one” peacemaking process which was characterized by the parti-
cipation of the highest ranking officials from the Government of Tajikistan and United 
Tajik Opposition.
3 For the discussion on sequencing see Lax and Sebenius (1991).
4 For the discussion on the use of violence during negotiations see Sisk (2009).
5 See Stedman (1997) for a discussion on spoilers in international conflict resolution.
4 Namibia
A much different case of multiparty mediation occurred throughout the 1980s in 
Southern Africa. The peace settlement signed on December 22, 1988 at the UN 
headquarters in New York by officials representing Angola, Cuba, and South 
Africa, which granted Namibia its long- awaited independence, represented the 
successful conclusion of an eight- year-long, US- led diplomatic endeavor that 
engaged a multitude of international actors. The intricate dynamics of the Cold 
War era coupled with regional problems dating back to the League of Nations, 
were reasons enough for the US to understand that acting alone was not suffi-
cient and that its mediatory clout, even as a superpower, was finite (Crocker 
1999, 229). In order to guide all parties involved in the regional imbroglio 
toward a settlement, they needed the much broader diplomatic involvement of 
various global and regional players.
 Looking back, it appears quite clear that the peacemaking process could not 
succeed without valuable diplomatic input provided by members of the Western 
Contact Group (the United Kingdom, France, West Germany, and Canada), 
frontline states (Tanzania, Zambia, Zimbabwe, Mozambique, and Botswana) and 
the UN and its sub- organizations (Iji 2011). According to Crocker, “the multi-
party character of the mediation was designed to neutralize the obstruction of 
competing parties and states, and add reach, credibility, and access to inter-
national and regional efforts” (Crocker 1999, 207).1 Moreover, on the systemic 
level, the rapprochement between the USSR and the US broke the deadlock in 
the negotiation process and contributed to the US mediation initiative (Berridge 
1989, Wood 1991, Pycroft 1994). When the Soviet Union radically altered its 
policy objectives and “abandoned reflexive obstructionism” in order to “do crea-
tive things together” (Crocker 1999, 239), the peace process managed to over-
come Cold War constraints and move the parties toward a settlement for a 
longstanding problem in Southern Africa. The rapprochement between the US 
and the USSR was very important for the peacemaking process. It allowed for 
US- led mediation (primarily conducted by Chester Crocker, who at that time 
was the US Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs) to achieve the 
necessary level of legitimacy and consequently produce success via a well- 
coordinated peace process. Thus, despite the fact the US acted as a biased medi-
ator with a specific set of interests it aimed to promote in the peace process, its 
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role was acceptable to both the disputants and the other powerful state (USSR) 
(Berridge 1989, 469). However, in the mentioned period, as the Soviets priori-
tized their interests in Afghanistan, they left policy leadership on Angola to the 
Cubans and their Angolan allies (Crocker 1993). Thus, next to an improved 
climate in US–Soviet relations, a critical change of position made by the Cuban 
government, which had its own independent agenda and a strong military pres-
ence in Angola, was of pivotal importance for the peacemaking process.
 Therefore, the case of Namibia provides a unique opportunity to observe a 
situation in which the outcome was dependent upon the interests of external 
actors and global geo- political conditions. At the same time, the case will also 
show how intrinsic dynamics of warfare induced multiple mediators and actors 
on the ground to achieve the necessary level of convergence of interests and, 
through a peace process coordinated by a powerful state, produce a mutually 
acceptable solution to the conflict.
The nature of the conflict
Sources of intractability
The territory of present- day Namibia was occupied by Germany after the Berlin 
Congress in 1878 and remained in its possession until the end of the Great War 
when the League of Nations decided to transfer it to South Africa as a ‘Class C’ 
mandate which stayed to administer the territory as an integral part of the gov-
erning state (Zartman 1989a, 174). After a series of events in the post- World 
War II period, and the growing global pressure toward decolonization, in 1968 
the UN changed the name of the territory of Southwest Africa to Namibia. Soon 
after, in 1971, following several appeals and rulings in favor of South Africa, the 
International Court of Justice ruled South Africa’s presence there illegal 
(Crocker 1999, 207). However, the real challenge to the South African presence 
in Namibia arose after a sudden Portuguese withdrawal from the region in 1975, 
leaving Angola completely vulnerable to a subsequent Soviet- backed, Cuban 
intervention. The link with the events unfolding in neighboring Angola proved 
to be of crucial importance to the mediation process that would follow, as both 
aspects – the power vacuum in Angola and Namibia’s claim of independence – 
would eventually be linked and managed jointly by international actors.
Development of deep feelings of distrust, mutual hatred and 
irreconcilable positions
During the wave of decolonization after the Second World War, in the territories of 
present day Angola and Namibia, several groups formed with national liberation as 
their main goal. Each one embodied a particular societal mark and was inclined 
to promote a specific socio- political agenda. During German colonial rule, the 
Herero community of central Namibia and the Nama from the south were subjected 
to brutal exploitation and genocide (Olusoga and Erichsen 2010). As early as the 
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1920s, when the territory was transferred to a South African administration (at that 
time a British dominion), the ideal of an independent Namibia started to emerge. In 
fact, a few thousand Hereros managed to escape the German “extermination order” 
of 1904, finding refuge in present- day Botswana (Vigne 1987, 87). According to 
Vigne, “it was through the efforts of exiles that Namibians themselves were able to 
bring the issue of Namibia to the attention of the UN, despite the virtual imprison-
ment of the majority of their own country, and the exile of many more” (1987, 87). 
The growing sense of Namibian nationhood was further strengthened in the midst 
of the global wave of decolonization, resulting in a strong resistance to South 
African rule. Colonial hardship was further aggravated with the introduction of 
apartheid policies in 1948. During the 1950s, several political movements emerged 
including the South West Africa’s People Organization (SWAPO) – an inexperi-
enced, populist, and non- aligned movement – and the South West African National 
Union (SWANU) – a sophisticated, perhaps elitist, and Peking- oriented movement 
(Vigne 1987, 88). The turning point came about in 1964, when the newly formed 
Organization of African Unity (OAU) put forward a direct challenge to both move-
ments centered upon their readiness to take up arms against the South African occu-
pation. SWAPO’s ‘yes’ led to its recognition, while SWANU’s refusal to accept the 
risks of armed struggle meant the withdrawal of OAU support (Vigne 1987, 88). As 
a result, SWAPO emerged as the “sole and authentic representative of the Namibian 
people” in the eyes of the UN (A/RES/3111, 1973; A/RES/31/146, 1976).
 Like many African countries, from its inception, Angola represented a con-
glomerate of different peoples and groups, each with its distinct history and tra-
ditions (Meijer and Birmingham 2004, 10). Their shared experience started in 
large part with the Portuguese colonial expansion in the region. Under the colo-
nial regime, the Angolan society was subjected to highly discriminatory legisla-
tion, which “separated the indigenous population from a tiny elite of ‘civilized’ 
individuals (or assimilados) who enjoyed some of the rights of Portuguese 
citizens” (Meijer and Birmingham 2004, 11). These racial and discriminatory 
politics unquestionably left an important mark on the future societal dynamics in 
Angola. Social cleavages that were generated by the colonial rule conditioned 
the future relationships between different social groups, which were character-
ized by high levels of mistrust and suspicion.
 While in Namibia SWAPO was able to assume the role of the “sole and 
authentic representative” of the people, which was able to challenge South 
African rule, in Angola things were quite different. The territory was affected by 
an ongoing rivalry between various elites. Over time, three very strong group-
ings emerged, all promoting the idea of national liberation. The National Front 
for the Liberation of Angola (FNLA), led by Holden Roberto, was initially the 
strongest one, reflecting the aspirations of the elites from the north, primarily 
from the hinterland of Kinshasa, while still maintaining some cultural links with 
the old Kongo kingdom (Meijer and Birmingham 2004, 12).
 The Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA), emerged from 
the territory populated by the Mbundu people from the surroundings of Luanda, 
but it also included several urban communities of both indigenous and 
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mixed- race descent. Finally, the Union of Total Independence of Angola 
(UNITA) led by Jonas Savimbi, promoted the economic interests of the Ovim-
budu people and their merchant leaders from the southern planalto (Meijer and 
Birmingham 2004, 12). However, according to Meijer and Birmingham, “to a large 
extent the ethnic identification of these movements has come about as a result of 
conscious political maneuvering by each leadership rather than as a genuine 
expression of popular sentiment and aspiration” (2004, 12). The promotion of par-
ticular interests was only aggravated by the power vacuum left after the end of 
Portuguese colonial rule, as each movement aspired to establish power over the 
entire country.
Internal characteristics of the conflicting sides and employment of 
repressive measures
The anti- colonial struggle in Angola started in the early 1960s and was charac-
terized by methods of guerilla warfare. Since none of the armed movements was 
able to seriously challenge the colonial rule, they tried to outmaneuver each 
other on the political and diplomatic level. For this reason, the nationalist move-
ments were very eager to attain the necessary support from abroad. The FNLA 
managed to secure the backing of some of the African countries, the US, and 
China, and in 1962 it established the Revolutionary Government of Angola in 
Exile (GRAE), which was initially recognized by OAU as a legitimate repre-
sentative of Angola and a successor of the colonial rule (Meijer and Birmingham 
2004, 13). However, despite being much weaker militarily, by 1975, the MPLA 
managed to outmaneuver the FNLA diplomatically and shift the OAU support in 
its favor.
 Both movements suffered strongly from internal fractionalization. Especially 
vulnerable in this regard was FNLA, whose government in exile suffered a 
serious hit in 1964 when Jonas Savimbi – Minister of Foreign Affairs at that 
time – accused the FNLA of being militarily ineffective, dependent upon the US, 
and affected by nepotism and the authoritarian leadership of Holden Roberto 
(Meijer and Birmingham 2004, 13). He went on to visit a number of states – 
interestingly enough, mainly communist ones – in search of support. In 1966, he 
established UNITA. Meijer and Birmingham point out that “by exploiting the 
feelings of exclusion in Angola’s largest ethnic group, the Ovimbundu, Savimbi 
built up his own constituency in the centre and south of the country” (Meijer and 
Birmingham 2004, 13).
 The first Angolan war – which was part of a greater Portuguese colonial war 
– was brought to an end in 1974, not because of the effectiveness of anti- colonial 
movements, but due to the growing pressure and dissatisfaction of the public in 
Portugal. In fact, the process of decolonization was a direct result of the April 
1974 military coup that overthrew the Salazar- Caetano regime in Portugal. As 
Portuguese control over Angola was decreasing, sporadic violence broke out 
across the country. During the turmoil, the armies of the MPLA, FNLA, and 
UNTA jointly patrolled the country with the aim of preserving peace (Meijer 
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and Birmingham 2004). In January 1975, thanks to strong international pressure, 
the Portuguese authorities and the three movements signed the Alvor Accords, 
which prescribed the establishment of a transitional government, a new constitu-
tion, elections, and independence for Angola. The accords soon collapsed, 
however, creating a pretext for a power struggle between three factions.
 At the same time, although in exile, SWAPO was challenging South African 
rule in Namibia. Over time, the movement opened offices in several cities across 
Africa, eventually opening one at the UN. Although very active on the diplo-
matic front, SWAPO received the necessary ‘push’ to resort to violence only 
with the ruling of the International Court of Justice (ICJ) on the issue of 
Namibia’s independence. The Court started deliberating on the issue due to 
South Africa’s refusal to transfer the territory to a UN Trusteeship Council. Ethi-
opia and Liberia had asked for a “contentious judgment” of South West Africa 
and in 1966 they received a favorable advisory opinion from the Court. 
However, this only caused further complications, as months later, the Court 
reversed its earlier opinion stating that the two countries had ‘no locus standi’ 
and that the case was inadmissible (Vigne 1987, 89). Although numerous inter-
national partners tried to persuade SWAPO to resort to legal means and use the 
UN system to gain the necessary support for independence, at that moment it 
was clear that SWAPO could only secure independence through fighting (Vigne 
1987, 90).
 On July 18, 1966, the same day the ICJ reversed its earlier opinion, SWAPO 
declared its intention to start a military campaign against South Africa. The 
movement was already preparing for this move and the first units entered north-
ern Namibia in August 1966 (Vigne 1987, 90). The movement was undertrained 
and poorly equipped to confront the South African forces. Nevertheless, they 
were resolute in their aims. In the midst of the early military campaign, SWAPO 
still tried to rally international support. The reversed decision of the ICJ, which 
South Africa proclaimed as its victory, motivated the members of the UN 
General Assembly to pass Resolution 2145 and terminate the current mandate 
which was conferred by the League of Nations. As South Africa had failed to 
fulfill its obligations as laid out in the mandate, it no longer had the right to 
administer the territory and henceforth South West Africa would come under the 
direct responsibility of the UN (A/RES/2145, 1996). Bypassing the Security 
Council, the General Assembly also established a ‘de jure’ government of the 
territory with a commissioner as its executive and renamed the territory Namibia 
(Vigne 1987, 92). This decision was strongly objected to by South African 
trading partners from the West.
 It was an unwritten rule during the Cold War that each liberation movement 
in Africa would be associated with a specific ideological camp. Despite often 
being labeled as a member of the ‘Casablanca Group’ – which included the 
African National Congress (ANC), Liberation Congress of Mozambique 
(FRELIMO), the MPLA and Zimbabwe’s African People’s Union (ZAPU) – 
SWAPO tried to establish a distinctive and non- aligned position. According to 
Vigne, there were two reasons for this: first of all, due to a long history of 
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oppression and genocide, the Namibians “felt themselves as yet ill- equipped to 
serve as equal partners with the imperial powers of East and West”; and sec-
ondly, while rejected by the US and UK, SWAPO was very hesitant to accept 
the authority of the USSR (Vigne 1987, 92). SWAPO’s initial choice to assume 
a non- aligned stance was aimed at preserving internal unity – something that 
other liberation movements could only aspire to. Nevertheless, in the midst of 
Cold War super- power rivalry, SWAPO’s struggle against South Africa pro-
vided sufficient motivation for the Soviets to support its cause. Over time, 
SWAPO’s ties with the Soviets improved and strengthened, which made them 
highly unpopular with the US and its Western allies.
 While unable to garner international support from the powerful Western 
states, the situation turned in SWAPO’s favor with another ICJ ruling. In 1975, 
the ICJ passed a new advisory opinion, this time stating that the continued pres-
ence of South Africa in Namibia was illegal. It called on the UN member states 
to recognize the illegality of South African presence and refrain from any acts 
that could imply the legality of its administration in Namibia. At the same time, 
South Africa was obliged to withdraw its administration from Namibia (ICJ 
1975). Despite objections from some Western states, the illegality of South 
African rule in Namibia was clearly established.
 The events in neighboring Angola, where the Portuguese were agreeing on a 
transfer of power and accepting the independence of its former colony, inspired 
SWAPO to continue its struggle against the South African regime. However, the 
situation in Angola soon became more complicated. Following the collapse of 
the Alvor Accords, the power struggle between the three main factions became 
extremely violent. Thanks to external support from the Soviet bloc, on Novem-
ber 11, 1975, the MPLA declared Angola’s independence and installed Ago-
stinho Neto as its first president (Meijer and Birmingham 2004, 10; Pycroft 
1994, 242). The FNLA and UNITA were excluded from the newly established 
government, which in fact was a socialist, one- party regime. Gradually, the new 
system, which was organized along Marxist- Leninist lines, received international 
recognition, though not from the US (Meijer and Birmingham 2004, 13).
 By the end of the 1970s, FNLA followers were integrated into the system 
thanks to a rapprochement between the MPLA and Zaire’s President Mobutu 
Sese Seko, who was very close to the FNLA’s leader Holden Roberto. The 
FNLA army, which at one point represented a foreign- armed force with thou-
sands of recruits, “disintegrated without being formally disarmed or demobi-
lized” (Meijer and Birmingham 2004, 15). This left UNITA as the main 
contender for power in Angola. With the collapse of the Alvor Accords, UNITA 
began receiving support from South Africa, at first in a clandestine form. By 
1983, the partnership with UNITA became an official policy of the government 
in Pretoria (Meyer 2004, 82). At the same time, the fact that UNITA was fight-
ing a Marxist- Leninist regime was enough reason for the US to directly support 
the movement.
 The turmoil that followed saw a simultaneous unfolding of three different 
armed conflicts. The first one was the bush war along the Namibian border with 
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Angola between the South African Defense Force (SADF ) and the SWAPO. The 
second and third conflicts saw the SADF involved in the Angolan civil war, 
where it assisted the UNITA in fighting the MPLA, which enjoyed Cuba’s 
unequivocal support. The US mediation efforts mainly tackled the problem of 
resolving conflicts involving the South African and Cuban military presence 
both in Namibia and Angola and concentrated on a settlement that would see 
withdrawal of foreign forces from both countries. By then, as far the Angolan 
civil war was concerned, “no external party had the standing or legitimacy to 
force its mediation on the Angolan parties, still less to create yet another linkage 
of the external to the internal Angolan issues” (Crocker 1999, 224).
 As the conflict in Vietnam was approaching an end, Angola and Namibia 
became a fertile ground for another super- power proxy war. In fact, as Pycroft 
notes, “the influence of super- power rivalry became one the defining characteris-
tics of southern African regional politics” (1994, 242). According to Meijer and 
Birmingham, “each side was not so much defending a specific interest in Angola 
as playing out geo- political rivalry” (2004, 15).
Involvement of international actors and their interests in the 
conflict
Soviet Union
The unfolding situation in the region provided enough reason for the Soviet 
Union to advance its ambition of implementing the ‘Brezhnev Doctrine’ in 
southern Africa. Under that doctrine, the détente and peaceful coexistence with 
the ‘imperialist camp’ were a result of a favorable shift in the balance of power 
and a form of struggle between the two systems. For Moscow, the agreements 
between the two global powers were a reflection of Soviet success in the “diplo-
matic struggle of the two worlds” (Mitchell 1978, 381). Brezhnev even stated 
that “détente by no means annuls the battle of ideas” (Brezhnev cited in Mitchell 
1987, 381). According to Mitchell, under the Brezhnev doctrine, “the Soviet 
support for national liberation movements, particularly in southern Africa, is 
presumably based upon the assumption that the general crisis of capitalism 
makes the West more vulnerable to pressure” (Mitchell 1978, 381). In other 
words, the success of the liberation movements was perceived as a means to an 
end, which was the increasing weight of the Socialist system in world politics 
(Mitchell 1978, 381).
 Following the rationale of the Brezhnev doctrine, the Soviets used the turmoil 
and instability that emerged during the collapse of Portuguese colonial rule in 
Angola to advance their role at the global level. Pycroft noted that 
the victory of the Soviet- backed MPLA over the South African and United 
States assisted UNITA and FNLA forces in the first round of the Angolan 
civil war in 1975 and 1976 provided the Soviet Union with a foothold in 
southern Africa, which it improved through support for the MPLA 
Namibia  87
in Angola, SWAPO in Namibia, the African National Congress (ANC) in 
South Africa, and Frelimo after independence in Mozambique.
(Pycroft 1994, 242)
The Soviet (and Cuban) support for the MPLA started as early as the 1960s, but 
was initially insufficient to allow the MPLA to challenge Portuguese colonial 
rule. Over time, Soviet support became fundamental to the MPLA’s cause. The 
heavy armaments that were provided to the movement in the most delicate 
moments of the civil war in 1975 were of crucial importance to the MPLA’s 
success in obtaining control of the capital and declaring Angola an independent 
country. In 1976, the USSR established even closer relations with the MPLA by 
signing the Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation (Meijer 2004, 86). At its first 
congress in December 1977, the movement transformed itself into a Marxist- 
Leninist party signaling its unquestioned affiliation with the Soviet bloc.
Cuba
Cuba was another close ally of the MPLA. Cuban interest in the region started 
with Che Guevarra’s visit to Central Africa in 1964. During the 1975 civil war, 
Cuba assisted the MPLA, by first sending military advisors and eventually by 
dispatching troops in response to South African intervention in support of 
UNITA. By February 1976, Cuba had dispatched around 14,000 troops to 
support the MPLA, with a clear intention of consolidating Soviet influence in the 
region (Meijer 2004, 87). Although the leadership in Havana welcomed Soviet 
cooperation in this conflict, Cuban involvement was rooted in an independent 
agenda and had its own rationale. Anatoly Dobrynin, who was the Soviet ambas-
sador to the United States at that time, stated in his memoirs, that the Cubans 
sent their troops to Angola “on their own initiative and without consulting us” 
(Dobrynin 1995, 362). In fact, according to Gleijeses, “by deciding to send 
troops, Castro challenged the Soviet leader Leonid Brezhnev, who opposed the 
dispatch of Cuban soldiers to Angola. . . . Indeed, it took two months for Moscow 
to provide crucial logistical support to airlift Cuban troops to Angola.” (2006, 8). 
Although the US and other external actors initially viewed Cubans in Angola as 
Soviet proxies, this was never fully the case. Kissinger noted:
At the time we thought he [Castro] was operating as a Soviet surrogate. . . . 
We could not imagine that he would act so provocatively so far from home 
unless he was pressured by Moscow to repay the Soviet Union for its 
military and economic support. Evidence now available suggests that the 
opposite was the case.
(Kissinger 1999, 816)
Cuban involvement was mainly motivated by its opposition to the South African 
backed white minority rule. The Cubans wanted to prevent any possibility of 
apartheid policies spreading over to Angola and the consolidation of white 
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domination over black majority in Southern Africa (Gleijeses 2006, 8). After 
Angola became independent, Cuba continued to provide much- needed military 
support, but it also assisted the government in rebuilding the country by provid-
ing it with engineers, teachers, doctors, and civil servants (Meijer 2004, 87). 
Cuban ability to push South African troops out of Angola was not only a signi-
ficant military accomplishment. According to Gleijeses, it was the real beginning 
of Namibia’s war on independence (2006, 9). Although SWAPO started its 
activities already in 1966, their efforts gained the needed momentum only after 
the advancement of Cuban and MPLA troops in Angola. As a general from 
South African forces stated, “for the first time they [the SWAPO rebels] obtained 
what is more or less a prerequisite for successful insurgent campaigning, namely 
a border that provided safe refuge” (citation taken from Gleijeses 2006, 9; see 
Geldenhuys 1995, 59).
United States and ‘linkage strategy’
American interests in intervening in the conflict were also primarily political and 
revolved around the ‘Reagan Doctrine.’ The doctrine had anti- communism as its 
raison d’être and promoted the idea of supporting anti- communist resistance 
around the world (Oye et al. 1987). Even during the Angolan civil war in 1975 
and 1976, the US assisted the anti- communist movements. In principle, in 
southern Africa, the Reagan administration tried to promote the policies of ‘con-
structive engagement’ – which were introduced by Assistant Secretary Chester 
Crocker in 1981 – with the primary aim of countering the Soviet presence in the 
region (Crocker 1992; Davies 2007). Under this policy, “any leader that was 
opposed to Soviet ideology and expansion was courted by America” (Pycroft 
1994, 243). The US found a close ally in South Africa’s Prime Minister P.W. 
Botha (who would later become president), who was engaged in a struggle with 
the Soviet- backed SWAPO in Namibia. The policies of constructive engagement 
for the South Africa government had a dual impact: on the one hand it was an 
opportunity for South Africa to regain the Western support it had lost and on the 
other, it offered a dose of legitimacy for the government’s disruptive actions 
both domestically and in the region.
 According to Pycroft, “for Angola, the most significant component of con-
structive engagement was the US’s introduction, in 1982, of ‘linkage’ into nego-
tiation for Namibia’s independence” (1994, 243). In a nutshell, the linkage 
meant that an independent Namibia could not be achieved without the with-
drawal of Cuban troops from Angola, thus tying together the fate of two coun-
tries. In principle, the US was interested in achieving a smooth, peaceful, and 
stable transition from colonial rule to self- government (Zartman 1989a, 182). 
The main dilemma the US faced was choosing between a continued apartheid 
South African sovereignty over Namibia, strongly opposed by the international 
community, or a UN- endorsed independence for the territory, which would most 
likely also entail a pro- Marxist, SWAPO government in Namibia. By the mid- 
1970s, as South African policies became incompatible with principles cherished 
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by the US administration, policy makers in Washington realized that any further 
resistance to Namibian nationalism, which had the backing of the UN, would 
only backfire in the long run. Thus the key concern of the US was to prevent a 
war from escalating even further. The US feared that any intensification of fight-
ing would only draw their Soviet rivals into the conflict, making it necessary for 
the US to align with apartheid South Africa, a scenario they absolutely wanted to 
avoid.
 With the help of partner Western states in the Security Council – France, the 
United Kingdom, Canada, and West Germany – in September 1978, the US 
managed to pass UN Security Council Resolution 345 that prescribed a “set of 
complex arrangements for the territory’s transition to independence under South 
African administrative control with simultaneous UN monitoring and super-
vision” (Crocker 1999, 214). Once the framework for upcoming peacemaking 
activities was set up, in 1981 the new Reagan administration took on the task of 
reestablishing “coordinated working relations among the Western Five” or the 
Western Contact Group, whose global leverage and reputation would became 
useful in the context of the upcoming peace- making efforts (Zartman 1989a; Iji 
2011).
 South Africa was very skeptical about the intentions of the US and its allies 
in Southern Africa, given the apparent UN advocacy of Namibia’s independence 
and growing support for SWAPO on the East River. However, the greatest con-
tributor to Pretoria’s unease was a lack of reaction by the US and its allies to the 
Soviet- Cuban intervention in Angola. Until then, the West had hesitated to 
include the Angola question in the peacemaking equation for determining 
Namibia’s final status. It was deemed as rather dangerous to address the issue of 
the Cuban presence in Angola and consequently lose Angola’s assistance in the 
Namibia negotiations, as it was feared that the rest of the international com-
munity might see this as Western countries’ prioritization of the communist 
question over the one of decolonization in Africa. From a practical angle, the 
West was aware that addressing the Cuban presence in Angola would neces-
sarily provoke Moscow to react, at least on a diplomatic level.
 However, despite these concerns, it became apparent to the new US administra-
tion under President Reagan that perpetuating this logic would only keep the peace 
process in deadlock, as South Africa made it quite clear that its cooperation in the 
process directly depended on the extent of the Cuban presence in the region. Even 
Angolan leaders recognized the connection between Namibian and Angolan events 
when they stated that “Cubans could leave Angola after Namibia’s independence 
under Resolution 435” (Crocker 1999, 216). So the US chose to take a risk and 
decided to restructure negotiations in order to include the Angolan factor as well. 
According to Crocker, the ‘linkage strategy’ had two advantages: “a far better 
chance to nail Pretoria down to a firm commitment on Resolution 435 and an 
appropriate US response to Soviet extension of the Brezhnev doctrine to the Third 
World, including Africa” (Crocker 1999, 216). The US hoped that a well- 
coordinated mediation effort, which put diplomatic pressure on the Soviet–Cuban–
Angolan group, would weaken the current Soviet martial policies in Africa. 
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Therefore, while the stage for mediation was set, the US still needed some type of 
compliance, even tacit, from the Soviets. In other words, the potential success of 
mediation efforts was directly related to the ability of the Soviets to use their biased 
position to leverage their partners in conflict to change strategies and opt for a 
peaceful settlement of the dispute. At the same time, the willingness to leverage 
both Cubans and Angolans toward an agreement would indicate that the US and 
the USSR had managed to establish a common idea of resolving the conflict 
through mediation and thus indicate Soviet willingness to participate in US- led and 
coordinated mediation activities.
 In reality, Moscow had quite limited interests in Namibia, or as Zartman puts it, 
“no interests to lose or defend and everything to gain” (Zartman 1989a, 183). Its 
involvement in the conflict was incomparable to the levels achieved in Angola; its 
involvement was based on arming SWAPO forces and providing modest amounts 
of training for them. In principle, the USSR was unconvinced that South African 
acquiescence to a negotiated independence for Namibia was actually achievable. 
Nevertheless, the Soviet Union had been more appreciative of conflict resolution 
on the issue, with its objections giving way to active support, as it was less willing 
to sustain the costs of continued conflict than one would expect (Zartman 1989a, 
184). In fact, Moscow’s stance on the issue drastically changed over the span of 
eight years, departing from straightforward obstructionism of every Western effort 
to find a solution, to fundamental cooperation with the US that eventually helped 
steer the parties toward a peace agreement.
 This shift in policy was a direct result of a dramatic change that occurred with 
Gorbachev’s accession to power and his new ‘perestroika’ policies (Shearman 
1987). Although the US- led mediation attempts were never formally objected to by 
the Soviets – as a result of the détente and coexistence prescribed by the Brezhnev 
doctrine – and albeit important mediation milestones that were reached in the early 
and mid- 1980s, the mediation process was still far from reaching a comprehensive 
peace agreement because the mediators did not have sufficient leverage over the 
warring parties. The Soviets had obvious leverage over the MPLA and Cuba, but 
in light of the Cold War power rivalry with the US, they were unwilling to use it to 
assist the US in mediating the conflict. In fact, under the Brezhnev doctrine, Soviets 
saw the US’s inability to mediate the conflict as a reflection of the ‘imperialist 
bloc’s’ decreasing global power and – since the bipolar dynamics of the Cold War 
were a zero sum game – an indication of the increasing Soviet influence in inter-
national relations. The rapprochement between the USSR and US that happened 
during Gorbachev’s mandate was more a result of a larger geo- political shift in 
Soviet policies toward the US and its allies than anything else.
Multiparty mediation process
Initial lack of cooperation between third parties
Moscow’s tendency to unequivocally hamper any Western initiative was already 
on display during the preparation of Resolution 435. In the face of clear support 
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by SWAPO and frontline states for the proposed text, Soviets backed off and 
abstained from vetoing the text in the Security Council. However, once the res-
olution was adopted, Moscow became its strongest promoter, now opposing any 
modification of the text. Thus, the US intention to link questions of Namibia and 
Angola was strongly opposed as it represented “nothing less than an attempt to 
block Resolution 435, to force capitulations of Angola and its departure from the 
socialist camp, to join forces with Pretoria in creating a pro- Western security 
zone, and reverse the tide of history in Southern Africa” (Crocker 1999, 234).
 The Soviet position was rapidly transposed on to the Angolan–Cuban joint 
communiqué in February 1982, a statement that officially proclaimed that Ango-
lans and Cubans would decide upon a timeframe for Cuban withdrawal from the 
country only after Namibia was granted independence.2 Angola wanted to be 
assured that Cuban withdrawal would not allow for invasion by South African 
troops, as had already occurred on two occasions, in 1976 and 1979, when with-
drawal was interrupted by South African attacks on Angola (Zartman 1989a, 
212). The US was aware that the linkage strategy introduced the necessity to 
accommodate Moscow in the process, as its leverage over the Angolans and 
Cubans might turn out to be instrumental for a successful outcome.
 Increased UNITA military activities amplified Angola’s need for stronger 
backing by its allies. By 1982, the number of Cuban troops increased to about 
25,000, and the government in Luanda signed arms supplies agreements with the 
Soviet Union in mid- May 1983 and early January 1984 (Zartman 1989a, 219). 
As the MPLA was strongly dependent upon Soviet and Cuban support, the US 
administration assumed that any Angolan position and proposal had been 
‘cleared’ in Havana and Moscow (Crocker 1999, 235). Since the Soviets refused 
to negotiate directly with the US, officials in Washington opted for a more cau-
tious approach. Crocker points out that during these years, US and Soviet offi-
cials held a series of ‘informal exchanges’ on Southern Africa, in which the US 
aimed to “avoid surprises, to probe for constructive openings and offer Moscow 
a chance to bid and to explain to US purposes and indicate how they might serve 
the interests of both sides” (Crocker 1999, 234). However, the initial exchanges 
did not produce any results as Moscow was insistent on bringing up legalistic 
issues and was unwilling to suggest any alternatives, emphasizing their support 
for the most recent Angolan positions.
 Authorities in both Luanda and Pretoria were having difficulties to find a com-
promised solution, as any such move was perceived as dangerous to national 
interest and to the strength of their positions on the battleground. It was a clear 
‘game of chicken’ between the parties, as they were unwilling to make the first 
move fearing the reaction of the other side. The US became fully aware that the 
conflict was still not ‘ripe’ for resolution and that they were unable to achieve a set-
tlement on their own (Zartman 1989a, 214–225). Quite problematic for the US was 
its lack of leverage, especially a lack of ‘sticks’ to induce authorities in Pretoria to 
compromise. Dissatisfied with the South African reluctance to cooperate, the US 
adopted limited sanctions against Pretoria in 1985 as a reaction to their apartheid 
policies and started considering the option of providing clandestine support to the 
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UNITA forces. Until then, the US had only a limited ability to support UNITA 
because of the Clark Amendment to the US Arms Export Control Act from 1976 
that barred the US from aiding any paramilitary activity in Angola (Berridge 1989). 
The intention was to put pressure on Luanda and Havana, and indirectly on Preto-
ria, and make them realize that the linkage strategy was a good alternative to com-
plete isolation. The Amendment was repealed in July 1985 and already in 1986, the 
US provided UNITA with ten million dollars in direct military aid. The assistance 
progressively increased to 80 million dollars under the Bush administration 
(Pycroft 1994, 245). According to Pycroft, “the increased US commitment to 
UNITA came as South Africa began reassessing its commitment to retaining 
control over Namibia, and therefore questioning its need to maintain UNITA as a 
bargaining chip in the linkage equation” (Pycroft 1994, 245). Nevertheless, South 
Africa, motivated by success on the battlefield in 1985, still did not see this as a 
plausible alternative. Two important events, one at the global level and one on the 
battleground, changed things dramatically.
Convergence of interests between third parties
With the arrival of Gorbachev to power in 1985, the Soviet Union started an 
important transition in relation to its regional policies. The new Soviet leader-
ship began publicly calling for ‘political solutions’ to regional conflicts (Shear-
man 1987, 1111). The articulation of the new, post- Brezhnev, foreign policy of 
the Soviet Union was secondary to the need to concentrate on reforming the 
Soviet economy and society. According to Pycroft, the expensive foreign adven-
tures in places such as Afghanistan and Angola had to be reduced as they were 
producing unbearable costs to the crippled Soviet economy, while at the same 
time the Soviet Union was quite willing to achieve “a limited rapprochement 
with the US to facilitate access to Western finance and technology” (Pycroft 
1994, 244). It should be noted that these were only initial steps that did not 
immediately imply a reduction in opposition to US proposals (Crocker 1999, 
235). In fact, the Soviet Union continued to publicly challenge US- led initi-
atives, asking for the process to be conferred to the UN, the African Union, and 
the Non- Aligned Movement. More importantly, the Soviet Union discouraged 
any Angolan cooperation with Washington and “criticized UN Secretariat offi-
cials for undertaking quiet probes of Luanda’s latest thinking on a linkage- based 
settlement” (Crocker 1999, 235). Mediators’ inability to reach convergence of 
interests was leading the process into a deadlock. For the US, this meant that the 
greatest obstacle to a smooth mediation process was not Luanda’s positions, but 
rather Moscow’s lack of cooperation. In March 1987, after consulting its allies, 
Angola decided to resume direct talks with the US. In order to strengthen its 
negotiating position, Moscow advised Luanda to undertake a massive offensive 
against UNITA (Crocker 1999, 236), using violence as an off- the-table tactic to 
improve his negotiating position. Evidently, the non- cooperative strategies of 
one of the mediators induced the party to the conflict that it supported to defect 
from the peace process as well.
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 However, the strategy proposed by the Soviets actually backfired. The Soviet-
 Angolan assault in late 1987 was a fiasco, with thousands of Angolan troops 
killed and a large portion of Soviet military hardware either destroyed or 
captured. As the costs of supporting the conflict were increasing, while still 
maintaining a hard line on US- led endeavors, Moscow grew frustrated with a 
continued conflict and became open to fresh ideas introduced by Castro during 
the 70th anniversary of the Soviet revolution in November 1987. One of the 
crucial implications of the Gorbachev shift in foreign policy was that the MPLA 
could no longer depend upon ‘unqualified support’ from the USSR and Cuba. A 
deteriorating economic situation in the Soviet Union induced officials in 
Moscow to reconsider overstretching their military involvement around the 
globe. Pycroft notes that “although there was a commitment from the Soviet 
leadership to maintain the military presence in Angola to counter UNITA and 
South Africa, pressure began to mount on the MPLA to find a negotiated settle-
ment” (Pycroft 1994, 244). While Soviet military support was quite substantial, 
it came at a high cost. The MPLA had to finance this military support with oil 
and diamond revenue, to the severe detriment of the country’s economy. Almost 
65% of Angola’s national debt was with the USSR and the presence of Cuban 
troops was costing the country 250 million dollars a year (Pycroft 1994, 244).
 On the other hand, the MPLA had sufficient reason to believe that it could 
find partners in the West. First of all, the US was the largest importer of Angolan 
goods – especially oil – with trade worth more than two billion dollars in 1990 
(Pycroft 1994, 244). Secondly, the fact that the regime in Luanda was not recog-
nized by the US did not prevent close contact from being established between 
the US State Department and the MPLA (Berridge 1989, 470). In fact, Crocker 
was quite interested in having the MPLA at the negotiating table, and for this 
reason he initially even opposed the repeal of the Clark Amendment, as he feared 
that this would drive the MPLA away from the talks (Berridge 1989, 470). 
Nevertheless, the US’ unyielding support of UNITA’s cause was a direct indica-
tion to the MPLA that a military victory was virtually impossible and that a 
negotiated settlement should be sought (Pycroft 1994, 245).
 While acknowledging Cuba’s decision that its forces would have to leave 
Angola, Soviets maintained a firm position that Angola would not be “thrown to 
wolves” (Crocker 1999, 237). Despite these affirmations, the Soviet Union still 
did not propose any viable alternative to the linkage strategy. It was the Cubans, 
who did not participate in the latest military debacle, that made two crucial 
choices. First, Havana decided to shift the unfavorable balance of power created 
with the latest SADF- UNITA victory over their allies and sent 15,000 fresh 
troops to Angola’s border with Namibia. By mid- 1988 there were close to 
50,000 Cuban troops in the region. It was a clear signal to South Africa that 
celebration time was over and that a military solution to the conflict was far from 
being easily attainable for Pretoria (Berridge 1989; Pycroft 1994). Second, in the 
mid- 1987 Cuba made a decisive shift and made its bid to join the talks. This 
enabled the US to conduct talks with a joint Angolan- Cuban delegation starting 
in January 1988.
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 Ultimately, the US produced the necessary ‘stick’ that induced South Africa to 
engage in negotiations. As the Soviet influence in Southern Africa was decreasing, 
the need to have South Africa as an anti- communist ally was called into question. 
This prompted the US to gradually start reconsidering its relationship with South 
Africa. Especially problematic were the apartheid policies of the Botha administra-
tion. In October 1986, the US Congress passed the Comprehensive Anti- Apartheid 
Act, which imposed a strict set of economic and trade sanctions on South Africa. 
These policies greatly harmed the South African economy, plunging the country 
into recession (Pycroft 1994, 245). Mounting problems, both on the battlefield and 
domestically, induced the officials in Pretoria to find a way to “re- establish favor-
able relations with the international community and stave off further sanctions” 
(Pycroft 1994, 245). Thus, South Africa started signaling readiness to join the 
negotiations with the US and, together with Angola, started drafting a proposal on 
the timetable for the withdrawal. In other words, Pretoria was looking for an ‘hon-
orable exit.’ The situation was slowly becoming ripe for resolution: the parties 
were entering a hurting stalemate as it was clear that a military solution to the con-
flict was unattainable for any of the parties; thus they started perceiving negoti-
ations as being a ‘way out’ (Zartman 1989a).
 An important consequence of the linkage strategy was the gradual exclusion 
of SWAPO and UNITA from the peace process. The isolation of the two move-
ments was not done because of their predisposition to spoil the process, but was 
a calculated decision by Crocker to design a proper ‘party arithmetic’ that would 
include all the parties relevant for the achievement of a negotiated settlement 
and exclude those whose presence could be problematic and disputed. The plan 
was to create a sequence of steps: first a regional settlement was supposed to be 
negotiated between states and not movements, after that parties to each conflict 
were expected to conduct internal peacemaking. According to Berridge,
the South Africans pressed for SWAPO’s exclusion because of their hatred 
of it, and found the United States receptive because this would make it 
easier to reconcile UNITA – which had a vital interest in developments in 
Namibia as well as in Angola – to being excluded as well.
(Berridge 1989, 472)
 With both Cuba and Angola willing to talk to South Africa, the US decided to 
accommodate the Soviets in the peace process while hoping to “neutralize resid-
ual obstructionism” and hopefully obtain “valuable insights and even help” 
(Crocker 1999, 237). In present circumstances, with the new policy outlook of the 
Gorbachev administration, which voiced the need for policy solutions and was 
coupled with Moscow’s unwillingness to assume any more military costs in the 
region, the US opted for a careful approach. In April 1988, three in- depth, US–
Soviet consultations were held, and as a final result the Soviet Union decided to 
publicly support a US- led mediation process for the first time. In return, the US 
bestowed them with ‘observer’ status which was never fully defined. Meetings 
with the Soviets continued throughout the tripartite negotiations mediated by the 
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US. It was tripartite (Angola–Cuba–South Africa) because Cuba explicitly asked 
to be included in the talks as a part of the Angola team. As underlined by 
Crocker, US–Soviet meetings soon moved from “debates about the shape of an 
acceptable settlement” to more practical issues of “how the two sides might 
advance those points agreed on and how current obstacles could be handled” 
(Crocker 1999, 237).
 Full exploratory meetings between three sides and the US started at the begin-
ning of May 1988 in London. The first meeting saw an immediate Angolan offer of 
a four- year Cuban withdrawal from Angola and a one- year withdrawal of SADF 
from Namibia. Before the troop withdrawal, however, the proposal called for a pre-
ceding stop to US and South African support for UNITA. The South African dele-
gation responded with a counterproposal asking for a Cuban withdrawal before 
Namibian independence and at the same time reconciliation between MPLA and 
UNITA (Zartman 1989a, 230). Fortunately, parties agreed to evaluate each other’s 
proposals, so they decided to meet again in Cairo at the end of June 1988. In the 
meantime, a series of US–Soviet consultations intensified, bearing more fruit than 
ever before. During their meetings, both sides explored the options for strengthen-
ing cooperation between the three parties in the peace process. According to the 
Soviet sources, the US guaranteed South African implementation of Resolution 
435 if the Cubans withdrew their forces from Angola within three years in return. 
During a Reagan–Gorbachev summit in Moscow in May, the two sides agreed to 
deliver a peace settlement within four months – in order to celebrate it at the tenth 
anniversary of Resolution 435. The two global powers, each backing a particular 
side in the conflict, had achieved the necessary convergence of interests that 
allowed for a coordinated mediation process to take place (Zartman 1999, 230).
 This coordination was best demonstrated during the talks in Cairo, which 
almost broke down due to an unexpected Cuban and Angolan ‘ideological tirade’ 
regarding apartheid policies of South Africa. The Soviet delegation immediately 
exercised necessary pressure on its allies and brought them back to the point of 
negotiation (Zartman 1989a, 231). Thanks to this unprecedented move by the 
Soviets, the next talks in New York saw all the parties work on the actual text of 
the settlement. The three sides started increasing levels of cooperation and opted 
to neglect the timetable of withdrawal in favor of ‘indispensable principles’ for 
the final settlement. These included:
aspects of cooperation (aid) for development, right to peace, right to self- 
determination, non- aggression, non- interference, non- use of force, and 
respect for territorial integrity and inviolability of frontiers, as well as recog-
nition of roles – the United States as mediator and permanent members of 
the Security Council as guarantors.
(Zartman 1989a, 231)
The principles were later ratified by all three sides and by SWAPO. After this, 
negotiations focused on finalizing details regarding the timetable for the 
withdrawal.
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 Also as a sign of willingness to elevate cooperation to the highest level, US 
officials continuously briefed Soviet colleagues about the “mediator’s priorities 
and game plans” (Crocker 1999, 238). The US hoped that by providing essential 
information, Soviets would play their part and induce Angola and Cuba to reach 
an agreement with South Africa on the timetable. At the same time, Moscow 
also intensified communication with South Africa and contributed to the overall 
super- power encouragement for authorities in Pretoria. Ultimately, through their 
consultations, US representatives convinced the Soviets to terminate their 
requests for a suspension of US support for UNITA and encouraged them to put 
pressure on Angola to achieve national reconciliation with UNITA. This closed 
the circle, as all the issues were covered by the peace process. Shortly after, fol-
lowing a very painstaking negotiation on the details of withdrawal, on December 
22, 1988, Cuba, Angola, and South Africa signed a peace agreement at the UN 
headquarters in New York.
 Just as in the case of Tajikistan, the US and USSR acted as biased mediators 
in the sense of the game theoretical model presented earlier. As long as the US 
and the Soviet Union were unable to achieve a convergence of interests in man-
aging the conflict, any attempt at finding a peaceful solution was unsuccessful, 
as a mediator’s defection was perceived as a sufficient reason for the conflicting 
parties not to commit to the peace process. At the same time, biased mediators 
are useful in terms of the effectiveness of the process, as long as they maintain 
cooperative behavior with other mediators, as they can use their special relation-
ship with one conflicting side to influence its behavior, positions, and percep-
tions and consequently move it toward an agreement. However, the process also 
witnessed a considerably different dynamic of multiparty mediation from the one 
that took place in Tajikistan. The crucial difference between the two cases con-
cerns the leadership role of coordinating mediation activities. While in Tajikistan 
this role was filled by the Special Envoys of the UN, in the case of Namibia, the 
leadership role was assumed by the US.
 Although the US as a powerful state had a clear set of interests to promote in 
the conflict and an undeniably biased attitude toward particular conflicting sides 
(UNITA and South Africa), it managed to be an effective coordinator for two 
reasons. First of all, over time its mediation activities were recognized as ‘indis-
pensible’ even by the disputants with whom it had no special relations (the 
MPLA and Cuba). This generated the necessary level of legitimacy required to 
prescribe behavior. In fact, this status was publicly and explicitly accepted by all 
the parties in conflict who considered the US- led mediation to be one of the 14 
principles that were crucial to the peaceful settlement of their conflict (Berridge 
1989, 469). At the same time, it acquired the necessary degree of consent and 
convergence of interests with the USSR (which was the key patron state of both 
the Angolan MPLA and Cuba). This (causal link) allowed for the coordination 
to be effective even though it was conducted by a biased, powerful state.
 The convergence of interests was induced by a larger geo- political shift that 
occurred once (the new) leadership in the Soviet Union realized that past geo- 
political preferences were not generating sufficient returns in the conflict: the 
Namibia  97
conflict was too costly and the parties were not getting any results from the 
mediation process. Such a change in perceptions was further strengthened by the 
stalemate reached between Cuban and South African forces and their partners in 
Angola and Namibia. It was a clear indication that a military victory in the con-
flict was unfeasible and that the present, non- cooperative strategy in the peace 
process was not producing any substantial results that would overturn the 
military stalemate.
Notes
1 The main focus of this chapter is on US- led mediation initiatives, and US–Soviet rela-
tions within this process. Nevertheless, the critical strategic contributions of the UN 
and the UK and to a lesser degree of Zambia and Tanzania, to the US- led mediation 
should be emphasized as well. The US mediation borrowed leverage from these actors 
wherever and whenever it could be done (Crocker 1993).
2 According to Gleijeses, 
having pushed the SADF out of Angola [in 1976], the Cubans hoped to withdraw 
their troops gradually, giving the MPLA time to strengthen its own armed forces 
(known as FAPLA) so that they could take over the defense of Angola. This was 
the message that Cuban Defense Minister Raúl Castro brought to Luanda on 20 
April 1976. He told Neto that the Cuban government proposed that “gradual steps 
should be taken to withdraw the troops over the next years – 1976, 1977, 1978 – 
until only military instructors remained.” Neto accepted the Cuban timetable with 
only minor changes, including that “the Cuban military doctors presently in 
Angola remain and continue to offer their valuable services”.
(Gleijeses 2006, 9–10)
5 Cambodia1
Civil war in Cambodia involved four different Khmer factions and each one had 
an outside sponsor state (Solomon 1999). Despite its reputation from the war in 
Vietnam and the bipolar constraints of the Cold War, the US was seen as the 
most ‘neutral’ member of the Security Council, “with the political influence and 
resources to help structure the settlement” (Solomon 2000, 4). At the moment 
the US- led peace talks took place in the final months of 1989, the government in 
Phnom Penh was headed by Hun Sen, whose faction assumed power thanks to a 
Vietnamese military incursion into Cambodia in December 1978 which over-
threw the Khmer Rouge regime (Hampson and Zartman 2012, 4). The pro- 
Vietnamese government, named the People’s Republic of Kampuchea (PRK), 
was backed only by the USSR and its allies and did not enjoy the support of the 
West. Also, it certainly did not have good relations with the authorities in 
Beijing. China was concerned about Vietnamese expansionist policies, interpret-
ing them as Soviet efforts to contain Chinese influence in South- East Asia. Once 
dethroned, the Khmer Rouge fled to the jungles along the border with Thailand 
and thanks to Chinese support, started an insurgency campaign against Viet-
nam’s client regime (Solomon 1999, 284).
 Given its experience with Vietnam and the positioning of the Soviet Union in 
the matter, the United States chose China as its partner. It was clear to the US 
that China was interested in improving its international reputation after the June 
1989 events at Tiananmen Square and thus that it would be more willing to 
cooperate with the US even at the cost of distancing themselves from the Khmer 
Rouge (Hampson and Zartman 2012, 6). The two sides managed to reach initial 
convergence of interests in supporting a future coalition government led by 
Prince Sihanouk, who had governed Cambodia in its first decade as an inde-
pendent state, only to be toppled by Khmer Rouge forces in 1963. Ironically, 
Chinese acceptance of Sihanouk was coupled with a request to allow for the 
Khmer Rouge to be included in the future power- sharing arrangement. The US 
did not object to this, as it wanted to keep the Khmer Rouge engaged in the 
peace process, fearing that they might otherwise act as spoilers. At the same 
time, the US was confident that if the Khmer Rouge agreed to participate in the 
future political life of Cambodia, its unpopularity with local people would cer-
tainly not allow them to gain power through elections.
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Nature of the conflict
Sources of intractability
During French colonial rule, Cambodia was a relatively peaceful area. The 
majority of its population was ethnic Khmers and Buddhism was the most 
dominant religion. At the same time, almost a fifth of the country’s inhabitants 
were ethnic and religious minorities. Interestingly, these minorities also had a 
distinct work- related role in the society. As Kiernan points out, “Vietnamese, 
Chinese, and Muslim Chams worked mostly in rubber plantations or as clerks, 
shopkeepers, and fisherfolk, while a score of small ethnolingusitc groups, such 
as the Jarai, Tampuan, and Kreung, populated the upland northeast” (Kiernan 
2002, 483). After World War II, the colonial rule was gradually challenged and 
resisted by organized independence movements of Vietnamese (Viet Minh) and 
nationalist Khmer Issarak (independence) forces. Over time, the lengthy 
anti- colonial struggle produced a Vietnamese- sponsored, Cambodian communist 
movement, the Khmer People’s Revolutionary Party (KPRP), which received 
“increasing though not unchallenged” support from the Issarak nationalists 
(Kiernan 1985, 2002). As the KPPR slowly acquired leadership over the Issarak 
membership, several anti- communist movements started emerging. By 1952, 
these anti- KPRP movements started campaigns of massacres targeting ethnic 
Vietnamese and Cham populations (Kiernan 1985).
 Cambodia became independent in 1953, as a result of the French defeat in the 
First Indochina War. King Norodom Sihanouk, who according to Hampson and 
Zartman (2012) was a mercurial figure, immediately assumed a foreign policy of 
neutrality. This was a carefully calculated decision in the midst of Cold War 
dynamics. As Kiernan points out, he tried to accommodate the communist forces 
and acknowledge their role in Cambodia’s struggle for independence, while at the 
same time he was fearful of their potentially disruptive behavior if the country was 
to assume a more pro- Western stance (Kiernan 2002, 484). The policy of neutrality 
was also aimed at maintaining a peaceful relationship with neighboring Vietnam.
 In the first decade of Cambodia’s independence, Sihanouk’s policies of 
neutrality managed to appease both the moderate nationalists and veteran commu-
nists, transforming the country into a one- party kingdom (Kiernan 2002, 484). Dis-
satisfied forces – both from the left and from the right – either found refuge in 
Vietnam or headed for the hills deep in the countryside waiting for an opportune 
moment to return. Veteran leaders of the demobilized KPRP – who generally came 
from rural, Buddhist and pro- Vietnamese backgrounds – were gradually replaced 
by a group of younger, urban, Paris- trained, anti- Vietnamese militants headed by 
Saloth Sar, Ieng Sary, and Son Sen. According to Kiernan’s accounts, “from the 
jungles of remote northeast, the new party leadership planned an armed rebellion 
against Sihanouk’s regime, ignoring his independent nationalism and labeling him 
a U.S. puppet” (Kiernan 2002, 484). Fearful for its survival, Sihanouk’s regime 
started employing harsh policies against all leftist forces pushing the moderate 
communist veterans to join the new young leaders of KPRP.
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Development of deep feelings of distrust and employment of 
repressive measures
However, the biggest threat for Cambodia’s stability in the mid 1960s came with 
the intensification of the US campaign in Vietnam. The border between the two 
countries was flooded with Khmer and Vietnamese- communist refugees escap-
ing Saigon’s and the US’ advancement. By 1967, the communist forces under 
Saloth Sar’s leadership – now renamed the Communist Party of Kampuchea 
(CPK) – started a small scale insurgency which provoked a disproportionate 
response from the government. The Cambodian countryside was dragged into a 
civil war. Unable to cope with the challenges brought about by the war in 
Vietnam and CPK’s rebellion, Sihanouk’s government was toppled in a military 
coup led by General Lon Nol on March 18, 1970.
 Seeking refuge in Beijing, Sihanouk found allies in the CPK and its leader 
Saloth Sar who started using his ‘code name’ Pol Pot – or Brother Number One 
(Kiernan 2002, 485). The country was immediately renamed into the Khmer 
Republic and Lon Nol became its first President. Under his directive, the army 
started a campaign of massacres of ethnic Vietnamese, forcing around 300,000 
to flee across the border to Vietnam. According to Kiernan, this set the precedent 
for intensified “ethnic cleansing” by the Khmer Rouge – a colloquial term used 
for the CPK (Kiernan 2002, 485).
 In fact, although assisted by the Vietnamese army as a reaction to the US’ 
support for the Republican forces in their anti- communist campaign when the 
Vietnamese conflict spilled over to Cambodia,
the Khmer Rouge central leadership attacked its Vietnamese allies as early 
as 1970, killed a thousand Khmer communist returnees from Hanoi, and in 
1973–74, stepped up violence against ethnic Vietnamese civilians, purged 
and killed ethnic Thai and other minority members of CPK regional com-
mittees, banned an allied group of ethnic Cham Muslim revolutionaries, and 
instigated severe repression of Muslim communities.
(Kiernan 2002, 485)
In the meantime Lon Nol’s government was losing credibility and support, as its 
policies were tainted with numerous cases of corruption and a repressive military 
regime. Continued fighting with the communists culminated in 1975, when 
Khmer Rouge forces seized the capital Phnom Phen – one of the bastions of Lon 
Nol’s power – deported its two million residents to the country side and estab-
lished a new state of Democratic Kampuchea (DK) (Kiernan 2002, 485).
 The new regime immediately started applying severe policies of mass depor-
tations of people from urban areas into agricultural labor camps in the north-
western part of the country, eventually doubling the population of that area. 
Unbearable living conditions caused the deaths of tens of thousands of people. 
At the same time, the Khmer Rouge started purging the former Khmer Republic 
officials, army officers, civil servants, and even the peasants from the northwest 
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who were related to the officials from the former regime. By 1979, more than a 
million people had died due to starvation, poor living conditions, and extreme 
repression (Gordon 1986). Under attack were also numerous minorities. Between 
1975 and 1979, more than half of the ethnic Chinese population – around 
250,000 people – had perished, more than 100,000 Cham Muslims were killed 
or had starved to death, and more than 10,000 Vietnamese were killed and the 
remaining 100,000 Vietnamese expelled from the country (Kiernan 1985).
 The Khmer Rouge also conducted sporadic incursions into Vietnamese ter-
ritory. The cross- border attacks motivated Vietnam to intervene, invading Cam-
bodia on 25 December 1978 and taking over Phnom Penh on 9 January 1979 
(Gordon 1986). Officials and forces loyal to the Khmer Rouge once again fled to 
the mountains, leaving the country in the hands of Heng Samrin and his rebels 
supported by 150 000 Vietnamese troops. The country was again renamed, this 
time to the People’s Republic of Kampuchea (PRK). Finding refuge in the sanc-
tuaries mostly along the country’s northern and western borders with Thailand, 
the Khmer Rouge continued to challenge the new government and the Vietnam-
ese military for more than a decade (Gordon 1986, 66).
Internal characteristics of the conflicting sides and creation of 
irreconcilable positions
The new governing elite consisted primarily of former Khmer Rouge officials – 
such as Hun Sen and Chea Sim – that defected to Vietnam in 1978 (Bergquist 
1998, 93). Their policies largely avoided “[stressing] Cambodian grandeur at the 
expense of Vietnamese intentions and took a more realistic view of power rela-
tions between the two states” (Chandler 1998, 17). Due to its dependency on 
Vietnamese support, Cambodia remained quite isolated from the international 
community throughout the 1980s.
 In fact, while ejected from power, Pol Pot and his Khmer Rouge managed to 
maintain its strong international backing from China and the US. By 1982, 
together with the royalist National United Front for an Independent, Neutral, 
Peaceful, and Cooperative Cambodia (FUNCINPEC) led by the exiled Prince 
Sihanounk, who had the strong backing of both China and the US, and a non- 
communist movement the Khmer People’s National Liberation Front led by Son 
Sann, the Khmer Rouge successfully formed an exiled Coalition Government of 
Democratic Kampuchea (CGDK) (Solomon 2000, 15; Chandler 1998, 17). They 
were joined by a shared hatred of Vietnam and a dependence on foreign support.
Involvement of international actors and their interests in the 
conflict
The irreconcilable positions of various Cambodian actors cannot be properly 
understood without a careful assessment of diverging interests and standpoints 
of major international and regional powers. In fact, the years that followed actu-
ally saw a conflict on three levels, which not only included the overthrown 
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Khmer Rouge and the new Heng Samrin regime, but also Vietnam, China, the 
USSR, the US, and their numerous allies. Solomon points out that as early as the 
1970s, “Indochina became a cockpit of the global rivalry between the Soviet 
Union and China that developed after the breakdown of their alliance in 1960” 
(2000, 10). Thus the first two levels of conflict are what Gordon refers to as ‘East-
 East’ struggle, as they embodied a clash within the communist ideological camp. 
On the one side, there was the obvious struggle between two communist groups 
in Cambodia – the Khmer Rouge and Heng Samrin’s PRK. This struggle had a 
second, more regional level, which saw the conflict between China and Vietnam 
– again two members of the communist bloc. According to Gordon, in February 
1979, as “punishment” for Hanoi’s invasion of Cambodia, China launched a brief 
attack on several northern provinces of Vietnam (1986, 66). The tension between 
two regional powers increased over time, resulting in Chinese leader Deng Xiaop-
ing’s public threat of a second invasion of Vietnam unless Hanoi withdrew its 
forces from Cambodia (Gordon 1986, 67; Solomon 2002, 11).
Sino- Vietnamese/Soviet rivalry
China and Vietnam have had a long- lasting rivalry in the region. As Gordon 
points out, this has always been an uneasy relationship, as “the Vietnamese have 
never doubted that the long- term challenge to their independence emanates from 
Beijing, and the Chinese have always regarded Vietnam and Indochina as their 
nation’s ‘soft underbelly’ ” (Gordon 1986, 67). The name Vietnam comes from 
the Chinese term ‘An nam’ which means ‘Pacified South’ (Gordon 1986, 68). 
Vietnam’s regional expansionist ambition to unify all of Indochina was strongly 
opposed by China. Beijing perceived this scenario to be a direct threat to its 
national stability – in fact almost all the French colonial advancement toward 
China over the course of centuries had been conducted from the south. There-
fore, in 1954 during the Geneva conference, which was convened as the French 
were defeated by Viet Minh, the Chinese “consistently opposed” a unified Indo-
china and instead “strongly endorsed the concept of separate Indochinese states” 
(Gordon 1986, 67). During the conference China’s position was well in line with 
the positions of other major powers: the French tried to preserve as much influ-
ence as possible, thus conceding only the northern territories to an independent 
Vietnam; the US followed its French allies; and so did the Soviet Union, hoping 
to gain French support for banning German rearmament in Europe. Facing pres-
sure from all sides, Vietnam accepted the creation of Cambodia and Laos. As 
Gordon points out, “Prince Sihanouk knew at that time, the legitimacy given to 
Cambodia’s independence at Geneva (as well as that accorded Laos) owed much 
to China’s support” (1986, 68).
 Hoping to establish a strong and lasting influence in Cambodia, Vietnam 
trained and supported a vast number of high- ranking members of the Khmer 
Rouge during their uprising against the republican regime. However, as soon as 
he got to power, Pol Pot, quite suspicious of Vietnam’s plans, commanded a 
series of purges to be executed with the aim of ousting the ‘Hanoi Khmers’ and 
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on several occasions tried to alter the border with Vietnam. More importantly, 
“he had Chinese support from the outset” (Gordon 1986, 69). These provoca-
tions eventually resulted in a Vietnamese intervention which put an end to the 
Khmer Rouge regime.
 In its regional power- struggle with China, as a result of the 1960 Sino- Soviet 
split, Vietnam managed to find a strong ally in the Soviet Union. Moscow had 
been Hanoi’s strongest ally since the war with the US. Thanks to Soviet financial 
assistance – which amounted to about two billion dollars per year – Vietnam was 
able to keep its economy afloat and sustain the Cambodian occupation. In return, 
the Soviets could use the strategically highly important Vietnamese naval and air 
bases in Cam Ranh Bay and Da Nang (Gordon 1986, 67). The tensions between 
two communist super- powers lasted until the end of the 1980s. As recorded by 
Solomon,
as late as 1989, Deng Xiaoping told President Bush that Moscow’s relation-
ship with Vietnam and Cambodia were a threat to China because they 
represented a continuation of Soviet efforts to “encircle” his country going 
back to the Khrushchev and Brezhnev eras.
(Solomon 2002, 11, fn 4)
 In order to counter the Vietnamese presence in Cambodia, China openly sup-
ported the Khmer Rouge. In 1984, Xiaoping stated “I do not understand why 
some people want to remove Pol Pot . . . [I]t is true that he made some mistakes 
in the past but now he is leading the fight against the Vietnamese aggressors” 
(cited in Kiernan 2002, 488). Throughout the 1980s, China supplied the Khmer 
Rouge with 100 million dollars in weapons on a yearly basis (Kiernan 2002, 
488).
United States
The US involvement in Indochina during the Sino- Soviet alliance in the 1950s 
was aimed at containing the spread of the influence of communism. In the 1960s, 
this policy resulted in a lengthy, costly, and most importantly unsuccessful 
attempt to hamper revolutionary nationalism under the communist banner in 
Vietnam and Cambodia. Between 1969 and 1973, the US bombed Cambodia 
extensively, hoping to cut off the North Vietnamese supply routes and contain 
the expansion of the Khmer communist forces (Bergquist 1998, 100). The US 
also provided ‘active support’ to Lon Nol in overthrowing Sihanouk, whose 
foreign policy of neutrality the US perceived as “insufficiently supportive of US 
interests” (Bergquist 1998, 100). However, in 1972 after the Sino- Soviet split, 
Washington found “a common cause with China in shared opposition to the 
expansionist Soviet Union and its allies” (Solomon 2002, 12). In 1975, during a 
visit to Indonesia, President Ford announced that “despite the severe setback of 
Vietnam . . . the United States intends to continue a strong interest in and 
influence in the Pacific, Southeast Asia and Asia. As a whole we hope to expand 
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this influence” (cited in Kiernan 2002, 487). This statement was not aimed at 
China because during the same visit Kissinger added,
we believe that China does not have expansionist aims now. . . . Their first 
concern is the Soviet Union and their second Vietnam . . . the Chinese want 
to use Cambodia to balance off Vietnam . . . we don’t like Cambodia, for the 
government in many ways is worse than Vietnam, but we would like it to be 
independent. We don’t discourage Thailand and China from drawing closer 
to Cambodia.
(cited in Kiernan 2002, 487)
The US ‘winked semipublicly’ (to use Brezinski’s term) at the Chinese in 
support of their aiding the Khmer Rouge. In 1979, Kissinger revealed the 
following: “I encouraged the Chinese to support Pol Pot. Pol Pot was an 
abomination. We could never support him, but China could” (cited in Kiernan 
2002, 487).
 According to Kiernan, it was for “geopolitical reasons, while the Cambodian 
genocide progressed, [that] Washington, Beijing and Bangkok all supported the 
continued independent existence of the Khmer Rouge regime” (Kiernan 2002, 
487). This common cause with China induced the US to promote the policies 
that isolated the PRK internationally after the overthrow of Pol Pot in 1979. 
They held on to Cambodia’s seat in the UN, assigning it to the Coalition Gov-
ernment of Democratic Kampuchea – thus absolving the Khmer Rouge of the 
crimes perpetrated by their genocidal regime (Chandler 1998, 17; Kiernan 2002, 
488). Throughout the 1980s, the US strongly opposed any effort to investigate 
the Khmer Rouge and their genocidal regime. US Secretary of State Schultz 
even called the Australian initiative for a dialogue over Cambodia “stupid” and 
declined to support Australian Foreign Minister Hayden’s proposal for an inter-
national tribunal (Kiernan 2002, 489). He even stressed his opposition of con-
ducting peace talks that would include Vietnam, warning the neighboring states 
“to be extremely cautious in formulating peace proposals for Kampuchea 
because Vietnam might one day accept them” (cited in Kiernan 2002, 489). Even 
the new administration, under President Bush, had no problem with the Khmer 
Rouge and actually proposed that they be included in the future government of 
Cambodia (Kiernan 2002, 489). Together with China, the US sponsored the two 
smaller anti- Vietnamese, Khmer resistance movements led by Prince Sihanouk 
and Son Sann. At the same time, it did not object Beijing’s support of the Khmer 
Rouge, as both countries were “determined to prevent Hanoi from consolidating 
its client government in Phnom Penh led by a former Khmer Rouge commander 
Hun Sen” (Solomon 2012, 12).
 The combination of these different positions resulted in a clear stalemate. On 
the one side China, supported by the US, insisted that Vietnam immediately 
evacuate Cambodia, on the other, Vietnam, supported by the Soviet Union, 
asked for clear guarantees that Khmer Rouge would play no role in future 
governmental arrangements and that China abandon its policy of threats toward 
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Hanoi. As noted by Gordon, “the involvement of the outside major powers, 
introduces to the Indochina conflict the classic formula for explosive inter-
national politics, in which external states often have a greater impact on devel-
opments than those directly involved” (1986, 67). It was clear that the powerful 
outside power had both the leverage to guide the belligerents towards a mutually 
acceptable solution and a strong interest in achieving an outcome compatible 
with its strategic goals.
Multiparty mediation process
Initial lack of cooperation between third parties
Early contact between Prince Sihanouk and Hun Sen had already taken place in 
December 1987. They met in Paris to discuss the possibility of formulating a 
power- sharing arrangement between the two non- communist movements and the 
Hun Sen regime. Although this had the potential to end the war, it was rejected 
by the US and China “on the ground that it excluded the Khmer Rouge and legit-
imized the Vietnamese- backed regime already in power” (Chandler 1998, 19). It 
was obvious that any solution to the conflict would have to include all four 
Khmer factions. More importantly, any future negotiations had to tackle a 
number of questions that had to be compatible with the interests of the major 
powers. These issues were: the withdrawal of the Vietnamese troops from Cam-
bodia; demobilization of paramilitary forces; establishment of measures that 
would prevent potential retaliatory activities; and a formula for organizing the 
elections which would produce a legitimate and internationally- recognized gov-
ernment (Chandler 1998, 19).
 The importance of powerful outside actors was immediately evident during 
the first regional forum on Cambodia held in Jakarta in 1988. The meeting was 
attended by all Southeast Asian states and only managed to produce the neces-
sary guidelines for any future settlement (Ratner 1993, 5). The new talks were 
scheduled to take place in Paris in a year, but this time with the direct involve-
ment of major powers. As Chandler points out, from the beginning the Paris 
agreements were worked out by foreign powers that exercised tight control over 
the factions and the form the final settlement would take (Chandler 1998, 19).
 As previously explained, the US and China had a shared goal in opposing 
Vietnam’s occupation of Cambodia, while at the same time they openly sup-
ported different anti- Vietnamese factions in the country. The Bush administra-
tion knew that open support for the Khmer Rouge was a liability, so in an 
attempt to block the recognition of the Vietnamese- installed government of 
Hun Sen, the US adopted a policy of supporting the Coalition Government 
(Sihanouk–Son Sann–Khmer Rouge) as the legitimate incumbent government in 
Cambodia (Solomon 2000, 20). As noted by Solomon, who was Assistant Sec-
retary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs and was to be appointed as a 
US envoy in the peace process at the time, “the evolution of great power 
cooperation on a Cambodia settlement was complicated in early June 1989 by 
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the violent events at Tiananmen Square . . . overnight our official contacts with 
China became a domestic political liability” (Solomon 2000, 20). These events 
sparked widespread criticism of the Chinese government. In the days that fol-
lowed, in an attempt to improve their international reputation, the Chinese 
became extremely sensitive about their continuing support for the Khmer Rouge. 
As Solomon points out,
the criticism increased Beijing’s interest in a political settlement of the 
Cambodia conflict in a way that would distance China from Pol Pot and his 
movement. Nonetheless, China’s strategic objective remained consonant 
with that of the United States: to prevent Vietnam from establishing hege-
mony over all of Indochina.
(Solomon 2000, 20–21)
The looming convergence of interests between the US and China was pushing 
the mediation process in a direction that was unacceptable for Vietnam and its 
partners in Phnom Penh. Reflecting on the game theoretical model, the peace 
process was at point (b). Cooperative behavior – as illustrated in the model – 
was producing much higher payoffs to the Chinese, as all of their priorities and 
interests were promoted through the process.
 The Paris Peace Conference was held in August 1989 and was attended by 18 
countries and four Cambodian factions (Chandler 1998, 19). According to 
Solomon, the US “was not inclined to take the lead on Indochina issues,” rather 
it was inclined to support the French and Indonesians (that organized the confer-
ence) in their preparations (Solomon 2000, 21). For the Paris conference, the US 
had a list of five goals that had to be included in the peace settlement: 
an immediate ceasefire and the eventual termination of all foreign military 
assistance to the Khmer factions; the formation of an interim administration 
headed by Prince Sihanouk; the establishment of a process that would cul-
minate in the internationally supervised election of a new constitutional 
government the voluntary return of the large Khmer refugee population in 
Thailand; and the creation of an international control mechanism to imple-
ment a settlement process monitored by the UN.
(Solomon 2000, 24)
 The Vietnamese, on the other hand, were aiming at a much different solution. 
Solomon refers to this position as “a partial solution” to the Cambodian Conflict. 
The Vietnamese wanted “to limit the international involvement in a settlement to 
verification of the withdrawal of their troops, perhaps some oversight of an elec-
tion, but no arrangement that would weaken the authority of their client regime” 
(Solomon 2000, 24).
 The US and China proposed a ‘quadripartite’ government that meant unequi-
vocally a transfer of a quarter of Hun Sen’s power to the Khmer Rouge. Vietnam 
expressed its strong opposition to the inclusion of Khmer Rouge not only in the 
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future governmental arrangement, but in the peace process itself. They were con-
cerned that in the event that the Khmer Rouge would get a role in the future 
power- sharing arrangement, a possibility would be created for them to return to 
power and subsequently retaliate. Vietnamese Foreign Minister Nguyen 
Co Thach, stuck to the idea that “only Hun Sen government, intact had the power 
to prevent the dreaded Khmer Rouge from fighting their way back to power” 
(Solomon 2000, 25). In other words, Vietnam was quite opposed to the ‘quadri-
partite government.’ Solomon points out that this position had “little resonance 
among the conference participants, who generally supported the view that the 
best way to constrain the Khmer Rouge was to give them some stake in a polit-
ical process subject to international supervision” (Solomon 2000, 25). As 
Vietnam was not showing signs of cooperating, Hun Sen’s delegation continued 
requesting that the potential Vietnamese withdrawal be “linked to the guarantees 
of a non- return to power of the Khmer Rouge” (Chandler 1998, 19). As Chan-
dler points out, “this was simply interpreted as political maneuvering on the part 
of the SoC [abbreviation for State of Cambodia] to stall the peace process” 
(1998, 19).
 According to Bert, China was not enthusiastic about the Khmer Rouge’s 
return to power, however it used it as a bargaining chip, recognizing that “the 
Khmer Rouge was the only force in Cambodia capable of standing up to the gov-
ernment militarily, and it used the KR to achieve its objectives, either encourag-
ing them with arms support or pressuring them to participate in negotiations” 
(Bert 1993, 329). Thus the main Chinese strategic interest was to have Cambo-
dia free of Vietnamese influence, which was largely in line with US interests and 
those of the ASEAN countries (Bert 1993, 330). As noted by Kiernan, “China’s 
involvement brought Khmer Rouge protégés to center stage” (Kiernan 2002, 
489). It was obvious that any agreement would require unanimity. With veto 
power in their hands, the Khmer Rouge could both obstruct any compromise 
and, while stalling negotiations, rearm and improve their military power. Kiernan 
shows Pol Pot’s briefings to his generals in which he indicated his intention to 
delay elections (which were one of the issues that was discussed in Paris) until 
his forces controlled the countryside:
the outside world keeps demanding a political end to the war in Kampuchea, 
I could end the war now if I wanted, because the outside world is waiting 
for me. But I am buying time to give you, comrades, the opportunity to 
carry out all the tasks. If it doesn’t end politically and ends militarily, that is 
good.
(cited in Kiernan 2002, 489)
Thus during the Paris talks, representatives of the Khmer Rouge insisted that 
their rule was not characterized by genocide and indicated their support for a 
coalition government under Sihanouk as the only way for Cambodia to regain its 
sovereignty lost in a Vietnamese “colonial” rule through Hun Sen (Hampson and 
Zartman 2012, 6). Although Vietnam was experiencing noticeable pressure, it 
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still did not perceive any utility in accepting the terms proposed by the US and 
China. At the same time, the uncompromising position of China led the Khmer 
Rouge to also assume an uncompromising position. The unyielding positions of 
main sponsor states led the peace conference to failure, as each of their client 
movements was unwilling to compromise. Clearly, in the event that mediators 
are unable to reach a convergence of interests, the conflicting sides will be 
induced to defect from negotiations, making it more likely that the peace process 
will fail. In fact, in light of the imminent failure of the peace talks “on the ground 
in Cambodia, the Khmer Rouge, the Khmer People’s National Liberation Front 
(KPNLF ), and Hun Sen’s State of Cambodia were launching new tests of 
military strength” (Solomon 2000, 31). Particularly symptomatic of this was 
Vietnam’s lack of convergence of interests with the rest of the mediating coali-
tion – especially the US and China – which was driving the process into a dead-
lock (Solomon 2000, 84). At the same time, the Vietnamese unyielding position 
was creating lower payoffs for the Hun Sen government, as they were experi-
encing stronger pressure from the rest of the conference to accept the ‘quadripar-
tite government.’ As a result, Hun Sen’s government opted to continue pursuing 
unilateral belligerent activities against other Khmer factions, minimizing the 
likelihood of a peaceful solution.
 However, a significant change took place when Moscow “delivered a secret 
warning to the Vietnamese that it would no longer subsidize Vietnam’s occupa-
tion of Cambodia and its tug- of-war with China” (Hampson and Zartman 2012, 
5). Soon after that, Vietnam announced that it would withdraw its troops from 
Cambodia. This significant change in conflict dynamics was strongly related to 
an earlier, larger geo- political shift in Moscow’s foreign policy that saw the rise 
of Gorbachev to power. Similar to the previously described case of Namibia, the 
new Gorbachev doctrine saw the developments in Southeast Asia as an oppor-
tunity to strengthen its relations with China.
 During a speech in Vladivostok in 1986, primarily aimed at the Chinese audi-
ence, Gorbachev pointed out that the Soviet Union should abandon the policy 
objective of being as strong as any possible coalition of states opposing it. It was 
an indication that the Soviet Union could not economically sustain the strategy 
of maintaining parity with the US, Europe, China and Japan combined (Nguyen 
1993, 285). Thus he suggested a pact between two continental powers, united by 
their real or imagined grievances against the West, which Nguyen calls “Eastern 
Rapallo” (Nguyen 1993, 286). Gorbachev emphasized that both countries had 
similar priorities in terms of improving their domestic economies and thus it was 
of mutual benefit to mend their differences and engage in constructive economic 
relations (Shearman 1987, 1101). Knowing that Soviet support of Vietnam had 
been perceived as a direct threat to Chinese interests, in 1985, Gorbachev 
informed the General Secretary of the Vietnamese Communist Party, Le Duan, 
that Moscow wished to see an improvement in Vietnam’s relations with China. 
Two years later, Duan’s replacement, Nguyen Van Linh, was informed that 
Moscow believed a solution to the Cambodian question rested in “national 
reconciliation and unification of all patriotic forces in Kampuchea” (Shearman 
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1987, 1101). Although important and novel, these early changes in Soviet posi-
tions did not generate sufficient pressure to provoke a change in Vietnam’s 
position. Nevertheless, Vietnam slowly began feeling isolated from the inter-
national community.
 The withdrawal of Vietnamese troops – promised to the Soviet Union – only 
aggravated the conflict between the government and insurgent forces. The resist-
ance forces slowly gained ground from Hun Sen’s troops, putting significant 
pressure on the Vietnamese and Hun Sen to explore the possibilities of a peace-
ful settlement. Vietnam already announced its plans to withdraw troops from 
Cambodia in April 1989. However, the withdrawal was conducted in stages, as 
the last troops left the country only after the first Paris talks, in September 1989 
(Ratner 1993, 5). Yet, in light of waning Soviet willingness to support 
Vietnamese policies in the region and the high costs of the occupation, the with-
drawal paved the way for more substantial talks (Bert 1993). Such developments 
suggest that an increase in the cost of supporting the war might induce the 
defecting third party to change its strategy and engage in a cooperative medi-
ation effort to manage the conflict. This will be further analyzed in the remainder 
of the case.
Convergence of interests between third parties
The United States became aware that a good way to detach various Khmer fac-
tions from their outside sources of support was by transferring the problem to an 
in- tune Security Council P- 5 that could induce the warring parties to com-
promise. Solomon points out that “the Paris Conference had had an ambiguous 
outcome regarding a role for the United Nations in a peace process, some pro-
posed it, a few opposed it” (Solomon 2000, 34). According to Hampson and 
Zartman (2012), the US had two reasons for transferring the problem to the UN. 
First of all, in case the peace process succeeded, the US wanted to avoid being 
the sole actor responsible for Cambodia’s post- conflict reconstruction and it 
wanted to see the financial burden shared with other countries. More impor-
tantly, “the only way to wean the various Cambodian fractions from their 
regional and great power backers was through a concerted P- 5 team- based effort 
that would, in effect, force Cambodia’s factions to compromise and make con-
cessions at the negotiating table” (Hampson and Zartman 2012, 6). The strongest 
opponents to this US position were Vietnam and the Hun Sen regime. In their 
eyes, strong involvement of the UN would undermine Cambodian sovereignty. 
The only way to prevent the Khmer Rouge from retaliating, they argued, was 
to preserve the integrity and military capabilities of the current Hun Sen 
government.
 The US initiated the creation of momentum among the five permanent 
members of the Security Council and a framework for future UN involvement in 
Cambodia was emerging. Between January and August 1990, the P- 5 held six 
rounds of talks. During the first session that took place in Paris, all participants 
unanimously accepted the US draft which indicated a need for enhanced UN 
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involvement, especially in the context of the verification of the withdrawal of 
Vietnam’s forces, monitoring of the elections, assistance in the protection of 
human rights and a smooth repatriation of refugees (Solomon 2000, 40). 
However, this early convergence of interests also revealed major obstacles to 
achieving a settlement. Among the most complex ones were: the issues of 
security, in light of continuous fighting between various Khmer factions; trans-
itional government until the elections could be organized; and Cambodian 
sovereignty.
 On the issue of security, the P- 5 concurred 
to stabilize a cease- fire, contending military factions should be put under the 
UN control in cantonments where they would be disarmed and eventually 
reorganized into a national army under the authority of the Cambodian gov-
ernment that would emerge from the elections.
(Solomon 2000, 42)
The problem of a provisional administration for the country was solved with the 
establishment of the Supreme National Council (SNC). On this matter the 
Chinese insisted that they would not support any settlement that did not provide 
for an active role for the Khmer Rouge. The US was quite apprehensive of the 
future role of the Khmer Rouge – especially in light of increasing public outrage 
at the US’s indirect support for the Khmer Rouge – as this would legitimize its 
past doings. The solution was achieved in assigning “individuals representing 
the full range of Cambodian public opinion and deprived of any operational 
authority” to the SNC instead of organizations and movements (Solomon 2000, 
42). Thus, while the Khmer Rouge would not be represented as a separate body, 
it would still have one of its officials as a full member of the Council. According 
to Solomon, “this gave the Chinese sufficient political leverage to “deliver” their 
client to the settlement” (Solomon 2000, 42). However, as the negotiations 
between the P- 5 progressed, it became quite obvious that the Soviet Union and 
China were unable to find a mutually acceptable formula regarding the degree of 
UN involvement in implementing the peace agreement. On the one hand, the 
Soviets refused to accept any significant role for the UN, referring to respect for 
Cambodian sovereignty, which was a euphemism for the concern that strong UN 
involvement could endanger the government’s chances in the upcoming elec-
tions. On the other hand, the Chinese were asking for complete disarmament of 
the government, claiming that such a move would serve the purpose of creating 
equal chances for everyone in the elections, while in reality Beijing was trying to 
weaken Hun Sen’s chances (Hampson and Zartman 2012, 7; Solomon 1999, 
2000).
 While the Soviet Union and China were struggling to find an agreement, the 
United States was experiencing a serious challenge on the domestic front. 
Solomon recounts that “during the fall of 1989, and into the spring of 1990, 
domestic political pressure in the United States had been building against any 
agreement that would seem to legitimize the Khmer Rouge by including their 
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leadership in a settlement plan, much less increase the party’s chance of return-
ing to power by some combination of military and political maneuvering” 
(Solomon 2000, 44). The strongest hit to the US position came in April 1990. 
Following a screening of a documentary on ABC news, which claimed that US 
financial support intended for Prince Sihanouk was ending up in the hands of the 
Khmer Rouge, a bi- partisan group of US Congressmen wrote to then Secretary 
of State James Baker demanding a radical change in US foreign policy. They 
asked for an immediate termination of support for Prince Sihanouk and the 
Khmer Rouge and a subsequent shift in preference toward Hun Sen and his pro- 
Vietnamese government. The letter stated that “China is the problem, not the 
solution in Cambodia” and that US policy “should be based, first and foremost, 
upon preventing the return to power of the Khmer Rouge” (Solomon 2000, 
44–45). The congressmen threatened that in the event that “the administration 
did not shift its approach to a Cambodian settlement away from Sihanouk’s 
coalition, Congress would cut off all financial support for the noncommunist 
resistance – FUNCINPEC and the KPNLF ” (Solomon 2000, 45).
 This radical shift – also known as ‘the Baker shift’ – in the US’ position was 
first announced to Soviets during the fifth P- 5 session in Paris in July 1990. 
Baker stated that the US intended to withdraw its recognition of the representa-
tives of Cambodia’s coalition (that included Sihanouk and the Khmer Rouge) in 
the UN (Hampson and Zartman 2012, 8). He also indicated that the US was con-
sidering initiating consultations with the Vietnamese government and their part-
ners in Cambodia (Solomon 2000, 46). The shift represented a political 
bombshell for the negotiation process. It was clear that the US was about to 
switch sides and put forward policies much closer to those of Vietnam and the 
USSR.
 China was very concerned that this change would cement Hun Sen’s position 
and jeopardize the momentum that was already created in the peace process. Pri-
vately they even admitted that the ‘Baker shift’ caused a great deal of confusion 
amongst the Chinese leadership (Solomon 2000, 46). Thus the Chinese decided 
to push more strongly for the achievement of an agreement within the P- 5, as a 
way of keeping the Khmer Rouge involved in the political settlement (Solomon 
2000, 46). Interestingly, reflecting on the game theoretical model, the Chinese 
choice to stay in the mediation process prevented the process from reaching a 
potential myopic equilibrium and consequently move the mediation efforts into 
NME. Vietnam for its part, apprehensive of the Soviet decision to improve its 
relations with China and stop supporting its cause in Cambodia, saw this as a 
chance to achieve a greater convergence of interests with the US. In light of the 
new policy priorities, the US officials openly indicated their readiness to improve 
bilateral relations with Hanoi under the condition that they accept a UN- managed 
settlement for Cambodia. Isolated Hanoi was also well aware that it had to “give 
up on Ho Chi Minh’s dream of an Indochina Federation . . . and to normalize 
relations with China on Beijing’s terms” (Solomon 2000, 78). As a result, Hanoi 
became more inclined to compromise and explore constructive ways to engage 
all of the Khmer factions in future political processes. At the same time, China 
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was careful not to make a move that would shift the blame for spoiling the 
process to them. For this reason, authorities in Beijing decided to put pressure on 
the Khmer Rouge telling them to “stay on the course and reach a political settle-
ment” (Hampson and Zartman 2012, 8).
 In August 1990, at their sixth and last meeting in New York, all the members 
of the Security Council accepted a framework agreement that “formally recog-
nized that there could not be a settlement without the participation of all factions 
and that the Khmer Rouge had to be included to avoid the continuation of the 
civil war” (Hampson and Zartman 2012, 8); that the UN would take over the role 
of a transitional government until the elections are organized; that Cambodia’s 
sovereignty would be ‘embodied’ in a Supreme National Council composed of 
individuals; and that this body would not have any authority before the UN- 
monitored elections would take place (Solomon 2000, 47). It was a strong 
indication that all the major powers – the US, China, and Russia (that repres-
ented Vietnam’s interests) – managed to achieve a convergence of interests with 
regard to solving the conflict. In terms of the theoretical model, the process was 
now at point (c), as each party evidently achieved less than what it initially set 
out to, but more than what was to be gained from non- cooperative behavior. As 
Solomon points out, the challenge was now to “convince the conflicting parties 
to accept the settlement” (Solomon 2000, 47).
 Once the P- 5 plan became public, the Chinese Vice Foreign Minister visited 
Hanoi to convince his Vietnamese colleagues to support the framework. Accord-
ing to Solomon, the initiative failed because the Vietnamese Foreign Minister 
Thach “gratuitously insulted the visiting Chinese envoy in an effort to keep the 
diplomacy deadlocked” (Solomon 2000, 74). After this incident, in September 
1990, Chinese and Vietnamese officials started a series of secret bilateral negoti-
ations in order to resolve their differences. As a result of these consultations, the 
“extremely nationalistic” Thach retired from his position in June 1991. Soon 
after that, Sino- Vietnamese relations “were fully normalized” (Solomon 2000, 
75). Unfortunately, there are no public records of these meetings. However their 
frequency in such a short period of time – according to Solomon (2000, 74, fn 
53) there were four secret meetings between September 1990 and the spring of 
1991 – was a clear indication of the two sides’ readiness to exit the lingering 
quagmire of their bilateral relations. Once reconciled, both sides exercised “irre-
sistible pressure” on their Cambodian partners – Hun Sen for the Vietnamese 
and Khmer Rouge for the Chinese – to accept the compromises in the interest of 
the settlement (Solomon 2000, 78). In August 1991, it was clear that all parties 
had accepted the proposed framework. As all major regional and global actors 
that were involved in the peace process showed the intention of resolving their 
differences and exiting Indochina, the signing of a final settlement plan hap-
pened in a matter of days. Within two months, specific details of the plan were 
discussed and the agreement was ratified in Paris on October 23, 1991.
 As a direct participant in the peace process, Solomon points out that “it is 
clear that the parallel and mutually reinforcing reconciliations of 1991 between 
Beijing and Moscow, and Beijing and Hanoi, made possible the fundamental 
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political deals that enabled the Perm Five’s peace plan for Cambodia to fall into 
place” (Solomon 2000, 78). The evident convergence of interests was a direct 
result of the mediators’ ability to negotiate a solution amongst themselves. At 
the same time, the constructive role of China, the Soviet Union, and Vietnam in 
the multiparty mediation process was best observed in their ability to influence 
their client Khmer factions and move them toward a mutually acceptable solu-
tion. However, this role was only fulfilled once the parties managed to reach a 
convergence of interests: the Sino- Soviet rapprochement that culminated with a 
P- 5 agreement that was a result of a major geo- political shift represented by the 
rise of Gorbachev to power; and the Soviet decision to stop financing the Viet-
namese ‘tug of war’ with China and change its strategies toward Beijing. Sim-
ilarly, the Sino- Vietnamese rapprochement was also the result of a geo- political 
change – waning Soviet influence induced Vietnam to seek new partners in the 
US and China – and awareness that the costs of supporting the war through 
occupation were becoming too high, particularly as the Soviets cut their financial 
support.
 The intra- P-5 negotiations that generated the convergence of interests, while 
conducted under the US leadership, benefited greatly from the legitimacy of the 
UN. In fact, the US used the legitimacy of the UN to guide the conflicting com-
munist super- powers to an agreement. At the same time, the US was able to take 
the leadership role only once its goals did not jeopardize those of the other P- 5. 
In fact, the compromise solution that was achieved within the P- 5 indicates that 
each side had to accept less than what they initially aimed to, confirming the 
dynamics described in the model that a cooperative solution will still produce 
some costs.
Note
1 An earlier version of this chapter was published as a case study in Vuković (2012).
6 Kosovo1
Contemporary conflict management scholarship describes the situation in 
Kosovo as an undeniable case of intractable conflict (Burg 2005). It is character-
ized by contention over the rights of self- determination, sovereignty, and territo-
rial integrity. It persisted over time which led to the development of 
psychological manifestations of deep feelings of distrust and mutual hatred, 
manifested in the employment of destructive means, violence, and a refusal to 
yield to endeavors aimed at reaching a political settlement. All of this is indic-
ative of its undeniably intractable nature. The case of Kosovo offers a unique 
opportunity to explore two distinct phases of the peace process within the same 
conflict, which despite the inevitable change of actors (vis- à-vis their leadership) 
still did not produce any success.
The nature of conflict
Sources of intractability
As Burg observes, “the dissolution of Yugoslavia can be attributed to the effects 
of several mutually reinforcing conflicts” (Burg 2005, 184). The key feature of 
all these conflicts can be found in mounting ethno- nationalism among the 
various peoples of Yugoslavia, which was caused by unresolved historical dis-
putes and by contemporary conflict on political and economic issues. Increasing 
claims to self- determination in Kosovo were directly linked to both territory and 
ethnic identity. A territorially compact Albanian ethnic majority was defying 
domination by the Serb minority and the existing political regime in Belgrade.
 The ease with which justifiable economic and political issues were able to 
inflame temporarily subdued ethno- nationalism and provoke internal conflict 
was undoubtedly proven in 1968, when frustration over the economic situation 
in the province aggravated the nationalistic strife between the Albanian popula-
tion in Kosovo and Serbian authorities in Belgrade. In fact, by the late 1960s, the 
situation in Kosovo was quite dire – it was the most underdeveloped part of 
Yugoslavia in terms of all socioeconomic indicators with the highest rate of illit-
eracy, 36% were officially illiterate, while a much larger number was not 
working literate (Ramet 1992, 189).
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 In 1974, Yugoslav federal authorities managed to appease the claims for self- 
determination in Kosovo, by granting the province a high degree of autonomy 
and a status as a federal unit, although formally it was still a province within the 
republic of Serbia. Gradually the Albanian population was emancipated and 
assigned to high administrative positions. According to Ramet, it was at this 
moment that “the Albanians were becoming restless . . . when the slow begin-
nings of reform had become unmistakable – a confirmation of Machiavelli and 
Crane Brinton’s proposition that repression becomes intolerable once reforms 
are begun” (1992, 190). In fact, the level of underdevelopment in Kosovo was 
continuing to fuel popular restlessness. Once again, socio- economic issues were 
easily translated into political agitation, which culminated in a series of riots, 
subversive activities and the use of violence across the entire province in 1981. 
These demonstrations resulted in more than 1000 deaths and many more injuries 
(Ramet 1992, 196). The protestors now publicly echoed revolutionary tones that 
flirted with separatism: Kosovo reconstituted as a republic or utter secession 
(Troebst 1998). The federal authorities reacted without delay, tightening their 
grip on the province.
The development of deep feelings of distrust and mutual hatred
In the coming years, anti- Albanian sentiment reached every aspect of society. 
The authorities expanded their list of potential suspects and several thousands of 
Kosovo Albanians were prosecuted for separatism between 1981 and 1987. 
Fueled by the stories of exiled Serbs from Kosovo, Belgrade media started pub-
lishing articles covering Albanian atrocities, which genuinely and irrevocably 
contributed to the development of stereotypes of Kosovo Albanians in the eyes 
of the Serbian audience. The exaggerations in storytelling went so far that Bel-
grade newspapers started labeling the crisis in Kosovo as “ethnic cleansing” of 
Serbs (Banac 2001). By 1986, Serbia was inflamed with nationalism, peaking 
with the infamous Memorandum of the Serbian Academy of Science and Arts 
that lamented over Serbia’s faith in the Yugoslavian community and echoed a 
direct warning about the imminent loss of Kosovo. The hatred so rampant that 
Serbs began boycotting Albanian shops and trade with Albanians, which cut 
down their sales by as much as 85% (Ramet 1992, 199).
The employment of repressive measures
The consistent demographic decline of the Slavic population in the province 
invigorated nationalistic rhetoric and policies of the new party elite in Belgrade. 
The underlying aim of Serbian nationalists that assumed the highest ranks in the 
party (at the republic level) was the implementation of a program that would 
reduce the number of Albanians in Kosovo (Banac 2001). The accession of Slo-
bodan Milošević to power in 1987 signaled a new and more dramatic escalation 
of the conflict in Kosovo. He intervened in Kosovo with heavy security forces 
and revoked the province’s autonomy. Under ‘emergency measures,’ ethnic 
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Albanians were forced out of public institutions (Ramet 1992; Troebst 1998). 
Serbian authorities intensified the policy of dismissal of Albanians from jobs in 
public enterprises. According to statistics from that time, more than “100,000 
Albanians were fired from factories, mines, schools, hospitals, judiciary, cultural 
institutions, media public services, municipal and regional authorities, etc. and 
replaced by Serbs, Montenegrins, or pro- Serbian Albanians” (Troebst 1998). 
Serbian authorities issued orders to outlaw all Albanian political, cultural, sport, 
and media organizations and associations. Albanian students were expelled from 
universities and a new curriculum in the Serbian language and with Serbian text-
books was imposed. Albanians were not allowed to make any transactions on 
real estate markets without special permission from the authorities (Caplan 1998, 
751). Repressive measures and violence, exercised by the security forces, distin-
guished Kosovo as the region with one of the worst human rights records in 
Europe at that time (Nizich 1992).
The creation of irreconcilable positions
The expelled Albanian political elite started developing new forms of organiza-
tion and resistance. The Albanian political leaders in Kosovo developed a 
strategy of non- violent resistance and established ‘parallel’ state structures in the 
province. In 1991, an underground referendum was organized in which almost 
100% of participants – all of them Albanians – voted in favor of an independent 
Kosovo. This motivated the elites to declare the Republic of Kosovo to be an 
independent and sovereign state. At the same time, emboldened by the referen-
dum, members of this ‘parallel government’ organized both parliamentary elec-
tions in which the Democratic League of Kosovo (LDK) won an absolute 
majority (89%) and presidential elections that confirmed LDK’s leader Ibrahim 
Rugova as the indisputable leader.
 From then on, Kosovo was a clear example of segregation in Europe (Banac 
2001). On the one hand, there was the official Serbian regime that excluded 
ethnic Albanians from nearly every aspect of society and a ‘shadow state’ estab-
lished by ethnic Albanians. The Serbian authorities ‘tolerated’ this clandestine 
state, which signified the definite separation of two ethnic communities and 
absolute exclusion of Albanians as citizens of Serbia. The non- violent approach 
taken by Albanian elites to resist Serbian policies was the only option, given the 
tremendous power disparity between Kosovo Albanians and the Serbian authori-
ties. This Ghandian approach attracted a great deal of sympathy in the West, but 
the West was very slow (if not reluctant) to start pressuring Belgrade to change 
its policies in the province.
 The situation at this moment was clear. The zero- sum issues that divided both 
sides made compromising very difficult. Thus the early attempts at international 
involvement in the crisis were faced with the serious challenge of formulating 
effective approaches in order to create a non- zero-sum outcome.
 Despite the apparent pattern of neglect on the part of the international com-
munity, the biggest disappointment for Albanians in Kosovo originated with the 
Kosovo  117
Dayton agreements in 1995 that ended the civil war in Bosnia. For several years, 
the low degree of inter- ethnic friction and the illusion of stability in Kosovo – 
due to repressive policies that excluded Albanians from participating in the 
system on one side and shadow state structures established by these very Albani-
ans on the other – indirectly motivated the international community to overlook 
the real situation on the ground. According to Caplan, it was the absence of war 
in Kosovo that made foreign countries believe that there was no urgent need to 
deal with the question (1998, 751). It seemed as if non- violent resistance, which 
attracted sympathy in the West, was the ‘victim of its own success’ (Caplan 
1998, 751). Despite Western sympathies, the Albanian leadership lacked a strong 
ally for their cause. In fact, at that time Milošević was identified as the ‘stabiliz-
ing factor’ and collaboration with him was seen as essential to creating and 
maintaining peace in ex- Yugoslav countries. So, not surprisingly, up until March 
1998, both the American administration and its European counterparts were 
reluctant to accept any claim of independence by the Kosovo Albanian elites.
 For Albanians in Kosovo, Dayton provided an obvious signal that ethnic ter-
ritories have legitimacy (given the fact that the Republika Srpska was estab-
lished) and that international attention can only be garnered through war (Surroi 
1996). Disappointment culminated with the increasing support of the Albanian 
population for the radical separatist Kosovo Liberation Army (UCK). Their 
militant activities against Serb forces in the province soon brought them control 
over almost 30% of Kosovo’s territory. Gradually, even some members of the 
political elite started supporting the guerilla warfare of the UCK, claiming that 
the “path of nonviolence has gotten [them] nowhere . . . the Kosovo Liberation 
Army is fighting for [their] freedom” (Caplan 1998, 752). It was obvious that 
Dayton represented the turning point for Kosovo Albanians and their future 
demands. Demands for extended autonomy and a return to the situation pre-
scribed by the constitution from 1974 were now overruled. The only political 
aim at that point was an independent Kosovo.
Internal characteristics of the conflicting sides
The radicalization of the Kosovo Albanian separatist tendencies was rapidly 
restricting the space for any compromise- based solution. The international com-
munity was resolute that a mutually acceptable compromise solution needed to 
be found. Given the fact that, in as early as 1991, the overwhelming majority of 
Kosovo Albanians voted in favor of independence, it was unlikely that the popu-
lation would settle for the restoration of autonomy that the international com-
munity was trying to put forward as a compromise. In fact, after seven years of 
frozen and intractable conflict, marked by the establishment of a segregation 
system, Albanians in Kosovo now had less reason to accept any form of political 
autonomy within Serbia. As a direct consequence of the conflict’s intractability, 
there was no trust in Serbian authorities that they would guarantee Kosovo Alba-
nian autonomy, given the fact that it was the same authorities that had abolished 
it in the first place.
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 As the mediation literature suggests (e.g., Bercovitch 2005), in the case of 
intractable conflicts, one of the main goals of successful mediation is actor 
transformation. In the case of Kosovo, a stable settlement would seem to be 
attainable only through the establishment of a truly democratic regime in Bel-
grade. However, at that time, opposition forces in Serbia were largely silent on 
the matter of what was happening in Kosovo, while the strongest opposition 
parties were even defending Milošević’s policies in the province (Caplan 1998; 
Troebst 1998). Even public opinion seemed to reflect complacency. According 
to a survey done by the Helsinki Committee for the Human Rights Office in 
Belgrade:
An independent Kosovo, or the Republic of Kosovo within the FRY, is 
admissible in the view of only a negligible number of our respondents. Like-
wise, very few respondents would accept a division of Kosovo. A vast per-
centage (41.8%) believes that the solution is to be looked for in the forcible 
or ‘peaceful’ expulsion of the Albanians. On the other hand, 27.2% of those 
manifesting ‘democratic tolerance’ would be willing, at best, to grant the 
Albanians their cultural autonomy. . . . In other words, in the case of Kosovo 
is the Serbian public opinion neither willing to search for a compromise nor 
even for a minimum democratic solution.
(Troebst 1998, 21–22)
The situation amongst the Kosovo Albanian political elite was also problematic. 
The non- violent tactics of Rugova and his LDK were losing public support due 
to the increasing popularity of violent tactics employed by radicals in the UCK. 
At the same time, other political parties were less inclined to negotiate with Bel-
grade on the issue of autonomy. The Parliamentary Party of Kosovo (PPK), the 
biggest opposition party in Priština, headed by Adem Demaci, promoted as a 
compromise the reconstruction of Yugoslavia as a confederation or association 
of independent states of Kosovo, Montenegro, and Serbia better known as 
‘project Balkania.’ Less than this was not an option for the PPK. Clearly this 
option was less palatable to Serbia and thus was not even considered by policy 
makers in Belgrade.
 The deep radicalization of political elites on both sides was a direct obstacle 
to a long- lasting solution. To rise above the deadlock, the international com-
munity – that wanted to resolve the crisis through negotiations – was challenged 
by two conflicting principles that they had yet to reconcile: the autonomy of 
Kosovo and sovereignty of Yugoslavia. The latter principle was mirrored in the 
fact that Belgrade was reluctant to accept any foreign third- party intervention, 
claiming that the situation in Kosovo was an internal affair. The principle of the 
inviolability of state sovereignty and territorial integrity was something that the 
international community was not willing to jeopardize, given new dynamics in 
the region and globally. There was a fear that recklessness in approaching the 
situation might serve as a signal for other states to intervene elsewhere according 
to their own judgment (i.e., there was apprehension that Russia might use this 
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precedent as justification for future intervention in ex- Soviet states) (Caplan 
1998). For this reason, any form of direct intervention was put aside, especially 
the use of force, unless it was to be authorized by the UN Security Council.
 The surfacing of the UCK put a great deal of pressure on the LDK leadership to 
show determination in achieving independence. Since the LDK was insistent on 
the employment of non- violent methods, it understood UCK’s pressure as an addi-
tional motive to try to find some compromise with Belgrade, otherwise large- scale 
violence would be unavoidable. Along with the intra- Albanian power- struggle, the 
regime in Belgrade was also subjected to internal pressures from the emerging 
democratically- oriented opposition, headed by Democratic Party (Demokratska 
stranka, DS) forces in 1996. The DS were compelling Milošević to seek to achieve 
some progress toward finding a settlement that would pacify the situation in 
Kosovo. A result of this convergence of interest between Rugova and Milošević 
was the negotiated settlement of September 1996 on the normalization of the 
education system facilitated by mediation activities by an international, non- 
governmental organization, Comunità di Sant’Egidio (Troebst 1998). Having had 
success in mediating the conflict in Mozambique, the NGO’s involvement was 
accepted because its interests were not suspicious to either side, but were perceived 
as being a desire to contribute to the de- escalation of the conflict. Clearly, given the 
fact that there was no true international guarantor ready to exert pressure on both 
sides to realize the agreement, the sides were unwilling to implement it. In the end, 
it merely resulted in a demonstration of good will – mainly toward the international 
community – and an intention to achieve some results in terms of bridging differ-
ences, but nothing further as clear incentives were missing. As in all intractable 
conflicts, the conflicting parties felt that “at best they may reach temporary cessa-
tions of violence and that they cannot reach a fundamental and genuine resolution 
of their issues” (Bercovitch 2005, 100).
Involvement of international actors and their interests in the 
conflict
During the 1980s, initial steps to encourage dialogue between representatives of 
Kosovo Albanians and authorities in Belgrade were taken by governmental and 
non- governmental third parties, but none of them made any significant progress. 
In fact, while the Serbian officials were resisting any third- party involvement, 
especially from abroad – both from foreign governments and non- governmental 
organizations – Albanians were of the opposite opinion. Both sides were well 
aware of the repercussions of such third- party involvement, namely the inter-
nationalization of their conflict.
Western countries: the EC/EU and the United States
During the Cold War period, Western countries were fully aware of the national-
ist tensions in Yugoslavia. It was for this reason that they supported Tito’s firm 
regime, which was able to keep ethnic tensions at bay. Soon after Tito’s death in 
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1980, these projections proved to be right, as was shown by the violent clashes 
between Albanians and Serbs in Kosovo in 1981. With the end of the Cold War, 
the American and European stance toward issues in Yugoslavia started to change 
dramatically. The geopolitical relevance of Yugoslavia was fading away and the 
country became just one of the many communist countries that needed to demo-
cratize its system and liberalize its economy. In this respect, the situation in 
Kosovo appeared to be the perfect lens through which Yugoslavia was viewed.
 Severe abuses of human rights in Kosovo represented the main concern for 
American diplomats at that time. However, this concern was more superficial 
than what would have been needed for Americans to be more actively engaged 
in managing the crisis. In fact, the limits of American policy were best described 
by Zimmerman who assumed an Ambassadorial post in Belgrade in 1989:
I was to reassert the traditional mantra of US support for Yugoslavia’s unity, 
independence and territorial integrity. But I would add that the United States 
could only support unity in the context of democracy; it would strongly 
oppose unity imposed or preserved by force.
(Zimmermann 1995, 3)
At the same time, for the US, the situation in Kosovo represented only one 
aspect of the greater overall crisis Yugoslavia was experiencing.
 American unwillingness to take action was made easier by Western Europe’s 
argument that Europe should be the one dealing with issues in Yugoslavia. The 
logic behind this claim derived from the fact that almost half of Yugoslav 
foreign trade was with the countries from the European Community (EC), while 
only a fraction was with the US. Although there was an apparent motivation to 
act, Western European countries lacked a common perception of the situation in 
the country. Touval argues that “their divergent attitudes stemmed largely from 
cultural- historical preconceptions existing in their respective societies” (1996, 
410). Despite the fact that the EC as a whole seemed to send a unified signal on 
its position on the matter, individual EC member states sent contradictory 
signals. On the one side, the United Kingdom and France insisted that the 
primary concern should be the preservation of Yugoslav unity and territorial 
integrity, while Italy and newly- unified Germany were much more inclined to 
emphasize the necessity and primacy of promoting human rights and democratic 
standards, which for them represented euphemisms for respecting the principle 
of self- determination. Such ambiguity in the European position was further com-
plicated by the fact that Europe’s main interest was in the evolving situation in 
the rich northern republics of Slovenia and Croatia that were looking for allies 
for their separatist movements. Kosovo was largely ignored.
 In fact, the politically powerful European states were willing to act with deter-
mination, but only through unofficial channels because they wanted to avoid being 
criticized for “violating the normative and legal injunction against interference in 
the internal affairs of a sovereign state” (Touval 1996, 413). Any attempt to 
become directly involved, including via mediation, would have entailed exhaustive 
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participation in Yugoslavia’s internal politics, which Western countries wanted to 
avoid. However, this had no effect on the crisis in Kosovo. Even when Western 
countries gave up on their goal of the preservation of Yugoslav unity, the right to 
secession was recognized only for those entities that had the status of a republic in 
the federation, which Kosovo never managed to obtain. This happened once the 
wars in Slovenia and Croatia started and the EC rushed to establish an arbitration 
commission better known as Badinter Commission (after Robert Badinter, Chief 
Jurist and President of the French Constitutional Court), which was supposed to 
resolve disagreements between parties in the Yugoslav crisis. More importantly, 
this commission issued several crucial opinions that rapidly became pillars around 
which the international community’s future activities revolved. For Kosovo, one 
finding of the Badinter Commission was essential: in the process of dissolution, the 
international community in fact recognized the right of secession for those entities 
that had the status of a federal unit, i.e., republics, but not for the autonomous prov-
inces. Despite the fact that Kosovo requested recognition as a sovereign state, 
along with other republics, and the results of a clandestine referendum on inde-
pendence, the EC refused to consider it (Caplan 1998). In a nutshell, by the 1990s, 
efforts to employ preventive diplomacy in the crisis in Kosovo could only be 
described as weak and ineffective because of the reluctance of outside actors to 
become engaged more directly and due to their holistic approach to the situation in 
Yugoslavia more generally.
 Along with the radicalization of Albanians in Kosovo, the international com-
munity also gave Milošević a great deal of room to maneuver in the province. 
Soon after the Dayton agreement was signed, Western countries started lifting 
previously imposed sanctions from Serbia and Montenegro (then known as the 
Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, FRY). Initially sanctions were supposed to be 
lifted only in the event that the FRY implemented a set of laws that would 
improve minority rights, especially those pertaining to Albanians in Kosovo. 
This matter was neglected due to Milošević’s constructive contribution in 
Dayton. On 23 February 1998, the US envoy to the region, Richard Gelbard, 
labeled the UCK as a terrorist group whose activities were strongly condemned 
by the US (Phillips 2012, 87).2 Milošević interpreted this as a go ahead to launch 
several large- scale attacks against the Albanian population in Kosovo under the 
guise of engaging in anti- terrorist activities.
 The upsurge of conflict in Kosovo did not draw synchronized attention from 
the international community to mediate a settlement until KLA activities posed a 
serious challenge to Serb dominance in Kosovo, which resulted in a dispropor-
tionate retaliation by Serb forces and subsequent humanitarian crisis. As Burg 
notes,
it was the onset of fighting between Serbian (formally Yugoslav) military 
and police units and the KLA, and especially the use of disproportionate 
force by Serbs against civilians in Kosovo, in early 1998 that prompted US 
and international efforts to mediate the conflict.
(Burg 2005, 202)
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 The initial efforts showed signs of ‘continual equivocation’ (Caplan 1998). 
The Contact Group, composed of six nations (the US, UK, France, Germany, 
Italy, and Russia), often threatened to reestablish sanctions unless authorities in 
Belgrade withdrew their special forces from the province and began a process of 
dialogue with the Kosovo Albanian leaders. Despite the fact that Milošević was 
not complying with its demands, the Contact Group was reluctant to impose and 
strengthen sanctions and chose to be more flexible with deadlines. The hesitance 
of the international community in this period can be attributed to various factors, 
but there are two that deserve special attention. First of all, for the first time, a 
non- Western country was included in the coalition of international actors that 
was active in managing the conflict, Russia. Emerging from the ashes of the dis-
solved USSR, Russia was now assuming a much more active role in inter-
national politics. Its absence from previous conflict management activities in 
Yugoslavia would not be indicative of its future behavior. Perceived as a country 
that had particular influence over authorities in Belgrade, Western countries had 
a strategic interest in including Russia as a partner in their coalition because it 
would allow them to create the necessary incentives to encourage Belgrade to 
collaborate and move toward a negotiated settlement. Nevertheless, as a member 
of the Contact Group, Russia was the most insistent in refusing to support many 
of the sanctions suggested by other states. On the other hand, Western countries 
were much more willing to apply more stringent measures if the fighting in 
Kosovo continued – especially in light of previous conflicts in Yugoslavia. For 
Caplan, these divisions prevented the Contact Group “from acting with greater 
determination” (1998, 754).
 The second matter that contributed to the reluctance of the international com-
munity to become more involved was the fact that it shared a common interest in 
preventing the independence of Kosovo, which it believed would create a pos-
sible precedent, giving credence to separatist aspirations across the globe. 
Despite the fact that international actors differed in their opinions on the nature 
of engagement, they were all reluctant to use measures that would weaken the 
repressive Serbian regime in Kosovo. Particularly when reports of the growing 
strength of the UCK were starting to come in, the Contact Group stopped insist-
ing so vociferously that Belgrade should reduce its special forces in the prov-
ince. The Group started demanding only a suspension of attacks on the civilian 
population in Kosovo (Caplan 1998; Phillips 2012).
 However, the crisis in Kosovo was deteriorating dramatically. By the end of 
March, Serbian security forces launched large- scale military attacks against 
civilian communities in Kosovo that resulted in the displacement of approxi-
mately 200,000 Albanians from their homes (Phillips 2012, 90). Faced with an 
alarming humanitarian situation, the UN Security Council immediately 
responded; on 31 March 1998, it adopted Resolution 1160, which imposed an 
arms embargo on Yugoslavia on the basis of Chapter VII of the UN Charter. The 
resolution also called for a substantive and meaningful dialogue on political 
status issues between Belgrade and Kosovo Albanian authorities and recognized 
the willingness of the Contact Group to facilitate the talks. The resolution 
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concluded that the outcome of such talks should be founded on the principle of 
Yugoslav territorial integrity, respect for OSCE standards and the Charter of the 
UN, and should promote an “enhanced status for Kosovo” which would imply a 
larger degree of autonomy and “meaningful” self- administration (S/RES/1160 
1998). The implications of this resolution were far reaching considering that the 
document in fact labeled the situation in Kosovo as a threat to international 
peace and security. Even so, authorities in Belgrade remained reluctant to accept 
any foreign involvement in the case, claiming that the issue was purely internal 
in nature.
 Despite the reluctance of the authorities in Belgrade to accept third- party 
involvement while the situation in Kosovo was deteriorating further, the Serbian 
government gradually faced considerable pressure from abroad. It first started 
communicating about the issue with US diplomats (Phillips 2012, 91). At that 
time, as a clear sign of a unipolar power- balance in the world, the American 
administration demonstrated the greatest determination to manage the conflict 
and if necessary to resort to the use of force. Despite the fact that the US was 
orchestrating the whole process, it had to rely on the assistance of other members 
of the Contact Group. It was Russia who managed to extract a very important 
concession from authorities in Belgrade who agreed to restart negotiations with 
Kosovo leaders in June 1998 “to the extent that terrorist activities are halted” 
(Crawford 2002, 508). This time, Kosovo leaders did not collaborate due to 
extreme pressure imposed on them by the UCK not to accept anything but full 
independence for the province. Slowly, US officials, using facilitator strategies, 
were able to start indirect negotiations with Belgrade and Priština, using a dis-
tinct form of shuttle diplomacy mixed with sporadic threats of military interven-
tion, since the two sides did not want to negotiate directly. The lack of direct 
communication was a sign that compromise was far from attainable, especially 
since the authorities from both sides were very limited in their bargaining power. 
This time, both sides had considerably less room to maneuver, just as in 1996 
when they signed the (never implemented) agreement on education in Kosovo. It 
was virtually impossible to reconcile the claims of independence and reaffirma-
tion of Kosovo as an integral part of Serbia. Between June and October, several 
attempts at shuttle diplomacy by US officials failed because Kosovo leaders 
could not accept proposals from the international community that maintained 
that Kosovo was to remain an integral and inalienable part of Serbia (Phillips 
2012, 91–94).
 Given the futile results, belligerent activities between the UCK and Serbian 
forces escalated again, resulting in another UN Security Council resolution 
that condemned all acts of violence in Kosovo, in particular the “indiscrimi-
nate use of force by Serb security forces” and again urged both parties to cease 
fire and seek a political solution (S/RES/1199 1998). It is also noteworthy that 
by that time, US officials had gradually stopped labeling the UCK strictly as a 
terrorist group. In fact, in July 1998, James Rubin, the spokesperson of the 
State Department said “not all activities of UCK should be considered as 
terrorism.” From that moment on, the UCK had more legitimacy in the eyes of 
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the international community (B92 2008). In a short time, the position of the 
UCK would change from a terrorist group into a partner in the mediation 
process, enabling the third parties to engage them more directly in the peace 
process.
 During this process, US officials were losing leverage over the LDK and 
Milošević, and they had no leverage whatsoever over the UCK (Burg 2005, 
Crawford 2002). After mixing diplomacy with threats of using military force to 
impose a settlement, an agreement concluded between Richard Holbrooke and 
Milošević in October 1998 that called for the reduction of Serbian security 
forces and their withdrawal from Kosovo fell apart because it was used by the 
UCK to expand its power in the province. Not surprisingly, by the end of 1998, 
the negotiations had become completely ineffective.
 While the futility of negotiation efforts was becoming more and more evident, 
the situation in Kosovo was becoming even less stable. The level of violence 
was drastically increasing; the conflict exhibited all the elements of intractabil-
ity. By the end of 1998, Serbian forces had responded to the UCK’s expansion 
of power in the province with a systematic campaign across all municipalities 
forcing more than 300,000 ethnic Albanians to leave their homes and leading to 
countless civilian casualties. Serbia claimed that their actions were legitimate 
and directed toward terrorists in Kosovo. However, soon the international com-
munity would discover that the attacks were directed at the Albanian civil com-
munity as a whole, rather than the terrorist cells of the UCK. The turning point 
was in January 1999, when the foreign press released a story covering the mass 
murder of 45 ethnic Albanian civilians in Račak, executed at close range by 
Serbian forces (Weller 1999). Confronted with this unprecedented level of hos-
tility, the Contact Group reacted swiftly.
 Since conflict intensity was high, with elevated levels of violence and distrust 
between the parties, the tactics of communication and formulation were not 
enough. The Contact Group ministers immediately met in London and assumed 
a more decisive role using a directive- manipulator strategy. The ministers “unre-
servedly condemned” what happened in Račak, stressing that the situation in 
Kosovo “remains a threat to peace and security in the region, [and was] raising 
the prospect of a humanitarian catastrophe” (Chairman’s conclusions 1999). 
Blaming both the Belgrade authorities and the UCK for perpetuating conflict and 
violence in the province, they called on them to end their belligerent activities 
and commit themselves to a process of negotiation that would lead to a political 
settlement. The negotiations needed to reestablish substantial autonomy of 
Kosovo in a form agreed to by both sides. Parties were required to gather in 
Rambouillet by February 6 and proceed with negotiations with the direct 
involvement of the Contact Group. The statement concluded that
the Contact Group will hold both sides accountable if they fail to take the 
opportunity now offered to them, just as the Group stands ready to work 




Despite the fact that the Rambouillet conference was mainly about the fate of 
Kosovo, it became an exceptional opportunity to provide an arena in which most 
of the friction lingering in the post- Cold War transformation process dissipated. 
According to Weller, it was an excellent opportunity for a “fundamental change 
in the roles of international actors” (Weller 1999, 212). It was also an undeniable 
statement against the materialization of a unipolar system dominated by the US.
 First of all, the steady emergence of Russia as the new- old global power was 
most emblematically represented by its membership in the Contact Group and 
presence at the Rambouillet conference in particular. Moscow developed a firm 
foreign policy stance that aimed to reject the concept of an imposed settlement 
upon Yugoslav authorities, especially if it was to be enforced by NATO. In case 
that would turn out to be unfeasible, Russia’s priority was to maintain a manage-
rial role for itself in the future administration of the situation. At that time, the 
best way to achieve these aspirations was to promote the involvement of col-
lective bodies in the crisis in which Russia could block decisions requiring con-
sensus (Weller 1999). Along with the Contact Group, these bodies were also the 
OSCE – which provides an additional layer of institutional authority in conflict 
management and where decisions are made by consensus – and more impor-
tantly, the United Nations Security Council where Russia is vested with veto 
power.
 As Levitin (2000) explains, the Russian interest in the situation in Kosovo 
was marginal during the early 1990s. The first reported talks with Belgrade 
regarding the crisis took place only in 1996. For far too long, Moscow ignored 
information about the deployment of Serbian security forces in the province, 
especially in the period when the intensity of violence was culminating 
(1997–1998). Such laxity deprived policy makers in Moscow of the possibility 
of acknowledging the importance of moderate forces in Kosovo – namely the 
non- violent resistance movement – and thus indirectly contributed to the sub-
sequent upsurge in radical forces in the province. The first contact with leaders 
from Priština was only established in July 1998. Undoubtedly, by then, Russia 
had assumed the role of a passive bystander in the crisis settlement. Finally, this 
lack of interest was best observed in the Russian ‘withdrawal’ of its veto in dis-
cussions on Kosovo, both in the Contact Group and the UN Security Council 
throughout the years. The first concrete involvement of Russian diplomats took 
place in the second part of 1998, at which point Moscow exercised its relative 
leverage over Belgrade, given the traditionally close relations between the two 
capitals and a shared religious and Slavic heritage. Russia, faced with the 
imminent NATO bombing campaign in Yugoslavia, managed to pressure 
Milošević through indirect channels to accept negotiations with Priština, which 
temporarily suspended the use of coercive force. It was a clear signal to the rest 
of the international community that Russia could act as a useful biased mediator, 
as it possessed the necessary leverage to create essential incentives for Serbia to 
cooperate in solving the conflict. Despite this contribution, it was only in 
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Rambouillet that the Russians actually got involved in a more constructive dis-
cussion in formulating peace plans with the Western countries of the Contact 
Group, which had already been active in this matter since mid- 1998. According 
to Levitin, “the real reason for Russia’s reluctance to join in serious discussions 
concerning Kosovo’s legal status stemmed not from a substantive gap between 
Russian and Western positions, but from the Russian habit of inertia, delay and 
fear of decision- making” (2005, 136). This attitude was a consequence of the 
“lack of clear vision” in Russian geo- political preferences in the Balkans that 
persisted in Moscow during the 1990s (Levitin 2005). In other words, Russia 
lacked a clear idea of its interests in the region.
 Until mid- 1998, Russia had a very rigid position on the issue of Kosovo’s 
legal status. In 1997, when the Contact Group drafted a very vague formulation 
of Kosovo’s autonomy, Russia’s traditional historical relations with Serbia 
prompted Moscow to insist that the principle of self- governance be accepted 
only if the province remained within Serbia’s formal jurisdiction (Levitin 2005, 
136). With the outbreak of hostilities in the second half of 1998, Moscow started 
contemplating the idea of a special status for Kosovo, though always within the 
Yugoslav federation. Despite this change of attitude, Russia was very slow to 
adapt to group dynamics within the Contact Group. During the shuttle diplomacy 
episode conducted by US envoys in late 1998, Russia did not oppose any of the 
formulations proposed for a settlement in principle. However, lack of vision and 
inertia in the conduct of foreign affairs made Russia assume a “kind of slack 
resistance” (Levitin 2005, 136).
France and the United Kingdom
According to Weller (1999), France also aspired to advance its role as a global 
power and tried to challenge the US position to delegate future decision- making 
mechanisms to NATO and away from the UN Security Council, where France 
enjoyed the same leverage as Russia. Germany and Italy were also more inclined 
to strengthen the role of the UN and initially even indicated that they would not 
support any use of coercive means by NATO unless it were approved by a 
Security Council resolution. The choice of Rambouillet for negotiation talks 
(instead of an American air base, e.g., Dayton, Ohio where the Bosnian war was 
settled) was an implicit signal to the US that their European partners were reso-
lute that they would approach the crisis in Kosovo with more determination 
(Weller 1999, 212).
 The only European country that deviated from this position was the United 
Kingdom. In fact, policy makers in London were much more inclined toward US 
policies in this matter and shared the idea that NATO should maintain a 
dominant role in the future administration of the conflict. However, both coun-
tries were well aware that forceful action by NATO, without a clear mandate 
from the Security Council, would only increase friction within the Contact 
Group during the Rambouillet talks. The fact that there was an undeniable 
humanitarian crisis in the province provided much more room to consider 
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coercive action and promote it to partners in the Contact Group. Even the UN 
officials backed this vision. The UN Secretary General Kofi Annan, in his visit 
to NATO headquarters, stressed the importance of “contemplating” the use of 
force to halt internal conflict, despite the reluctance of the host government, 
especially bearing in mind the Bosnian experience (Annan 1999).
Multiparty mediation process
The contact group’s mediation strategy
In order to get everyone on board and create ‘internal coherence,’ the US 
strengthened diplomatic contacts with all members of the Contact Group. 
Despite their initial differences, all European countries eventually agreed to 
employ coercive power through NATO as a necessary incentive in the upcoming 
talks. Then NATO Secretary- General Javier Solana publicly announced full 
support for a political settlement under mediation of the Contact Group that 
would reaffirm sovereignty and territorial integrity of Yugoslavia and completely 
protect human and other rights of all ethnic groups. At the same time, NATO 
called on both sides to end the violence and pursue their goals through peaceful 
means. Yugoslav authorities were asked to start reducing the number of security 
forces in the province, while Kosovo Albanians were told to immediately cease 
hostilities and provocative actions (Weller 1999, 221). Shortly thereafter, NATO 
officials directly threatened Yugoslav officials with air strikes, despite the con-
tinuous acknowledgement of Yugoslav territorial integrity and sovereignty, in 
the event that they failed to commit to the achievement of a settlement. They 
also threatened to take all appropriate measures against Kosovo Albanian leaders 
in the event that they failed to comply with the demands of the international 
community. The threat of the use of force was justified as being a humanitarian 
action (Weller 1999, 223).
 At this point, the stage was set for ‘mediation with muscle.’ By the end of 
January 1999, the foreign ministers of the US and Russia met and jointly 
declared that they were determined to “maintain close contact in order to 
coordinate US and Russian support for a resolution of the crisis” (Weller 1999, 
221; emphasis added). For the US, the only acceptable strategy for tackling the 
situation in Kosovo was a combination of “diplomacy with a credible threat of 
force,” for which they already had the support of their allies and it would be pro-
moted through Contact Group (Weller 1999, 221). Even though policy makers in 
Washington showed the highest level of commitment to resolving the conflict in 
Kosovo, they were aware that they needed partners in order to make the strong 
inducements require to get both sides to sit at the negotiation table.
 Despite the initial internal struggle for power, the Contact Group managed to 
find coherence and members shared the idea that the conflict in Kosovo needed 
to be managed as promptly as possible (Phillips 2012, 101). The Contact Group 
immediately stepped in with a ‘directive- manipulator’ strategy and presented a 
document containing ‘non- negotiable principles/basic elements’ for a settlement 
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to the parties. These principles were divided into four groups: (a) general ele-
ments, including the necessity of an immediate end of violence and respect of 
ceasefire; peaceful solution through dialogue; an interim agreement – a mech-
anism for a mutual settlement after an interim period of three years; no unilateral 
change of the interim status; and international involvement and full cooperation 
by the parties on implementation; (b) governance in Kosovo, including a high 
level of self- governance for Kosovo through own institutions; harmonization of 
Serbian and federal laws with the interim agreement; and members of all 
national communities to be fairly represented at all levels of administration; (c) 
protection of human rights including judicial protection of human rights guaran-
teed by international conventions, establishment of an ombudsman office; and 
(d) implementation, which included dispute management mechanisms, establish-
ment of joint implementation monitoring commission, and a considerable role 
for international bodies such as the OSCE (Weller 1999, 225–226). The general 
principles also included preservation of territorial integrity of the FRY and 
neighboring countries; protection of rights of the members of all national com-
munities within the FRY; protection of rights for members of all national 
communities in FRY; free and fair elections in Kosovo; amnesty and release of 
prisoners (Weller 1999, 225–226).
 It was mandatory for the parties to take notice of these non- negotiable prin-
ciples. The mediators did not require a formal consent on the principles, since 
they were considering the decision of the parties to participate in negotiations as 
implicit acceptance of them. Most of the principles were a compilation of pro-
posed suggestions by the US envoys in the shuttle diplomacy period. The crucial 
addition was the mechanism of an interim agreement that implied a transitional 
phase of three years, after which a final settlement should be achieved.
Party arithmetic
The Serbian delegation was composed of three groups. First of all, there were 
prominent political figures from Belgrade that were directly mandated by 
Milošević. Along with them, the delegation included individuals that acted as rep-
resentatives of several non- Albanian ethnic groups from Kosovo (Phillips 2012, 
102). However, from the beginning, their representativeness was put under serious 
doubt when numerous communities in Kosovo learned about their presence in 
Rambouillet. As it turned out during the conference, their role was quite marginal 
and they were only included by Belgrade authorities as a demonstration of alleged 
unity of non- Albanian constituencies in Kosovo. Most importantly, the delegation 
consisted of professional negotiators and experts that assumed leading roles once 
the process started (Weller 1999, 226). American diplomats viewed the Serbian 
delegation as ‘intentionally unserious,’ an indication that Serbian authorities were 
not interested in a diplomatic solution because no one in their delegation had suffi-
cient authority to make decisions or accept agreements (Phillips 2012, 103).
 The Kosovo delegation was also controversial, and deeply divided (Phillips 
2012, 103). Members of the leading party, the LDK, comprised only one third of 
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the overall delegation. The rest of the delegation consisted of representatives of 
opposition parties in Kosovo, whose stances on the issues were far less flexible 
and more inclined toward the UCK. And more importantly, there were a 
considerable number of representatives from the UCK itself. The UCK not only 
became a negotiating partner, but its leader, Hashim Thaci, was also assigned to 
head the tripartite presidency of the Kosovo delegation. The delegation was 
primarily broadened due to extreme pressure coming from Kosovo (Weller 1999, 
227). This was viewed as acceptable by the mediators because they realized that 
in excluding the UCK (and other opposition parties) from all previous negoti-
ations, they had only lost leverage over them. Considering that the UCK had 
become an important actor in the conflict, mediators used a particular form of 
party arithmetic. It implied inclusion of additional players that might be con-
structive to the implementation phase once the settlement had been achieved.
 The mediation was conducted by three key negotiators – Christopher Hill 
(US), Wolfgang Petritsch (representing the European Union), and Boris Mayor-
ski (Russian Federation) – all appointed by the Contact Group who were 
expected to represent the interest of the entire coalition and not of their state of 
origin. Since the Contact Group had, on previous occasions, declared a shared 
commitment to resolving the conflict, had ‘muscle’ at its disposal, and support 
from very relevant international organizations (such as the UN and the OSCE), 
the mediators immediately assumed both formulator and manipulator strategies.
The mediation process
At the beginning of the conference, both sides received a draft version of the 
political settlement, which consisted of a framework agreement and three annexes 
(on the constitution of Kosovo, elections, and an ombudsman). The mediators 
also formulated a very strict procedure for the process of negotiations. The parties 
were not expected to engage in direct talks, but rather they were to submit com-
ments on the drafts. In the event that both sides agreed on a modification of the 
text, that change would immediately be included; if there was no consensus, alter-
ation of the text would not take place and the draft would remain unchanged. 
Modifications were not allowed to diverge from the non- negotiable principles 
(Weller 1999, 228).
 From the beginning, the Kosovo delegation assumed a very constructive 
strategy and immediately submitted written comments on the draft, claiming that 
the document was acceptable in principle and that they would suggest some 
changes in order to improve it. The Serbian delegation, on the other hand, was 
much less constructive, as it did not produce any comments for quite some time 
and engaged in several attempts to downplay the position of the Kosovo delega-
tion, to no avail (Weller 1999, 228).
 The Kosovo delegation hoped that its constructive role would be rewarded by 
the mediators, but that never happened. In fact, the mediators were much more 
occupied with urging the Serbian delegation to submit some comments and 
suggestions on the first draft. The first proposal from the Serbian block was 
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 challenging the non- negotiable principles, so the mediators “then proceeded to 
engage the FRY/Serb delegation in an intensive dialogue, so as to whittle down 
the wide- raging comments in to a more limited number of submissions which 
might be discussed” (Weller 1999, 229). Under these circumstances, the Kosovo 
delegation and its comments were largely ignored by the mediators until some 
progress was made with the other side. The mediators’ revised draft came as a 
shock to the Kosovo delegation because it included almost all demands from the 
Serbian side (such as codifying the legal status of Kosovo in the constitutional 
settlement, the establishment veto powers for all community leaders in Kosovo, 
and a limiting of the authority of Kosovar institutions), while suggestions from 
the Kosovo delegation were largely ignored and only a few were included 
(Weller 1999, 231).
 Once the revised draft was presented, mediators suggested that both parties 
consider it to be a final version of the political settlement. Both sides declined to 
do so. The Kosovo delegation refused to receive the document, considering it to 
be a direct result of talks between mediators and the Serbian delegation, which 
represented a breach of the faith that they had had in the process. In other words, 
the presentation of the draft led to the development of a feeling of distrust and 
betrayal that seriously jeopardized further constructive participation of the 
Kosovo delegation. However, the mediators were insistent on the matter. Since 
there was no going back to the original draft, the Kosovo delegation presented a 
statement containing a list of necessary changes that needed to be considered if 
negotiations were to succeed. The Serbian delegation also insisted on further 
changes. Realizing that neither side was willing to accept the document, 
mediators extended the deadline and took the positions of both sides into 
consideration.
 This time the procedure was somewhat different. Negotiations were actually 
conducted in a form of genuine proximity talks (Weller 1999, 232). This meant 
that substantive suggestions from one side were channeled through a body of 
legal experts to the other side. In the event that the other side refused to accept 
suggested changes, the mediators would aim to reduce the scope of alterations 
and refine them through negotiations with both sides until they agreed. Using 
this method, in a very short span of time, mediators were able to produce a new 
draft that merged all previous annexes into a comprehensive document that was 
entitled the Interim Agreement for Peace and Self- Government in Kosovo 
(S/1999/648 1999). In sum, the agreement prescribed that Kosovo would not be 
an independent state, but a component part of Yugoslavia with a status some-
where between an autonomous province and a federal unit. Federal laws were 
supposed to remain in force in Kosovo as long as they were compatible with the 
agreement. The proposed constitution of Kosovo was deeply rooted in the Yugo-
slav federal tradition and prescribed “sovereign rights at the level of the auto-
nomous sub- state entities” (Stahn 2001a, 538). The status of Kosovo within 
Yugoslavia was to be safeguarded by an international supervisory institution 
with binding decision- making powers. This meant that Kosovo would become a 
sub- state entity protected by international guarantees and supervision, without 
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assuming characteristics of an international protectorate or international territory. 
Despite the international military presence of Kosovo Force (KFOR), Kosovo 
still remained under the overall external protection of Belgrade (Stahn 
2001a, 538).
 In the meantime, the mediators also had to put additional pressure on both 
sides, especially on the UCK, which was still reluctant to accept anything less 
than independence and was very reluctant to accept the process of demilitariza-
tion, given the high level of distrust and animosity towards Serbian security 
forces. Thus through a coordinated activity, representatives of militaries from all 
Western countries in the Contact Group discussed issues of demilitarization in 
practice and mechanisms of international guarantees that the security in the 
province would be under strict control. From that moment, it was implicit that 
KFOR would be a NATO- led mission. Ultimately, a very important concession 
was made to the Kosovo delegation in the form of the inclusion of the phrase 
“will of the people” in the part referring to the interim period of three years. It 
meant, implicitly, that the people of Kosovo were granted a mechanism and a 
possibility to achieve independence after this period. At this point, the Kosovo 
delegation was persuaded by mediators (especially the representative from the 
US) to accept the agreement. The initial response was that the delegation needed 
time to consult the constituencies in Kosovo, but after a short while, the Kosovo 
delegation issued a declaration that “noted that in order to facilitate such consul-
tations, the delegation had voted in favor of the agreement as presented in the 
negotiations on 23 February” (Stahn 2001a, 233). According to Ker- Lindsay, 
they were aware that unless they accepted the proposed agreement, they would 
inevitably lose any form of international support (Ker- Lindsay 2009, 14).
 The position of the Serbian delegation was somewhat more confusing. While 
it was evident that the opposite side was not willing to accept the agreement, 
Serbs were issuing statements demanding further concessions. However, once it 
was clear that the Kosovo delegation was going to sign the document, the 
Serbian delegation stepped forward with a declaration that emphasized the 
considerable progress towards commonly acceptable solutions that was made 
during the negotiations. At the same time, it asked for further clarification on the 
issues of Kosovo’s self- government and on international presence in Kosovo 
during the implementation of the agreement. Thus, for the Serbian delegation, 
the issues that had made the talks necessary had not all been dealt with and nego-
tiations were far from being concluded (Weller 1999, 223).
 The Contact Group, faced with firm stances on both sides, issued a joint state-
ment that was clearly the product of a directive strategy. The statement put 
forward an ultimatum for both sides. The statement noted that “important efforts 
of the parties and the unstinting commitment of our negotiators Ambassadors 
Hill, Petritsch and Mayorsky, have led to a consensus” on substantial issues 
regarding self- governance and autonomy of Kosovo and established a “political 
framework . . . and groundwork . . . for finalizing the implementation . . . includ-
ing” (Contact Group Statement, 1999; emphasis added). The mediators indicated 
that the document needed to be completed and signed as a whole by both sides at 
132  Kosovo
the upcoming conference on March 15 in Paris that would cover all aspects of 
implementation. The future conference was not intended to be a place at which 
talks on the political settlement could be reopened. Only discussions on the 
issues of implementation of the agreement were to be discussed.
 In Paris, the Kosovo delegation submitted a letter immediately in which it 
indicated its full acceptance of the interim agreement from February 23. The 
mediators were reluctant to pressure the Kosovo delegation to sign right away 
and advised them to postpone this act until the Serbian delegation was on board. 
The Serbian side still had its reservations about the document. In direct commu-
nication with Serbian delegates, the mediators indicated “the unanimous view of 
the Contact Group that only technical adjustments can be considered which, of 
course, must be accepted as such and approved by the other delegation” (Weller 
1999, 234; emphasis added). It was a clear signal to the Serbian delegation that 
possibilities for further concessions were completely exhausted at this point. 
However, the Serbs did not accept this and instead issued a counter- draft that 
was undoubtedly aimed at reopening discussions on the political settlement from 
the beginning. The draft requested a formal subordination of Kosovo to the 
federal and republican system and complete marginalization of provincial insti-
tutions. According to some observers, this proposal sought to formalize an “insti-
tutional system of apartheid” (Weller 1999, 235). Ultimately, the draft 
completely removed the part regarding outside military and civilian presence for 
the implementation phase. For the Serbian delegation, it was absolutely unac-
ceptable that NATO forces assume any control in Kosovo (Black 1999). Around 
this time, Milošević, in the presence of Russian officials, stepped out and deter-
minedly announced that Serbia would never accept a requirement to withdraw 
its forces from Kosovo and allow the presence of foreign troops on its own soil 
(B92 2008). On March 18, the Kosovo delegation signed the agreement in a 
formal ceremony that was not attended by the Russian delegate Mayorski. This 
demonstrated that coherence and coordination within the Contact Group was 
falling short. For the first time, one of the mediators was not acting as a repre-
sentative of the entire coalition, but rather of a particular country.
Emergence of diverging interests between third parties
According to Levitin (2000), Serbia insisted on the matter of not accepting a 
NATO- led international military presence in Kosovo, believing that it would 
have support from the Russian delegation. During the conference, Russian offi-
cials tried to find reasons to cast doubt on the Kosovo delegation, labeling it as 
‘illegitimate’ and inappropriately composed due to the presence of the UCK. 
However, these were not real concerns, but rather tactical feints, without any 
strategic purpose, that sent false signals to the Serbian delegation. Russian offi-
cials were well aware that the agreement was not feasible without an outside 
military that would implement it. Yet they avoided discussing a mutually accept-
able arrangement and declined to offer any sensible alternative to Western plans 
to use NATO forces. This contributed to the lack of coordination among the 
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mediators. As Levitin claims, “the Russian habit of procrastination, especially 
with regard to the military annex of the agreement, contributed to Rambouillet’s 
collapse” (Levitin 2000, 137). Notwithstanding these harsh accusations, it was 
obvious that Russia did not have the same vision of a common solution to the 
conflict anymore. Its interests were now diverging from the rest of the coalition. 
It meant that the mediators were unable to coordinate their leverage on both 
sides: while one group was exerting pressure, creating the required incentives to 
push the Kosovo delegation to accept the agreement, the Russians abstained 
from exercising indispensable leverage on the Serbian delegation to do the same. 
As a consequence, the Serbian delegation perceived these mixed signals as an 
inducement to assume a much more unyielding position that eventually pre-
vented them from signing the agreement.
 The emerging division within the Contact Group did not reveal itself immedi-
ately. In fact, the mediators tried once more to convince the Serbian delegation 
to accept the agreement, reminding them that they were mediating with muscle. 
Once this attempt failed, the Contact Group issued a statement in which it indi-
cated that the Rambouillet Accords were the only peaceful solution to the crisis 
in Kosovo. They acknowledged the opportunity taken by the Kosovo delegation 
to accept the Interim Agreement and blamed the Serbian delegation for its 
attempt to unravel the conference. For all members of the Contact Group, there 
was no point in extending the talks. Negotiations were adjourned until such time 
as the Serbs expressed their acceptance of the final document. The Contact 
Group resolved to engage in consultations with other international partners that 
may be ready to act. They warned authorities in Belgrade not to continue any 
military activity in Kosovo because “such violations would have the gravest con-
sequences” (Weller 1999, 236). Russian lack of cooperation with the rest of the 
Contact Group guided the process directly into a deadlock.
 Despite these warnings, Serbian authorities continued their initial strategy of 
deploying troops to Kosovo. At the same time, when the Contact Group issued 
the last statement, Serbian security forces tightened their grip on Kosovo. Using 
extremely violent measures, they managed to displace around 200,000 ethnic 
Albanians outside of the province. This was a crucial error in their strategy 
(Posen 2000). Violent measures taken in Kosovo accompanied by an open 
refusal to accept the agreement (the final attempt by Holbrooke on March 23 to 
persuade Milošević ended in failure) were a signal to the Western countries that 
the ‘muscle’ at their disposal (i.e., NATO) needed to be deployed. On March 24, 
1999, NATO air forces started an 11-week- long bombing campaign of Serbia 
that led to numerous civilian and military casualties and extreme material 
damage.
 The start of the NATO campaign provoked particularly harsh rhetoric from 
Russia. Officials in Moscow immediately condemned the use of force without 
the authorization of the UN Security Council and took symbolic action to cease 
cooperation with NATO (Smith and Plater- Zyberk, 1999). According to 
Antonenko (2000), Russia’s reaction to the bombing campaign had little to do 
with the Kosovo situation, but was rather the materialization of a greater 
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anti- NATO sentiment and an avenue for venting post- Soviet frustrations. For 
Levitin, “the deterioration has to be understood in the context of more general 
and long standing trends in Russian foreign policy” (Levitin 2000, 138). Moscow 
was also continuing to send very mixed signals. For instance, on March 25, the 
Russian Foreign Minister Ivanov emphasized that Belgrade should be aware of 
its responsibility to resolve the problem in Kosovo and opt to accept the political 
settlement drafted in Rambouillet. The day after, he declared that the Rambouil-
let peace documents are “practically null and void” (Smith and Plater- Zyberk 
1999, 4). Nevertheless, in his speech at the Duma, Russian President Yeltzin 
highlighted that “the tragic mistake of the American leadership should not result 
in a prolonged crisis of US–Russian partnership” (Smith and Plater- Zyberk 
1999, 4). Such mixed signals reflected Russia’s persistent inability to formulate 
a clear set of preferences regarding the issue. On the one side, it wanted to main-
tain its influence in Serbia, while on the other, it was eager to improve its rela-
tions with the rest of the Contact Group.
 Looking back at the model, despite initial confidence that the mediators were 
able to find internal coherence within the Contact Group and aimed at success-
fully coordinating the multiparty mediation efforts, the process never moved 
from point (b). Initial readiness on the part of Russia to work together with the 
rest of the Contact Group initially guided both sides to accept a peace conference 
and negotiate together, which represented an important step toward success. On 
the other hand, Russia’s initial readiness proved to be a façade as it was unwill-
ing to employ the necessary leverage to induce its partners in conflict (in this 
case the Serbian government) to accept the compromise solution that was drafted 
in Rambouillet. While the Western states were able to induce the Kosovo dele-
gation to compromise, the Russians were unwilling to exercise the requisite 
leverage to ‘deliver’ the Serbian government to an agreement. Finally, the lack 
of success could be associated with the absence of clearly formulated prefer-
ences on Russia’s part, which prevented adequate coordination of mediators and 
their leverage.
Inclusion of the UN in the process
Russian hope to be still treated like a partner by the West was best demonstrated 
in June 1999, when the NATO campaign was about to turn into a ground opera-
tion3 (Phillips 2012, 113). Despite their open opposition to NATO intervention, 
Russia managed to extract a very important concession from Belgrade. Using the 
necessary leverage through informal channels and backdoor communication, 
Russian officials persuaded Milošević to accept a cease- fire that would allow for 
an international, NATO- led military presence in Kosovo. Russians acted in the 
name of the entire Contact Group, offering Milošević the option to have the 
international military presence be under the UN flag, thus reducing the likeli-
hood that Serbia would lose face domestically and abroad (NY Times 1999). 
More importantly, Serbia and Russia had converging interests in including the 
UN as a new actor in future conflict management activities. In Serbia, Milošević 
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publicly stated that by transferring future management of the problems in 
Kosovo to the UN, Serbia would preserve its sovereignty and territorial integrity 
that were guaranteed by the UN Charter. He claimed that the problems in 
Kosovo would finally be dealt within the body whose responsibility it is to pre-
serve global peace and security and thus reduce the impact of the coalition that 
used muscle to manage the conflict. This was a direct indication that for Serbian 
authorities, the UN would act as a new player that was vested with the requisite 
legitimacy derived from norms and values that were inherent to the organization. 
On the other side, Russia managed to transfer future conflict management activ-
ities to a body in which it had more mechanisms of control.
 In order to create the necessary legitimacy for this move, Russia assured offi-
cials in Belgrade that the UN Security Council would pass a resolution that 
would formalize its presence. Given the fact that, for Serbia, UN involvement 
was crucial at this point, the official presentation of the document was done by 
Special Envoy Martti Ahtisaari and the document was adopted by the Serb par-
liament on June 3. This meant that the mediation process had now been joined 
by a new actor, this time an international organization. Until then, UN involve-
ment was somewhat sporadic and largely conditioned by power politics at the 
international level. It was mostly based on the occasional issuing of resolutions, 
but fell short of direct involvement in the process.
The new reality in Kosovo
The Kumanovo Agreement and UN Security Council Resolution 1244
The ceasefire was signed on June 9 in Kumanovo, a Macedonian town on the 
border with Serbia. The Kumanovo Agreement reaffirmed the document pre-
sented by Ahtisaari to include the deployment in Kosovo of effective inter-
national civil and security presences under the auspices of the UN. It was noted 
that the UN Security Council was set to adopt a resolution regarding the deploy-
ment of an international security force (KFOR) that would “operate without hin-
drance within Kosovo and with the authority to take all necessary action to 
establish and maintain a secure environment for all citizens of Kosovo and other-
wise carry out its mission” (Kumanovo Agreement 1999). The following day, 
the UN Security Council passed Resolution 1244, which lay the foundation for a 
new reality in Kosovo. The resolution was proof of the compromise that had 
been reached within the Contact Group and was transposed in the Security 
Council. Undeniably, it refrained from recognizing Kosovo as an independent 
state, reflecting the Russian stance, but it also abstained from delivering any 
binding statements regarding Kosovo’s final status, which was in line with the 
Western countries’ position. The conciliatory formula endorsed the sovereignty 
and territorial integrity of the FRY, while assigning the interim UN Mission in 
Kosovo (UNMIK) with the task of “facilitating a political process designed to 
determine Kosovo’s future status, taking into account the Rambouillet accords” 
(S/RES/1244 cl.11, 1999). As Stahn (2001a) noted, this vague formulation 
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allowed for a variety of scenarios. Evidently, the allusion to the sovereignty of 
the FRY seemed to signify that in any potential future scenario regarding 
Kosovo, the province would remain part of the FRY. Nevertheless, by mention-
ing the Rambouillet Agreement, which stated that the future status would be 
determined by the ‘will of people,’ the resolution seemed to be somewhat open 
to interpretation with regard to Kosovo’s final status.
 Pending the final settlement of Kosovo’s status, the resolution charged 
UNMIK (headed by a special representative of the Secretary- General) with the 
administration of the province. Its mandate was: to promote the establishment of 
substantial autonomy and self- government in Kosovo; perform basic civilian 
administrative functions; organize elections; and maintain law and order using 
all necessary means (Stahn 2001a). Despite the fact that the resolution did not 
specify a strict deadline for the establishment of necessary institutions, once they 
were established, they were required to be transferred to the people of Kosovo in 
anticipation of a final settlement (Stahn 2001a). In practice, the mission was 
bestowed with powers traditionally only enjoyed states: the mission introduced a 
different currency; established its own legal system; and signed international 
agreements on behalf of the province. In other words, in practice, from the 
beginning, the FRY was dispossessed of its sovereign rights over Kosovo under 
the United Nations’ interim administration (Stahn 2001a). As the Secretary- 
General pointed out, UNMIK became “the only legitimate authority in Kosovo” 
(S/1999/1250 1999, par.35). According to several authors (Stahn 2001a, 2001b; 
Ruffert 2001; Kreilkamp 2003; Perritt 2005; Knoll 2005, 2006; Willigen 2009), 
Kosovo was transformed into an ‘internationalized territory.’ This neutral term 
indicates that the FRY was prohibited from exercising any form of power in 
Kosovo, while the UN administration was “pre- empted from disposing over the 
territory” (Stahn 2001a, 540). In legal terms, the UN sought to act as a trustee 
that had absolute administering power over the province for a limited time 
without acting as a new sovereign (Ruffert 2001, Stahn 2001a). Once the task of 
preparing the province for self- governance was complete, UNMIK was to 
transfer its authority to a different entity that the nature of which, according to 
the resolution, should be determined in the context of a political settlement 
(Stahn 2001b).
UNMIK regulations and the constitutional framework for provisional 
self- government
From the beginning of its mission, the Special Representative issued various reg-
ulations that contained basic ‘constitutional’ rules. According to these regula-
tions, all powers (legislative, executive, and judiciary) were vested in UNMIK 
and had to be exercised by the Special Representative. Institutions that were 
gradually being established (the Banking and Payments Authority of Kosovo, 
the Independent Media Commission, the Housing and Property Directorate, the 
Housing Claims Commission, etc.) were characterized by joint administration – 
one Kosovar and one UNMIK representative – and were based on the idea of 
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good governance and other democratic principles. As Ruffert noted, the UN was 
“furnishing Kosovo . . . with governmental and administrative institutions to 
bestow upon the respective populations the opportunity to exercise their rights of 
self- determination” (2001, 626).
 In May 2001, the Special Representative promulgated the Constitutional 
Framework for Provisional Self- Government (Constitutional Framework) which 
was intended to be a major step toward the establishment of provisional self- 
government in Kosovo, beginning with the election of a constituent assembly in 
November 2001 (Regulation 2001/9; Kreilkamp 2003). According to this docu-
ment, the Provisional Institutions of Self- Government (PISG) were to be: the 
Kosovo Assembly, the President of Kosovo, the Kosovo Government, and the 
Kosovo courts – institutions that would “normally be associated with a state of 
the sub- entities of federation” (Stahn 2001b, 151). It is very important to note 
the latter because such a scenario – Kosovo enjoying the status of a de facto 
equal federal entity in Yugoslavia while de jure still part of Serbia – was pre-
scribed by the Rambouillet Accords, which were turned down by the FRY at that 
time.
 Again the document was a result of a political compromise which was 
reflected (again) in its ambiguous language. Despite the fact that the term ‘con-
stitutional’ might have created high expectations amongst Kosovo Albanians, 
the document did not make any direct reference to the achievement of independ-
ence for the province and, in fact, deliberately avoided any term directly associ-
ated with it. At the same time, the FRY was not mentioned at all in the entire 
document. Put simply, Kosovo was not explicitly made a part of either the FRY 
or Serbia, which implicitly meant total suspension of their administrative control 
in Kosovo. This document initiated a slow devolution of power from UNMIK to 
local authorities. Significant aspects of legislative, executive, and judicial power 
were to be transferred to local institutions (both of the central and municipal 
administration). Soon after the adoption of the Constitutional Framework, both 
the Special Representative and UNMIK faced severe criticism: internally, from 
Belgrade and from the international community. According to the report by the 
Independent International Commission on Kosovo, “under UNMIK constitu-
tional provisions . . . the UN administration retains . . . vice regal powers, appro-
priate to colonial dependency, rather than to a self- governing people” (Kreilkamp 
2003, 648). The report emphasized that the international administrators had “per-
vasive distrust of the administrative and political capacity of the population” 
which seems to explain the constitutional provisions adopted in the Framework 
(Kreilkamp 2003, 648). The report that was published in 2001 called upon the 
international community to grant Kosovo “conditional independence” which is 
“quite distinct from limited self- rule under UNMIK” (Kreilkamp 2003, 651).
 Serbian authorities in Belgrade were not pleased with the framework, claim-
ing that it violated the spirit of Resolution 1244 that “enshrine[d] their right to 
carry out certain state functions in what they still view as Serbian province” 
(Knoll 2005, fn. 16). Based on this position, the Serbian government encouraged 
the Serbian minority living in Kosovo to boycott the provisional institutions and, 
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for this reason, established parallel structures of government, especially in the 
areas of education, justice, and health care, in municipalities in which Serbs were 
the majority. By not participating in provisional institutions, the Serbian side 
implicitly acknowledged the fact that provisional institutions that were being 
established were to be exclusively Kosovar and out of Belgrade’s control. This 
made it possible for the Kosovo Albanians to feel absolutely detached from the 
Serbian presence in the province. Given the fact that UNMIK was mandated 
with an interim assignment, it was part of its task to strengthen the established 
institutions in order to accomplish “the setting- up and development of meaning-
ful self- government in Kosovo pending a final settlement” (Regulation 2001/9, 
par. 2). Gradually, Kosovo established all the institutions that were necessary to 
have a functioning independent state.
 In this environment, the province awaited the signal from the Security 
Council that the talks on Kosovo’s future status might begin. On May 23, 2005, 
the UN Secretary General appointed Ambassador Kai Eide to carry out a com-
prehensive assessment of the situation in Kosovo in order to determine whether 
or not the conditions were suitable to permit political discussion on final status. 
On October 7, 2005, Eide concluded that “while the standards implementation in 
Kosovo had been uneven, the time was ripe to enter the final- status negotiation 
process” (D’Aspremont 2007, 650). His remarks met with approval at the UN 
Security Council, which a few days later decided to initiate “a political process 
designed to determine Kosovo’s future status” (S/PRST/2005/51). The Council 
appointed Martti Ahtisaari as a Secretary General’s Special Envoy for Kosovo 
(UNOSEK), who officially began consultations and talks with Kosovo Albanians 
and Serbian authorities on November 14, 2005.
Multiparty mediation by the UN
The initial coherence in the contact group
From the beginning, Ahtisaari had been given “considerable room to maneuver” 
by the Contact Group (ICG 2006a). The Contact Group provided him with a 
working framework in ten guiding principles. He was instructed that once 
started, the process could not be blocked and must be brought to conclusion and 
that the result may be determined by who leaves the table first rather than by 
compromise (ICG 2006a, 1). The settlement needed to include and promote ele-
ments such as regional stability, sustainable multi- ethnicity, preservation of 
international civil presence in the province, dismissal of partitioning Kosovo, 
and highlight that any unilateral moves or acts of violence would not be toler-
ated. From that moment it was evident that the new process of mediation was a 
particular combination of ‘formulator and directive’ strategies. On the one hand, 
the Contact Group again prescribed non- negotiable principles and made the 
expected spirit of the agreement clear, while Ahtisaari, on the other hand, was 
supposed to explore, formulate, and offer best solutions to both sides. Despite 
the fact that the ten principles were non- negotiable, it was already questionable 
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whether or not they prescribed a very clear mandate for Ahtisaari as to where the 
process should lead. Ahtisaari made it clear that independence was the only pos-
sible outcome. He argued: “You need to look at history. Milosevic lost the right 
to govern by acting as he did. If you misbehave you will lose your right to 
govern and may also be held personally responsible” (Ahtisaari quoted in Phil-
lips 2012, 160). Moreover, at a meeting in London on January 31, 2006 Ahtisaari 
informed all of the members of the Contact Group (including Russia) of the final 
outcome and asked each state to individually and in secret deliver an eight- point 
message to both sides. The first point was a clear signal of what kind of outcome 
the Ahtisaari- led mediation aims to yield:
The unconstitutional abolition of Kosovo’s autonomy in 1989 and the 
ensuing tragic events resulting in the international administration of Kosovo 
have led to a situation in which a return of Kosovo to Belgrade’s rule is not 
a viable option.
(Ahtisaari 2007)
Ahtisaari justified his diagnosis by resorting to the principle of Responsibility to 
Protect;4 at an interview following his Nobel Prize acceptance speech he claimed: 
“if a dictatorial leadership in any country behaves the way as Milošević and 
company did vis- à-vis the Albanians in Kosovo, they lose the right to control 
them anymore” (CNN 2008).
 All but the Russian Federation delivered these private messages in the 
course of February and March 2006 to Belgrade, Priština and Kosovo Serbs 
(Ahtisaari 2007). Ahtisaari was confident that “everyone knew that independ-
ence was coming” (CNN 2008). Privately, all Contact Group countries saw 
monitored, conditional independence as the only viable outcome. According to 
a British diplomat, during the December 2005 meeting in Paris, “the taboo on 
the outcome had completely gone . . . everyone was talking about independ-
ence, and in front of Russians . . . they did not object” (ICG 2006a, 11). Indeed, 
on several occasions, Russian diplomats had indicated their acceptance that 
full independence was the only viable outcome (ICG 2006b, 2). It appeared 
that Russia perceived the new reality in Kosovo in the same way as other 
members of the Contact Group, but was reluctant to stress it explicitly in 
public. In London, in January 2006, the developing consensus in the Contact 
Group was translated into the joint Ministerial Statement which indicated that 
the settlement had to be “acceptable to the people of Kosovo” and that there 
was no going back to the status prior to 1999 (Contact Group London State-
ment 2006). However, the real concern of whether and when to publicly 
announce the Contact Group’s view of the outcome remained. There was a fear 
that in expressing their support for the independence of Kosovo too soon, 
Priština – satisfied with the outcome – might not be willing to make any con-
cessions afterwards, while a dissatisfied Serbia would simply leave the negoti-
ations. The Contact Group’s goal was “to get sufficient acquiescence from 
both sides so a settlement can be written into a new Security Council resolution 
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to supersede 1244” (ICG 2006a, 13). Indeed, none of the Contact Group’s 
members was inclined to impose a solution without at least Belgrade’s implicit 
consent. For this reason, the Contact Group and Ahtisaari’s team insisted that 
Kosovo Albanians would need to earn their independence through tangible 
initiatives and concessions in order to accommodate Serbian requests. As 
Ahtisaari’s deputy Rohan indicated, “their aspirations and status will not come 
automatically . . . much work has to be done” (Rohan 2005).
Actor transformation and UN legitimacy
From the beginning of his mandate, Ahtisaari assumed a very constructive 
‘procedural- formulator’ strategy. He first explored the positions of both sides 
for a period of three months through informal talks in Belgrade and Priština. It 
is noteworthy that in the interim period, the two sides went through a phase of 
actor transformation, which is commonly identified as a very valuable occur-
rence in terms of managing intractable conflicts (Bercovitch 2005). In Serbia, 
Milošević was ousted by a more democratic government. In Kosovo, Rugova 
died in January 2006 (just before the first official round of talks had begun) 
and the political party of the demilitarized UCK took over. Despite the fact 
that there were new actors on both sides, neither one changed its previous 
position. In Belgrade, the new government was ready to negotiate with 
Priština, thereby indicating its detachment from the pre- 1999 politics of stub-
bornness; but it remained resolute that Kosovo was an integral part of Serbia, 
as Resolution 1244 prescribed. For the Serbian authorities, the UN- led medi-
ation process was supposed to provide sufficient assurances that Kosovo could 
not secede from Serbia, because it would violate Resolution 1244, which 
directly identified Kosovo as an integral part of Serbia. They also warned that 
any decision made by the UN envoy had to be in line with the UN Charter that 
unquestionably guaranteed the inviolability of the borders of a sovereign state. 
Thus for the Serbian side, the UN was vested with the essential level of legiti-
macy required to prescribe future behavior deriving from norms (i.e., the UN 
Charter and the Resolution 1244) that officials in Belgrade viewed as neces-
sary in the upcoming process.
 On the other side, transformed UCK leaders expected formalization of the 
actual situation on the ground, in which Kosovo was already developing all 
necessary institutions for a functioning independent state and Serbia had not 
had any influence since 1999. Thus authorities in Kosovo also perceived UN 
involvement to be a mechanism through which the mediation process would 
gain more legitimacy because the new contextual factors that were condition-
ing the ongoing mediation process were a direct normative product of the UN 
and its specialized bodies. They assumed that the UN would not neglect the 
reality on the ground which itself had been set up by the UN administration of 
the province. It was clear that both sides maintained the unyielding positions 




Ahtisaari realized that the only way to reduce the gap between the two sides was 
if he could structure the negotiations in such a way that ‘technical’ issues, which 
were causing less friction, were tackled first. This way both sides would provide 
concessions, which would later pave the way to finding a solution to the last 
remaining question regarding final status. He set up a timeframe for talks and 
stressed his expectation that negotiations would be concluded in 2006. The tech-
nical issues that were to be tackled were: decentralization; community rights; 
protection of the Serbian Orthodox Church; state property claims; and debt. The 
official talks started on February 20, 2006 in Vienna, where Ahtisaari and his 
team (UNOSEK) had their headquarters. Once again, the selection of the loca-
tion of the talks was an indication that the issue was of primary concern to the 
European members of the Contact Group and that it was expected that, through 
the EU, they would be able to create incentives for both sides to agree on a nego-
tiated settlement. The EU policies were perceived as the main carrot in the 
process, as both Serbia and Kosovo declared their commitment to the EU inte-
gration process.
 The talks were conducted less expediently than was initially expected. In five 
rounds of talks, substantial differences between the two sides surfaced. The 
Kosovo delegation was initially extremely reluctant to talk about decentraliza-
tion, unless the issue of status was addressed first. On the other side, the Serbian 
delegation, which was getting signals from the Contact Group that Kosovo was 
going to be granted conditional and monitored independence, wanted to stall the 
talks as much as possible and use that time to lobby within the Contact Group, 
especially with the Russian officials, emphasizing their legalistic approach 
towards the issue. Nevertheless, signals that were coming from Western capitals 
and Moscow were not encouraging. France was the first member of the Contact 
Group that indirectly warned Serbia that its legalistic approach toward Kosovo’s 
independence would not find support and that it needed to face reality (ICG, 
2006a). Soon after that, Italy advised Serbia to realize that conditional independ-
ence would be the main topic of the talks in Vienna. Finally, in late 2005, Russia 
made it clear to Serbia that Moscow would not be drawn “into confrontation 
with the West over Kosovo” and that they would not veto a new Security 
Council resolution that would promote independence, given that might be the 
outcome of the negotiation process (ICG 2006a, 11).
 Under considerable pressure from the outside, the Kosovo delegation started 
making concessions regarding decentralization, protection of minority rights, 
and the Serbian Orthodox Church. These concessions, however, were met with 
increased signaling from the Contact Group – on several occasions it was unoffi-
cially announced that there was consensus within the Contact Group on the final 
status and that the people of Kosovo should be prepared for independence (B92 
2006). And while the Kosovo delegation was complimented for its efforts to find 
a compromise, the Serbian delegation was warned for its inflexibility in negoti-
ations. The fact was that the Serbian delegation did not even have a platform for 
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negotiations until the end of March, so despite the fact that their procrastination 
might have appeared tactical, it was primarily unintentional. However, once the 
platform was presented, the Serbian delegation demonstrated a certain desire to 
compromise by offering a formula, “less than independence more than autonomy” 
for Kosovo as part of Serbia. According to Serbian Foreign Minister Drašković, in 
light of the new reality on the ground and the change of political elites in Belgrade, 
the Serbian government was ready to accept that it did not have authority over 
Kosovo and that Kosovo would be able to retain 95% of its own control and 
administration, while only issues of foreign affairs and the military would be in the 
domain of Serbia, or as he put it: “Kosovo can get everything apart from a separate 
seat in the UN” (Drašković 2006). Ironically, the Serbian delegation was now 
offering the same platform that the Rambouillet accords prescribed, which was cal-
lously rejected by Milošević.
 As the time for negotiations was running out, the mediators were becoming 
well aware that it was highly unlikely that they would achieve a negotiated set-
tlement on Kosovo’s final status. It was clear that once Kosovo officials were 
aware of the fact that independence was imminent, they would become impa-
tient, less disposed to negotiate, and would start to urge the international com-
munity to formalize their new status. On the other hand, high officials from 
Serbia, also realizing the inevitability of independence for Kosovo, stated that 
recognizing Kosovo was not an option, was equal to political and national 
suicide for every politician in the country, and that no one was likely to assume 
that responsibility (Jeremić 2006).
Emergence of diverging interests within the contact group
Once the mediators realized that all opportunities to achieve a mutually accept-
able settlement were exhausted, they decided to delegate the issue to the UN 
Security Council to “impose independence” (ICG 2006b) through a superseding 
resolution. At that moment, within the Contact Group, initial fractions were 
emerging. The Quint (the informal group of Western members of the Contact 
Group) was well aware that the Serbian side was correct in its reassertions that 
the Security Council could not declare Kosovo independent because it was 
against the UN Charter to violate a member state’s sovereignty and territorial 
integrity. For this reason, they tried to establish a method through which using a 
new Security Council resolution, the settlement might be imposed. The most 
uncertain factor at that moment was Russia’s stance. Russian tacit consent for 
Kosovo’s independence was challenged when the Financial Times ran a story 
that Russia and China would not block the independence of Kosovo (Financial 
Times 2006). According to Ahtissari, “the leak forced Russia to take a more 
principled stand” (Ahtisaari quoted in Phillips 2012, 163). Russia started claim-
ing that it would not support any settlement that would be imposed on Serbia 
and that the outcome should be acceptable to both sides. Despite the fact that 
Russia signed the London Ministerial Statement, this dissent derived from 
Moscow’s newly formulated foreign policy interests, which once again sent very 
Kosovo  143
confusing signals to both Serbia and the rest of the Contact Group. The Contact 
Group members were confident that Russia was inclined to benefit from the 
precedent established by Kosovo’s independence by securing international 
recognition of ‘friendly mini- states’ – Abkhazia, South Ossetia and Transdnies-
tria – which would break away from Georgia and Moldova using Kosovo as a 
model (ICG 2006b). Despite the fact that Russia had a significant interest in 
having Kosovo be a negative precedent, publicly it renounced it, stating that “if 
Kosovo’s independence is recognized despite Serbia’s will, this will create a 
very negative precedent in international relations” and that it was ready to use its 
veto power in the event that the Kosovo solution did not conform to Russia’s 
interests (Lavrov quoted in ICG 2006b, 2). Obviously, Serbia understood this as 
explicit support for its position and consequently hardened its stance.
 Given the new developments, the rest of the Contact Group aimed to reduce 
friction and prevent a potential domino effect, by arguing that the Kosovo case 
was unique and that it could not provide a blueprint for other secessions and 
self- determination claims (ICG 2006b, 2). The first compromise within the group 
was formulated in the New York Statement, in which ministers looked forward 
to a “durable solution to the last major issue related to the break- up of Yugosla-
via” (Contact Group New York Statement 2006). Following this statement, and 
recognizing that the opportunities for negotiations had been exhausted, Ahtisaari 
decided to present a comprehensive settlement package to the Contact Group. 
Given the potential discomfort of Russians with the term independence, he opted 
for a document that would imply independence only in substance, while refrain-
ing from using the actual word. The settlement’s lack of direct reference to inde-
pendence was intended to curtail resistance and improve the chances of its 
acceptance by all members of the Contact Group and by both conflicting sides, 
and “postpone any discord until a later point in the process” (ICG 2006b, 3).
 The presentation of the document was scheduled for September 2006, but it 
was postponed until February 2007 due to parliamentary elections in Serbia and 
the Contact Group’s fear that even implicit consideration of Kosovo’s independ-
ence would result in yet another actor transformation in Serbia, but this time a 
less constructive one. Serbia interpreted statements coming from Russia as an 
indicator of a lack of consensus within the coalition. As such, it represented an 
opportunity to stall the process and delay the formation of government as long as 
possible until May 2007, in order to avoid being blamed for ‘losing’ Kosovo, 
with the expectation that the Contact Group would be less inclined to impose a 
resolution without an executive authority in Serbia (ICG 2007a, 7). Ahtisaari 
presented two documents to the Secretary General: the Proposal – an outline for 
state formation that harmonized the idea of an internationally supervised entity 
and an independent state – and the report on the reasons behind the proposal. He 
explained his position as follows:
For the past eight years, Kosovo and Serbia have been governed in complete 
separation. The establishment of the United Nations Mission in Kosovo 
(UNMIK) pursuant to resolution 1244 (1999), and its assumption of all 
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legislative, executive and judicial authority throughout Kosovo, has created a 
situation in which Serbia has not exercised any governing authority over 
Kosovo. This is a reality one cannot deny; it is irreversible. A return of Serbian 
rule over Kosovo would not be acceptable to the overwhelming majority of 
the people of Kosovo. Belgrade could not regain its authority without provok-
ing violent opposition. Autonomy of Kosovo within the borders of Serbia – 
however notional such autonomy may be – is simply not tenable. . . . Upon 
careful consideration of Kosovo’s recent history, the realities of Kosovo today 
and taking into account the negotiations with the parties, I have come to the 
conclusion that the only viable option for Kosovo is independence, to be 
supervised for an initial period by the international community.
(S/2007/168 2007)
The UN Security Council held a closed meeting on March 19, 2007, at which all 
the diverging interests and perceptions were brought to light. For the Western 
countries of the Contact Group, both the proposal and the report were supposed 
to be accepted because Kosovo urgently needed a sustainable solution to its 
status and any delay would lead to instability. The Russian delegation, however, 
proposed the retention of Resolution 1244 with selective implementation of parts 
of the proposal. It also rejected any notion of time running out for Kosovo and 
objected to making a rushed decision. Most importantly, Russia accused 
Ahtisaari of conducting shallow and abbreviated negotiations (ICG 2007a, 6).
 Russian refusal to accept the proposal formulated by Ahtisaari suggests that in 
the event that mediation efforts conducted (and coordinated) by an international 
organization are not compatible with a powerful state’s interest, the mediation 
effort is less likely to be successful. At the same time, the lack of success can be 
attributed to a lack of convergence of interests between Russia and the rest of the 
Contact Group, which conferred the necessary level of legitimacy to the UN envoy 
to formulate and, if needed, impose a solution on their behalf as well. Ahtisaari, 
argued that the general deterioration of relations between Russia and the US, on the 
global level, led to the Russian resistance to accept his proposal in the Security 
Council. Thus, the deadlock was less related to the negotiation process and more to 
the bilateral relations between these two states (Vesti 2012). Lack of convergence 
of interests once again led the process to a deadlock. Finally, while initial indica-
tions of a convergence of interests within the Contact Group induced Serbia to start 
realizing that Kosovo’s independence was imminent; eventual Russian defection 
from the rest of the Contact Group induced the Serbian government not to accept 
Ahtisaari’s proposal and to start stalling the process.
The additional attempt to mediate by the Troika
Diverging ideas on the process between mediators
Faced with Russian dissent, the US, UK, and France decided to stop drafting a 
new Security Council resolution. French president Sarkozy proposed another 
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round of talks, this time conducted by the Troika – US, Russia, and the EU – in 
order to accommodate Russian demands that negotiations needed to continue 
until both sides found a mutually acceptable solution. For the first time in the 
Kosovo conflict, the EU assumed the role of the actor with the most responsib-
ility for the process. The talks took place in Brussels. The role of the EU was to 
balance the opposing stances of the US and Russia, and using a ‘formulator’ 
role, thereby trying to ensure that every conceivable solution would be taken into 
consideration. Just as Ahtisaari had, the Troika avoided talking about status 
issues, but rather focused on cooperation and future relations between Serbia and 
Kosovo. A 14-point document was proposed which outlined that special rela-
tions between the two sides were based on the principles that: (a) Belgrade will 
not govern nor re- establish a physical presence in Kosovo; (b) it will not inter-
fere in Priština’s relations with international financial institutions nor hamper 
Kosovo’s EU stabilization and association process; and finally, (c) that it accepts 
Kosovo’s complete integration in regional bodies, especially economic institu-
tions (Troika Proposal 2007). Once again, the mediators were confronted with 
unyielding positions on both sides. While Belgrade insisted that negotiations 
should focus on substantial autonomy for Kosovo, Priština considered independ-
ence to be non- negotiable and wanted to negotiate its post- status relations.
 However, the lack of consensus on how the negotiations should be conducted 
was not just between Belgrade and Priština any longer. This time, mediators had 
highly opposing views on the format of talks. The EU representative, Wolfgang 
Ischinger, who proposed the 14 points, assumed a much more formal role, using 
the ‘formulator’ strategy. His idea was that the Troika talks should leave ‘no 
stone unturned’ in the search for a compromise agreement “which even if only 
partial could have shifted some responsibility from Western capitals to Belgrade 
and Priština” (ICG 2007b). On the other hand, the Russian diplomat Aleksandr 
Botsan- Kharchenko translated his country’s position of “not imposing a settle-
ment” into a ‘communicator’ strategy, claiming that the two sides needed to find 
a compromise on their own and that the mediators should only facilitate the 
talks. The differences in positions on the format of talks undoubtedly reflected 
the diverging interests between the mediators, who obviously did not share the 
same idea of a solution to the conflict. The lack of shared ideas between medi-
ators directly affected their coordination. During the negotiations, mediators 
rarely offered joint proposals; more often individual suggestions were made that 
were openly rejected during official talks by other mediators.
Lack of cooperation between mediators
Initially, mediators agreed to ‘suggest’ an ‘Ahtisaari- plus plan’ to both parties, 
implying a loose association or union between Serbia and Kosovo, which aimed 
to complement the plan for internal governance contained in Ahtisaari’s pro-
posal. The ‘suggestion’ was made informally at first, in order to explore the posi-
tions on both sides regarding the proposed ‘association of states’ model. For 
Priština, this represented an ‘Ahtisaari minus plan,’ since it shrunk political 
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independence in exchange for an extremely ‘interdependent’ relationship with 
Belgrade and access to global financial institutions. For Serbian officials, the 
association of states model was absolutely unacceptable as it formulated ‘inde-
pendence by another name’ (ICG 2007b, 4). Despite such positions, all Western 
capitals urged Ischinger to present this model officially because, apparently, 
there was little hope for compromise and mediators needed to assume a much 
more directive role. However, Russia blocked the official presentation and the 
Troika had to compromise for a vaguer ‘neutral status’ proposal, according to 
which Serbia and Kosovo would concur on instruments for stabilizing their rela-
tions “prior to and regardless of the ultimate status decision” (ICG 2007b, 4). It 
was obvious that mediation was not going forward at all. Under these conditions, 
the mediation process became not only a reconciliation process between Bel-
grade and Priština, but also a process of appeasement between the three medi-
ators. The difficulty of reconciling US, Russian, and European positions was 
evident until the end of talks, which directly hampered the Contact Group from 
issuing any clear recommendation to the UN Secretary- General. On December 
10th, after two years of negotiations and eight years after the first international 
involvement, the Troika officially declared negotiations exhausted without 
reaching a compromise.
 The failure of the Contact Group to formulate a common platform was a 
direct result of the fact that its member states did not share a common interest in 
reaching a solution to the Kosovo problem. As a consequence, their inability to 
negotiate an agreement amongst themselves led the peace process to a deadlock, 
as neither party in the conflict was willing to compromise any further.
Notes
1 An earlier version of this chapter was published as a case study in Vuković (2012).
2 According to Phillips, 
The U.S. government had not formally designated the KLA as a foreign terrorist 
organization (FTO). Therefore, the State Department was taken by surprise when 
Gelbard called KLA a terrorist organization at his Belgrade press conference. 
According to his senior adviser, Stuart Seldowitz, “Gelbard just slipped. He said 
what he taught. Bob never said he was wrong about this – or anything.” Sonja 
Biserko, head of the Helsinki Committee for Human Rights in Serbia, confronted 
Gelbard at a meeting of Serbian civil society leaders on the afternoon of his press 
conference. “If you call them terrorists, what do you call then Belgrade’s state 
terror?” Gelbard later pronounced, “I know a terrorist when I see one, and these 
men are terrorists.” Gelbard went as far to call the KLA an Islamic terrorist organ-
ization after the U.S. embassies in Kenya and Tanzania were bombed.
(Phillips 2012, 87)
3 When Milosevic tried to alter the proposed offer, Chernomyrdin made it clear that the 
deal was non- negotiable, while Ahtisaari emphasized that Blair was prepared to issue 
an ultimatum and request a UNSC approval for a ground invasion (Ker- Lindsay 2009, 
15; Phillips 2012, 113).
4 For a discussion on Responsibility to Protect see Bellamy (2006) and Evans (2008).
7 Sri Lanka1
One of the most violent and intractable conflicts in Asia, fought for decades 
between Sri Lankan Tamil rebel forces and the government of Sri Lanka,2 ended 
on the battlefield. On May 18, 2009, following the killing of Velupillai Pra­
bhakaram, the leader of Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE), the govern­
ment officially declared that “the war against the terrorists is now over” 
(statement taken from Goodhand and Korf 2011, 1). The conflict, which offi­
cially started in 1983 following pogroms against Tamil civilians, had resulted in 
more than 70,000 casualties and hundreds of thousands displaced persons as of 
2006 (ICG 2006a). Early peace initiatives – including the Thimpu talks in 1985, 
the Indo­ Lanka Accord in 1987,3 the Premadasa/LTTE talks in 1989–1990, the 
Kumaratunga/LTTE talks in 1994–1995 – yielded only modest advances and 
failed to lead to a significant breakthrough in bridging the differences between 
the parties and brokering a peaceful solution to the conflict. The fifth and final 
peace process, the focus of this chapter, the Wickremesinghe/LTTE–Rajapaksa/
LTTE talks, which consisted of six rounds of talks in 2003 and two in 2006, 
managed to generate a cease­ fire agreement (CFA), but became obsolete in 2006 
when both parties resumed military activities. According to a UN report, in the 
tragic events that followed, 40.000 civilians lost their lives (UN Report on Sri 
Lanka 2012, 14).
 The final peacemaking efforts were highly internationalized. They included 
numerous external actors in possession of both tactical and strategic means. Each 
actor had particular leverage at its disposal and a set of alliances within Sri 
Lankan society, allowing for the possibility of strategic complementarity among 
them (Goodhand 2006a, 39–40). However, as the following chapter will illus­
trate, the absence of strategic interests on the part of external actors that would 
motivate the parties to conduct a coordinated peacemaking effort contributed to 
its failure. This was certainly not the only reason for failure; many other studies 
have emphasized the lack of actual ripeness and the conflicting parties’ unwill­
ingness to compromise as the main sources of failure (Sisk 2009, Goodhand et 
al. 2011, Svensson 2014). Nevertheless, the following chapter explores the 
relevance of the interests of external actors with respect to the coordination of 
their activities and the application of the required leverage in order to guide the 
conflicting parties toward a mutually acceptable solution. The mediation process 
148  Sri Lanka
was formally led by Norway and was backed by a coalition of donor states. The 
supporting states were able to generate important financial incentives, but were 
unable to balance those rewards with meaningful ‘sticks.’ Given the conflicting 
parties’ intransigent attitudes throughout the process, mediation required exter­
nal states to ‘play heavy.’ Although the external actors indicated their willing­
ness to work together, the requisite convergence of interests between them was 
never achieved during the process because the conflict was not strategically 
significant enough to induce them to apply all the (most costly) leverage at their 
disposal.
Nature of the conflict
Sources of intractability and the employment of repressive measures
In the context of the end of British colonial rule and rapidly growing Sinhala 
nationalism, the intensification of the Sri Lankan conflict commenced with the 
new constitution of 1948. Rotberg notes that the constitution “lacked a bill of 
rights like India’s,” or anything that could provide “effective formal protection 
for minorities” (1999, 5). The state’s discriminatory policies, like the ‘Sinhala 
Only Bill’ that replaced English with Sinhalese as the only official language, led 
to anti­ Tamil riots in 1956, followed by more violent riots in 1958. As a reac­
tion, various Tamil militant groups became active, most notably the LTTE, 
founded in 1976 and led by Velupillai Prabhakaran. They were created in reac­
tion to the 1972 constitutional changes, which prescribed Buddhism as the coun­
try’s primary religion and Sinhalese as the official national language (Sisk 2009; 
see Stewart 2002 on the socio­ economic consequences of these policies). The 
LTTE was able to successfully formulate the nationalistic ideology of the Tamils 
and develop a parallel economic system within the territories it controlled. The 
central goal of the LTTE was the establishment of an independent country, the 
Tamil homeland called Eelam. Rotberg argues that “by the time the war begun 
the Sri Lankan society had become irredeemably polarized” (1999, 7). As Tamil 
frustrations grew, periodic episodes of violence, such as the riots of 1977 and 
1981, aggravated the already strained relations between the two communities. 
By 1983, violence had spread to Colombo, where hundreds of Tamils were 
killed by Sinhala mobs “with the tacit tolerance of security forces” (Sisk 2009, 
152). The riots were provoked by ambiguous reports that the LTTE had killed 13 
Sri Lankan army personnel in the area of Jaffna, inducing retaliation by the 
army, which resulted in 44 Tamils being killed (Sisk 2009, 152). Human Rights 
Watch argued that the events were orchestrated, as “the police and soldiers stood 
by and watched as Tamils were attacked . . . in some cases they perpetrated the 
acts themselves . . . the violence was well organized and politically supported . . . 
high ranking officials, including government ministers were accused of orches­
trating the violence” (1995, 88). The notorious 1983 riots prompted thousands of 
Tamils to flee Sri Lanka and find refuge in India and Western countries. Tamil 
refugees established a large and vibrant diaspora, which soon became a crucial 
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to supporting and financing LTTE anti­ government activities (DeVotta 2007, 
77). The epilogue of the 1983 riots was full­ fledged warfare between the Sin­
halese dominated government and the Tamil community.
Failed peace processes
According to Sisk, a history of failed peace processes4 contributed to the con­
flict’s intractability (Sisk 2009, 153). The core political issues were largely mar­
ginalized by humanitarian, logistical and military issues (Rupesinghe 2006c). 
The conflicting parties used the negotiations for their own purposes like buying 
time to rearm themselves and “reconstitute the conflict,” while making sure to 
“discover new differences” through negotiations (Uyangoda 2007, viii). Even in 
instances in which the government showed modest signs of a willingness to 
compromise, the opposition parties led by the Buddhist clergy played a crucial 
role in preventing them from formulating concrete proposals (Biswas 2006, 54). 
The LLTE, for its part, continued rearming itself and refused to rely solely on 
negotiations in their dealings with the government. As Biswas observes, the fact 
that the government was unable or unwilling to articulate tangible incentives to 
Tamils, along with the LTTE’s lack of commitment to the peace process, 
resulted in an environment where “facilitative intervention does create room for 
talks but no agreement is reached” (Biswas 2006, 59).
 A number of pivotal developments ripened the overall situation and led to the 
2002–2006 peace process. At the international level, the post­ 9/11 environment 
significantly affected the LTTE’s calculations. Before the terrorist attacks on the 
Twin Towers in New York, thanks to powerful lobbying support from the Tamil 
diaspora, the LTTE managed to promote itself as a freedom fighting organiza­
tion created to protect the Tamil minority from the systemic harassment that the 
Sri Lankan government had been perpetuating for decades. Even though the 
LTTE’s tactics prompted some powerful states with large Tamil diasporas to list 
it as a terrorist organization prior to 9/11 – India placed it on the terrorist list in 
1992, the United States did the same in 1997 and the UK followed suit in Febru­
ary 2001 – the full weight of the label was brought to bear after 9/11, as the 
LTTE started “fighting a losing struggle to be recognized as a legitimate actor in 
the international community” (Höglund and Svensson 2007, 107). As Paikia­
sothy Saravanamuttu, head of the local non­ governmental organization (NGO) 
Centre for Policy Alternatives, points out, “11 September impacted the LTTE’s 
political psyche and its room for manoeuvre internationally in respect of funds, 
legitimacy and acquisition of weapons” (Saravanamuttu 2003, 132). The shifting 
international conditions became increasingly burdensome for the LTTE and it 
struggled to maintain its image of being a group of freedom fighters and to 
secure a steady influx of financial support from its diaspora and NGOs in 
Western countries. These new realities prompted the LTTE to amend its 
approach and explore the possibility of reaching a negotiated solution.5
 Domestically, the country was suffering from an economic recession, further 
aggravated by the escalation of belligerent activities in 1999–2001. The population 
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was becoming increasingly exhausted and dejected as a result of the prolonged 
conflict. By the end of 2001, the economic hardship and escalating conflict con­
tributed to the government’s fall. The December 2001 elections were won by a 
coalition of parties called United National Front (UNF ), headed by Ranil Wick­
remesinghe and his United National Party (UNP). Wickremesinghe, who became 
the Prime Minister and stayed in that position from 2001 until 2004, is often cred­
ited as the architect of the peace process. Chandrika Bandaranaike Kumaratunga, 
whose Sri Lanka Freedom Party (SLFP) lost the elections and the control over the 
government, remained president, setting the groundwork for an uneasy partnership.
Multiparty mediation process
Upon taking office, Wickremesinghe and his UNF government set their three 
main priorities: (1) reviving the country’s economy with the help of external 
donors; (2) signing a cease­ fire agreement that recognizes that there are two 
armies in the country controlling different parts of the territory; and (3) opening 
negotiations with the LTTE through a peace process that would have an institu­
tionalized role for external actors (Bastian 2008, 84). A cease­ fire agreement was 
reached in February 2002. To ensure the end of hostilities, the agreement estab­
lished the Sri Lankan Monitoring Mission (SLMM) – composed of five Nordic 
countries: Norway, Sweden, Finland, Denmark, and Iceland – which was 
assigned a mandate to monitor the implementation of the cease­ fire between the 
parties and, if needed, to assist the parties by facilitating the resolution of dis­
putes over its implementation.6 With a cease­ fire in place, the LTTE and the gov­
ernment held six rounds of direct negotiations between September 2002 and 
March 2003.
 Even prior to the signing of the CFA, the international community was 
making efforts to link aid to the peace process (Shanmugaratnam and Stokke, 
2004: 14; see also Goodhand and Klem 2005; Bastian 2006). Initially, the most 
active donors were Japan, the World Bank and the Asian Development Bank. 
When Wickremesinghe took office, he made it clear that the fragile peace in Sri 
Lanka could be preserved and advanced only with the international community’s 
support. Although his UNF government insisted on international involvement 
prior to the signing of the CFA, the end of hostilities bolstered the willingness of 
very important external actors to take a more active role in the donor community. 
Based on the UNF ’s political strategy, the United States, Japan and the EU 
joined the Norwegian­ led peace process in a more institutionalized manner as 
donor co­ chairs. As Bastian noted, the process was now supported by a ‘super­
power,’ Sri Lanka’s major trading partners, and its largest donor (Bastian 
2006, 247).
 The rapid developments in the peace process provided enough reason for the 
external actors to perceive the Sri Lankan case as an ‘easy win’ (Goodhand 
2006b). Following the signing of the cease­ fire agreement, there was noticeable 
progress toward peace. As reported by Sisk, the six rounds of talks “were ini­
tially encouraging: they covered the principal issues of power sharing, federalism 
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and devolution (i.e., the terms of autonomy), development finance and aid, child 
soldiers, and in Japan in March 2003 a possible joint character of human rights” 
(Sisk 2009, 159). In fact, with the CFA in place, the parties managed to create 
considerable momentum. Through a series of unprecedented compromises, they 
agreed (albeit only nominally) to a decommissioning of weapons, opening of 
roads and civilian air traffic in conflict­ affected areas, the exchange of prisoners 
and the end of a governmental ban on the LTTE (Sisk 2009, 159). The last con­
cession, which satisfied the rebel group’s key demand, prompted the LTTE to 
assume a more compromising approach. A major breakthrough was achieved in 
December 2002, following a conference in Oslo, when the two sides announced 
an important rapprochement by declaring a mutual willingness to explore the 
federal option as a solution to their ongoing conflict. The statement expressed 
the parties’ readiness to “to explore a solution founded on the principle of 
internal self­ determination in areas of historical habitation of the Tamils peaking 
people based on a federal structure within a united Sri Lanka” (Daily Mirror 
2002). For the first time, a federal solution became acceptable to both sides, indi­
cating the LTTE’s abandonment of its earlier separatist aspirations (Höglund and 
Svensson 2006).
 The gradually emerging rapprochement between the two conflicting sides in 
2002 provided sufficient reason for external actors to “prioritize peacebuilding 
because it appeared to be a low risk­high opportunity situation” (Goodhand 2006a, 
15). The perception of the conflict as being an ‘easy win’ may have conditioned the 
external actors to focus primarily on achieving short­ term success. Uyangoda noted 
that it appeared as if the international community was approaching the peacemak­
ing process “as an exercise that should produce an early peace deal” (Uyangoda 
2006, 4). Initially, all the external actors involved in the peacemaking process 
(Norway, the EU and Japan) with the exception of the United States were willing 
to engage with the LTTE. Nevertheless, even the United States, formally con­
strained by its rigid post­ 9/11 anti­ terrorist foreign policy objectives, still praised 
the LTTE’s commitment to the peace process and signalled “that a change in LTTE 
behaviour could lead to a change in the U.S. approach” (Lunstead 2007, 16).7
Involvement of international actors and their interests in the 
conflict
Norway
Norway was first country approached to facilitate the talks in September 1999 
(Bullion 2001, 76). Its political and economic stability, absence of a colonial 
heritage and its lack of specific geopolitical interests in Sri Lanka, made Norway 
a suitable candidate in the eyes of the conflicting parties (Ram 2001). These 
characteristics also helped Norway become accepted by important regional 
actors: India for instance, did not perceive Norwegian involvement as a threat to 
its own strategic interests in the region (Moolakkattu 2005). Norway is also a 
country that is home to a sizable Tamil diaspora and one whose prior presence in 
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Sri Lanka amounted to a number of development and social service projects 
(Bullion 2001, 77). These long­ term development projects helped Norway to 
establish personal contacts with relevant actors on the ground, cultivating Nor­
wegian interest in engaging in the peacemaking process (Rupesinghe 2006b). 
Moreover, Norway has a strong track record based on its significant contribution 
to some of the most complex mediation processes around the globe in the 1990s, 
including the Oslo Accords (1993); Guatemala (1996); Haiti, Sudan, Cyprus and 
Kosovo (1999); and Colombia (2000) (Bullion 2001, 76). Maintaining its reputa­
tion as a peacemaking and ‘great moral’ power has been very important to Nor­
way’s self­ perception (Höglund and Svensson 2009, 179). For a relatively small 
and distant Nordic country, peacemaking offers the opportunity to assume a 
more significant role in international affairs (Moolakkattu 2005; Höglund and 
Svensson 2009). While reputational concerns may explain the Norwegian intent 
to maintain a presence in Sri Lanka even after the peace process collapsed, these 
were certainly not the only motivations behind Norway’s initial involvement in 
1999. In fact, at that time, it was difficult to predict that a regime change and a 
subsequent successful start of the peace process would take place that would also 
attract the involvement of other players.
 In the context of previous mediation activities, Norway preferred to sustain 
an approach characterized by the creation of back channels for secret negoti­
ations where the responsibility for success of the facilitated talks remained with 
the conflicting parties themselves (Joenniemi 2014, 127). As a lead mediator in 
Sri Lanka, Norway departed from its traditional inclination to maintain a sup­
portive and low­ profile role away from public scrutiny (Kelleher and Taulbee 
2005, 80). Officially, Norwegian mediators maintained that their role was prim­
arily to facilitate the talks. In reality, they did much more: their activities ranged 
from facilitating communication between the two sides, to playing a more asser­
tive role in formulating the cease­ fire agreement and the Oslo Declaration and a 
manipulator role by creating positive incentives through financial aid. Neverthe­
less, from the onset of the peace process, Norway preferred to present itself as a 
‘postman,’ employed to convey crucial information necessary to finding 
common ground between the parties (Economist 2001). This also meant that the 
responsibility for the outcome was with the conflicting parties and not with the 
Norwegian mediators. Erik Slheim, who was appointed as a special adviser to 
the Norwegian Department of Foreign Affairs in March 2000 and assumed the 
facilitator role once the UNF government took office in December 2001, pointed 
out that “it has to be remembered that at the end of the day President Mahinda 
Rajapaksha and the LTTE leader Prabhakaran will decide. If they want peace, 
we are here to assist. If they want war, there is nothing we can do” (Rupesinghe 
2006b, 344–345; Bullion 2001). The Sri Lankan government also supported this 
approach. Sri Lanka Foreign Minister Lakshman Kadirgamar explained their 
expectations:
But when it comes to substantive negotiation, the Norwegians will have no 
particular role at all. They will have no mandate to propose solutions. They 
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will certainly have no mandate to make any judgmental decisions. In that 
sense, they’re not arbitrators, they’re not judges, they’re not mediators.
(Ram 2001)
The strategy of delegating ownership of the peace process to the conflicting 
parties was later criticized as a source of Norway’s decreased legitimacy and 
leverage which might have prevented the conflict from escalating once the talks 
reached a deadlock (Höglund and Svensson 2009). Another criticism of this 
approach speaks to an incompatibility between the process conducted by a 
neutral, low­ key facilitator and the collectivist culture of Asia, which caused 
confusion for the parties involved (Moolakkattu 2005).
 Norway also aimed to establish a ‘joint work principle’ or dugnad with other 
relevant international actors (Joenniemi 2014, 128). This strategy was first trans­
formed into the UNF government platform. As a result, the Unites States as a 
global power, the EU as Sri Lanka’s biggest trading partner and Japan as its 
biggest donor became the co­ chairs of the process. While India was not partici­
pating in an official capacity, Norway was careful to obtain India’s consent for 
the various steps taken throughout the process. For this reason, the two countries 
maintained regular consultations on the progress of the peacemaking process. 
Norway was also very keen to maintain its image of being an impartial third 
party, able to maintain an equidistant relationship with both conflicting sides. 
However, upholding the image of an impartial third party in asymmetric con­
flicts is a very challenging task (Höglund and Svensson 2009). By treating both 
parties equally, Norway granted legitimacy to the LTTE, something that was 
never welcomed by the Sinhala nationalists. At the same time, this meant dealing 
with a rebel group with whom a majority of Norwegian allies would never have 
wanted to engage, at least not formally (Martin 2006, 126). Throughout the 
process, Norway was often criticized for being in favor of the LTTE. This was 
most certainly exacerbated by the LTTE’s enthusiastic comments, calling them 
‘the white tigers’ (Martin 2006, 113).
 Despite mounting criticism, Norway remained patient with the conflicting 
parties, an attitude that was characteristic of its previous mediation endeavors. 
The Norwegian delegation was well aware that criticism was inevitable. As 
one of the delegates put it: “If you want to get involved in this process, you 
should not expect not to get your fingers burned, you should expect to get 
them electrocuted” (Martin 2006, 116). Norwegians resisted the pressure 
coming from the Sinhala nationalists and local media, even when their 
embassy in Colombo was besieged by protesters carrying coffins with dead 
bodies inside and burning the Norwegian flag (ICG 2006a). Norwegian resolve 
in the process was mainly exhibited in its use of low­ key, non­ intrusive tacti­
cal power. However, it became clear that under such intractable conditions, in 
order to keep the parties committed, the process required a significant degree 
of strategic strength. Since Norway was unable to muster the necessary carrots 
and sticks on its own, it brought in other external players capable of lending 
the necessary leverage.
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United States
The track record of US involvement in peacemaking processes unequivocally 
demonstrates that it is both willing and able to employ its manipulative strength. 
American assertiveness in various conflicts has bolstered the perception that if 
and when the US is involved, it is most likely to due to a veiled interest it has in 
that specific area. Moreover, this strategically­ driven involvement also com­
pounds the expectation that the US will put its strategic leverage to use. 
However, in the case of Sri Lanka, the US did not have any “significant strategic 
interests” (Lunstead 2007, 11). First of all, the two countries had neither a histor­
ical legacy nor particularly well­ developed economic relations. US development 
assistance had been gradually decreasing since the early 1990s and was expected 
to decline significantly from around US$5 million annually in 2001–2004, to 
US$2 million in 2005 (USAID 2000). Second, the Tamil diaspora in the US, 
which amounted to approximately 35.000 people, was not large enough to have 
significant sway over US foreign policy priorities (Bandarage 2009, 21). Third, 
given its proximity to hotspots in central Asia and its geostrategic position in the 
Indian Ocean, there was speculation that the US might have a military interest in 
using Trincomalee Harbor and related runway facilities in Sri Lanka (Noyahr 
2006). However, as Jeffrey Lunstead, the US ambassador to Sri Lanka in 
2003–2006, stated when comparing Trincomalee to Singapore, where the US 
Navy had already established its presence: “Singapore is ideal because of its 
internal stability, its superb facilities and infrastructure, and its position. Trin­
comalee currently lacks all of these, and is unlikely to gain any of them in the 
foreseeable future” (Lunstead 2007, 11). Furthermore, even within South Asia, 
US strategic interests are focused on two nuclear powers – India and Pakistan – 
and on Afghanistan in relation to the fight against al­ Qaeda (Kronstadt 2004, 
Lunstead 2007). As economic and military relations with India had been improv­
ing, the US was careful enough not to challenge Indian requests to preserve 
regional primacy. The two countries held routine meetings at which they dis­
cussed the situation in Sri Lanka. According to Lunstead, this spirit of consulta­
tion was strengthened because they viewed the conflict in a similar fashion: Sri 
Lanka’s unity and territorial integrity should be preserved, the Tamil community 
in Sri Lanka had legitimate grievances that the government had to address and 
the LTTE had to renounce terrorism and enter into a political process (Lunstead 
2007, 25). Nevertheless, Lunstead also emphasized:
This atmosphere of consultation and cooperation should not be misunder­
stood. It was much more consultation than cooperation. The two countries 
discussed their understanding of the situation in Sri Lanka and their policies. 
They did not attempt to develop joint policies or operations. This was not 
some type of U.S.–India condominium with regard to Sri Lanka. It was in 
many ways a “non­ confliction” exercise to ensure the two sides did not work 
at cross purposes.
(Lunstead 2007, 25–26)
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Finally, despite the fact that in the post­ 9/11 period, US foreign policy interests 
were strongly shaped by the ongoing ‘war on terror,’ the LTTE was seen as a 
local terrorist organization, whose relations with global terrorist groups was 
either insignificant or non­ existent and, as such, its ability to endanger US inter­
ests was marginal (Lunstead 2007).
 In light of the evident absence of strategic interests, Lunstead explains Amer­
ican involvement as the result of two parallel developments: Sri Lanka’s new 
government was openly pro­ Western (and pro­ free market) and the US Deputy 
Secretary of State Richard Armitage had a personal interest in participating in 
the peace process (Lunstead 2007, 13). In a speech delivered in Washington in 
February 2003, Armitage asked a rhetorical question, “Why should the United 
States invest significant attention and resources to Sri Lanka, especially at a time 
when we have such overwhelming competing interests?” (Armitage 2003, 89). 
While noting that “it would be tough to make a truly convincing case by sticking 
to the terms of strict self­ interest,” his answer was quite unambiguous: “because 
it can be done. And because it is the right thing to do. Because the parties to the 
conflict appear to be ready to reach a resolution, more so than at any other time 
in the past twenty years” (Armitage 2003, 89). The notion that ‘it can be done’ 
was reiterated by another participant at that conference, the former US ambas­
sador to Sri Lanka, Teresita Schaffer, who promoted the view that “there was the 
real possibility of success” (Noyahr 2006, 373). Evidently, in the eyes of US 
policy makers, the situation in Sri Lanka was ripe for resolution. The perception 
of an ‘easy win’ had a dual effect. On the one hand, it prompted the US and 
other international actors to participate in the peace process (Goodhand 2006a, 
2006b). On the other, however, as the process became more difficult to manage, 
the elusiveness of the ‘easy win’ contributed to more reluctant participation by 
external actors.
 According to Frerks and Klem, the US endorsed a threefold approach: “pres­
suring the LTTE, engaging with the government and supporting activities aimed 
at peaceful transformation” (2006, 43). The US had very limited engagement 
with the LTTE. Ever since the LTTE was designated a foreign terrorist organiza­
tion in 1997, the US was unable to provide it with any tangible assistance. Fur­
thermore, in the post­ 9/11 environment, it was politically unimaginable to meet 
directly with representatives of a terrorist organization. For this reason, the US 
never held direct talks with the LTTE. At the same time, the US maintained its 
support of the government of Sri Lanka. It was the only co­ chair that provided 
military assistance to the government. Even though this assistance never 
achieved a significant level, for the LTTE, it was still a factor that diminished 
the possibility of a compromise (Lunstead 2007). Initially, the lack of US 
engagement with the LTTE still contributed to the ‘good cop–bad cop’ approach: 
while the US maintained the role of a ‘bad cop,’ the EU – still willing to engage 
directly with the LTTE – played the role of a ‘good cop’ (Höglund and Svensson 
2011). However, this coordination did not last long. The US decision not to 
allow LTTE officials to attend the Washington Development Conference in 
April 2003 was a pivotal moment in the peace process. This conference was a 
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preparatory one for a much larger meeting of donors planned for June 2003 in 
Tokyo. The LTTE reacted by announcing their withdrawal from future direct 
negotiations. Although there were some claims that this incident was not a 
reason, but an excuse for the LTTE to walk away from the peace process, the US 
decision still provided that push. In its response, the US maintained that the 
LTTE’s reasons for withdrawal were “not convincing” and “called on the Tigers 
to reconsider and to return to the negotiating track” (Asian Tribune 2003).
 If the deterioration of the peace process was the first sign of limited (and 
steadily waning) US strategic interest, the second one came in January 2005 
when the new Bush administration replaced Deputy Secretary Armitage with 
Robert Zoellick, who subsequently passed the Sri Lanka issue to Under Sec­
retary for Political Affairs, R. Nicolas Burns. According to Lunstead, “perhaps 
the decline in interest was only natural; it could hardly be expected that the same 
degree of highly personal interest would be sustained in a new administration” 
(Lunstead 2007, 33). While the US was conducting two highly publicized 
military operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, the fact that a peace process in a 
small and distant country “with minimal strategic interests for the US, with a 
deteriorating security situation based in part on the inability of Sri Lankan polit­
ical elements to cooperate,” reached a deadlock was not a priority for the United 
States (Lunstead 2007, 33). The US maintained its presence in the peace process 
through the co­ chairs framework, but its visible involvement did not go beyond 
statements of condemnation regarding the escalation of hostilities and human 
rights and humanitarian concerns.
The European Union
Similar to the US, The European Union was also seen as a ‘reluctant co­ chair’ due 
to its unassertive engagement in Sri Lanka before and at the beginning of the peace 
process (Noyahr 2006, 387). Before 2002, the EU’s involvement in Sri Lanka was 
quite minimal. By 2001, the EU Commission downgraded its delegation in 
Colombo to one diplomat, with a non­ resident head of delegation based in Delhi. A 
reluctant EU delegation got involved as a co­ chair only after intense lobbying on 
the part of the Sri Lankan government (Noyahr 2006). The “absence of major 
direct interests” drove the EU to “stick with the Norwegians” and keep a low 
profile through the peace process (Frerks and Klem 2006, 46). The lack of strong 
interests was also evident due to the fact that only seven out of 27 EU member 
states had a diplomatic mission in Sri Lanka: the UK, Sweden, the Netherlands, 
France, Italy, Germany and Romania. Of these countries, Sri Lanka had closest 
relations with its former colonizer, the UK, where 300,000 Sri Lankans lived. 
Other EU member states had rather small Tamil diasporas: in France there were 
around 100,000 Sri Lankan Tamils, 60,000 in Germany, 24,000 in Italy, 7,000 in 
the Netherlands, 6,000 in Sweden and 600 in Finland (Bandarage 2009, 21).
 The ‘good cop’ role motivated the EU Commissioner on External Relations, 
Chris Patten, to meet with the LTTE leader, Prabhakaran (European Commis­
sion 2003). The decision did not meet with much praise: the Sri Lankan media 
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strongly condemned the EU for the visit; the local newspapers displayed head­
lines such as “Keep Patten out of the country,” accusing him of “bloody Euro­
pean gumption and insolence of the highest order” (Martin 2006, 116). The EU 
decision to meet with the LTTE was a direct result of its ‘stick with the Norwe­
gians’ approach: prior to the visit, the Norwegian delegation issued a statement 
to the rest of the diplomatic community in Colombo that in order for the LTTE 
to become a constructive partner, it had to meet with other actors. Nevertheless, 
following the visit, the EU issued a denunciatory statement regarding the 
LTTE’s human rights record and warned the group that it must comply with 
international human rights standards if it wished to enjoy “recognition as a polit­
ical player in Sri Lanka” (Martin 2006, 128).
 The ‘good cop’ role lost its relevance in May 2006, when the EU decided to 
employ one of its sticks by listing the LTTE as a terrorist organization. Officially, 
the decision was a response to the August 2005 assassination of Sri Lankan Foreign 
Minister, Kadirgamar, and other LTTE human rights violations. The Council of the 
EU’s declaration stated that the decision should not come as a surprise to anybody 
and emphasized that “several warnings have already been provided to the LTTE, 
which the LTTE has systematically ignored” (Council of the European Union 
2006). While the EU was willing to formally engage in talks with the LTTE, and 
despite the organization’s reputation within the global ‘war on terror,’ it was the 
LTTE’s specific terror tactics and methods – such as child recruitment and political 
killings – that resulted in grave human rights violations, that prompted the EU to 
assume a less accommodating attitude toward the LTTE (Ferks and Klem 2006). 
The actual impact of this ‘stick’ was quite limited. While the EU remained com­
mitted to the peace process, it focused most of its attention on issuing condemna­
tion – both alone and in cooperation with other co­ chairs – regarding humanitarian 
and human rights issues. It appeared as if the conflict never received much atten­
tion in Brussels. In one of its reports, the ICG argued that this was due to a ‘limited 
geopolitical impact’ of Sri Lanka’s conflict, and noted how “while fighting raged 
in August 2006, the situation did not even reach the agenda of EU foreign minis­
ters meeting in Brussels” (ICG 2006a, 19).
Japan
Japan, while certainly a global economic superpower, rarely took a very asser­
tive role in global politics. In the case of Sri Lanka, it seemed as though Japan 
was quite content with its role as a passive donor. Nevertheless, a gradual altera­
tion in its international positioning, prompted by increasing Chinese influence, 
saw Japan resort to non­ economic forms of influence, such as military and diplo­
matic measures (Laurence 2007). Japan assumed a more conspicuous role soon 
after the peace talks had begun: Yasushi Akashi, a former UN undersecretary for 
humanitarian affairs, was appointed by the Japanese government to be a special 
envoy to the Sri Lankan peace process. His official title was the Representative 
of the Government of Japan on Peace­ Building, Rehabilitation and Reconstruc­
tion of Sri Lanka. Evidently, for the Japanese, government aid was perceived as 
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the most fundamental impetus of peaceful change. For this reason, in June 2003, 
Japan hosted a donors’ conference at which the participants discussed ways of 
linking peace negotiations and international assistance for development and 
reconstruction in Sri Lanka (Noyahr 2006). However, as Japanese relations with 
Sri Lanka were mostly government oriented, this relationship had a significant 
impact on the peace process. Japanese aid was largely delivered through govern­
ment channels and in some exceptional cases through UN agencies. As a con­
sequence, despite the fact that Japan never banned the LTTE, the decision to 
channel aid through the government led Japan to refrain from directly providing 
any funds to the LTTE (Frerks and Klem 2006).
India
The only country with unequivocally strong strategic interests in Sri Lanka was 
India. For a long time, India had preferred to position itself as a regional power 
with the intention of limiting the influence of other external actors in South Asia 
(Rao 1988). Phillipson and Thangarajah note that “India has always had substan­
tial intelligence resources in Sri Lanka, including being involved in counterin­
surgency initiatives against the LTTE, whose autonomous power India seeks to 
crush” (Philipson and Thangarajah 2005, 47). The conflict in Sri Lanka had been 
affecting the political situation in India since the 1980s. Following the anti­ 
Tamil riots in 1983, many Sri Lankan Tamils found refuge in the Indian State of 
Tamil Nadu, where Tamil guerrilla groups started organizing (Samaranayake 
2006). In 1987, the governments of India and Sri Lanka signed the Indo­ Sri 
Lanka Peace Accord. The agreement established the Indian Peacekeeping Force 
(IPKF ) in Sri Lanka, which was mandated to disarm the militant groups. The 
mission, however, proved to be a failure, as the Indian armed forces failed to 
disarm the LTTE and suffered losses amounting to some 1,300 troops (Bullion 
2001). This was an upsetting outcome for India: it was a clear indication of 
India’s limited ability to apply strategic strength and perform the role of security 
manager in South Asia. However, it was after the LTTE­ orchestrated assassina­
tion of the former Prime Minister of India Rajiv Gandhi in 1991 that India made 
a firm decision not to further its formal engagement in Sri Lanka’s peace 
process. Soon after, the LTTE was declared to be a terrorist organization by 
Indian authorities, who issued a warrant for Prabhakaran. At the onset of the fifth 
peace process, Indian Foreign Secretary, Kanwal Sibal, visited Sri Lanka and 
admitted that though “logically we should be involved,” the “legal complexities” 
were such that “our options are certainly limited” (Sambandan 2002). For its 
part, India reluctantly granted its acceptance of the Norwegian leadership of the 
peacemaking process, resenting the increased internationalization of an issue in 
its own “backyard” (Philipson and Thangarajah 2005). However, since all exter­
nal actors and conflicting parties recognized India’s strategic interests in Sri 
Lanka, India was still consulted on regular basis (Rupesinghe 2006b, 339). A 
CPA report noted that, as a regional power, India was still the only external actor 
able to perform a high­ profile intervention. However, its involvement was 
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“conditioned by the ‘once bitten twice shy’ effect of the IPKF experience in the 
late 80s” (CPA 2007, 5). The CPA also highlighted a alteration in Indian interest 
in Sri Lanka: as economic interests increasingly take center stage, “high profile 
political or in the extreme case, military intervention, carries with it the risks of 
upsetting and even undermining the growing economic stake” (CPA 2007, 5).
The co- chair system
At the Tokyo Conference on Reconstruction and Development of Sri Lanka, 
which took place in June 2003 without the LTTE’s participation, the donors col­
lectively pledged foreign aid in the amount of approximately US$4.5 billion over 
the four­ year period between 2003–2006 and closely linked the disbursement of 
the aid to progress in the peace talks (Shanmugaratnam and Stokke 2004). The 
policy of conditionality, intended to be a big carrot, soon become a big failure 
for the international community, as they were unable to incentivize the parties to 
return to the negotiating table. First of all, neither one of the conflicting parties 
was truly aid dependent. Second, the conference contributed to the LTTE’s 
mounting dissatisfaction, prompted by the perception that it was not being 
treated as an equal party. Moreover, the impact of international fund raising on 
the LTTE was limited by the fact that the organization “did not have a legally 
constituted instrument under its control to receive the funds for reconstruction” 
(Shanmugaratnam and Stokke 2004, 16). Given the fact that LTTE was banned 
by several important donors, it remained unclear how the organization could 
possibly benefit from these incentives. The policy of conditionality lost its sig­
nificance in the aftermath of the tsunami that struck Sri Lanka in December 
2004. As Goodhand and Klem pointed out, “the threat of withholding aid in an 
‘over­ aided’ environment will have very little effect” (2005, 14). Overall, the 
donors relied on ‘carrots’ as long as they assumed that the process was headed in 
a positive direction, but once success appeared more elusive, they failed to sub­
stitute the carrot with the stick (Frerks and Klem 2006, 54).
 The co­ chairs maintained constructive and cooperative relations. Their state­
ments reflected a common voice. Although the co­ chair framework offered the 
possibility of a predictable division of labor, this division was still accidental 
and “based purely upon the policies of the home foreign ministry and aid minis­
try policies, not on the needs of the peace process in Sri Lanka” (Philipson and 
Thangarajah 2005, 48; ICG 2006a). More importantly, it appeared that the divi­
sion of labor did not reflect the various types and degrees of leverage that each 
actor had at its disposal. For instance, the US’ close relations with the govern­
ment were never put to use in delivering the government to a mutually accept­
able agreement. The lack of strategic interests prevented the US from using more 
meaningful carrots and sticks in its dealings with the government. At the same 
time, the US’ reluctance to work directly with the LTTE reduced the likelihood 
of softening up the LTTE for the peace process. In previous instances, when it 
was instrumental for the advancement of its strategic interests, the US had not 
been reluctant to engage with specific terrorist organizations. In other words, as 
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Lunstead pointed out, the decision not to talk to the LTTE was a policy choice 
and not a legal requirement (Lunstead 2007). Evidently, the limited role of the 
US resulted from its limited strategic interests in the conflict.
 The sticks applied in the process were limited to statements of condemnation. 
Numerous studies have pointed out the negative repercussions of third­ party 
involvement that does not go beyond scolding (Uyangoda 2006, Bouffard and 
Carment 2006, Smith 2007, CPA 2007). The more the mediators’ interests 
appeared limited in the eyes of the conflicting parties, as evidenced by their 
limited use of sticks, the more impotent their leverage became. According to the 
CPA report, once the Sri Lankan government became aware of the limited inter­
national interest in the conflict, it assumed a ‘let’s see what we can get away 
with’ attitude vis­ à­vis the external actors’ involvement. At the same time, the 
government also realized that it could improve its bargaining position by forum 
shopping among other, non­ Western international actors, such as Pakistan, Iran, 
China and Russia, which were willing to offer their assistance without any con­
ditions (CPA 2007).8
Failure of the peace process
Following the US refusal to allow the LTTE to attend the conference in Wash­
ington in April 2003 and the subsequent LTTE decision to suspend all direct 
talks with the government (it also refused to attend the Tokyo conference in June 
2003, at which donors had pledged US$4.5 billion to the peace process) based 
on the perception that it was not being treated as an equal party by the other 
participants, the peace process reached a deadlock. The government was also 
experiencing difficulties in maintaining its commitment to the process, especially 
due to the uneasy cohabitation with President Kumaratunga of the SLFP. The 
tension between the two political forces had lingered ever since the UNF gov­
ernment took office and, with international support, initiated the peace process. 
The President who was the commander in chief, head of state and head of the 
cabinet – with the power to call for elections at his or her own discretion once 
the government had been in office for a year – was largely excluded from the 
talks. A critical juncture was reached in November 2003 when the president 
managed to secure control over three key ministries. Soon after, the president 
dissolved the parliament and called for new elections, which were held in April 
2004 and marked the end of the UNF government (Fernando 2006). Despite the 
changes in the Sri Lankan political landscape, the Norwegian­ led mediation con­
tinued not only with the new government in place, but also after the newly 
elected president, with a nationalist and pro­ military­solution platform, Mahinda 
Rajapaksa of the SLFP, came to power in 2005. In 2006, the situation on the 
ground had gradually deteriorated from sporadic skirmishes into full­ fledged 
open warfare, particularly in the east. There were attempts to reignite the peace 
process, which had been stalled since April 2003, with two rounds of peace talks 
held in Geneva in February and October 2006. But these efforts also eventually 
failed.
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 In spite of such a promising start to the peace talks and the leadership of a 
strongly committed prime minister and experienced Norwegian mediators, there 
are a number of reasons why the process reached an impasse in 2003 and ulti­
mately failed in 2006. First, the conflict in Sri Lanka has always had the capacity 
for intense re­ escalation (Uyangoda 2007). Both sides accepted the initial cease­ 
fire, at least in part, for devious reasons: as an opportunity to rearm and reorgan­
ize for the future and to seek international support and legitimization for their 
respective interests (Höglund and Svensson 2009). In other words, as the parties 
never really lost the appetite for a military solution, the situation was never 
really ripe for peaceful resolution (Smith 2007). Second, the relationship 
between the government and the LTTE was based entirely on the CFA, as they 
failed to sign an interim settlement agreement of any kind. Uyangoda points out 
that the basis for the negotiations and the CFA “was the preservation of the 
parties’ strategic interests through a condition of no­ war. . . . Consequently, the 
problem­ solving and conflict transformation approach became entirely absent” 
(Uyangoda 2006, 4). Third, the peace process was focused exclusively on two 
parties: the government, led by Wickremesinghe, and the LTTE. President 
Kumaratunga and other southern political elites were largely excluded from the 
process and non­ LTTE Tamil parties and Muslim parties had no role at all. As 
pointed out by the ICG, “much of the dynamic of this conflict is within ethnic 
communities, and the failure of the peace process to address this, made a lasting 
peace less likely” (ICG 2006a, i). In 2004, two significant developments changed 
the balance of power between the parties. The defection of the LTTE’s eastern 
commander, Vinayagamoorthy Muralitharan, known as Colonel Karuna, and the 
losses suffered by the LTTE’s naval wing in the tsunami of December 2004, led 
some sections of the government and armed forces to believe that the LTTE’s 
offensive capacity was weakened and that a highly concentrated war against the 
LTTE, with the help of the breakaway faction, would be winnable (Uyangoda 
2006).
 In conclusion, all of the aforementioned developments induced the parties to 
start exploring their military options again and contributed to the subsequent 
failure of the talks. But without discounting the internal developments that con­
tributed to the failure of the peace talks, it is important to understand the part 
that the international mediators and their self­ interest played in the peace 
process. The third parties’ interests in the conflict proved to be insufficiently 
strong to engage in a properly coordinated multiparty mediation process. There­
fore, the evident lack of strategic interests within the co­ chair system created an 
environment within which Norway was unable to successfully coordinate multi­
party mediation efforts through the co­ chair system. The leverage that the third 
parties possessed was never used to guide the disputants toward a mutually 
acceptable solution. Instead, the mediators, including the US or even the EU, 
blocked any possibility of reaching a solution through the peace process due to 
their reluctance to engage in direct talks with the LTTE. This ‘defection’ strategy 
created internal incoherence within the mediating coalition, which was a signal 
to the government (which had solid relations with the US and the EU) that a 
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military solution could still be explored. This provides sufficient evidence of the 
existence of a causal mechanism indicating that in the event that mediators do 
not reach a convergence of interests, the conflicting sides will be induced to 
defect from negotiations, making it more likely that the peace process will fail. 
The fact that in the case of Sri Lanka the necessary strategic interests hampered 
the achievement of a convergence of interests between the third parties as the 
process was unfolding. Weak interests in the conflict induced the parties not to 
rethink their policies as the peace process hit the wall. Based on the theory pre­
sented here, it is hypothesized that in cases where the third parties realize that 
their ongoing strategies are not producing expected results, they will be induced 
to rethink their policies. However, due to a lack of interest in the conflict, the 
parties were also not sufficiently interested in altering their strategies. As the 
mediators were unable to reach a convergence of interests and instead main­
tained their initial positions regarding the conflict, the conflicting sides saw this 
as a signal of lack of commitment to the peace process and eventually resorted to 
violence once again.
Notes
1 This chapter is based on Groeneveld­ Savisaar and Vuković (2011). I am greatly 
indebted to Maria Groeneveld­ Savisaar whose meticulous research is at the founda­
tions of this chapter.
2 There were many anti­ government Tamil groups active in the beginning, only during 
the second phase of the civil war (after the Indian had been defeated) was LTTE the 
sole rebel group.
3 Svensson (2014) discusses and defines the Indo­ Lanka Accord as a partial ‘success.’ 
Although this was not a peace agreement in a traditional sense, it is still a ‘borderline 
case.’
4 Yet, there is also the alternative interpretation: that parties learn from previous lessons, 
or that even failure might create changes that move the parties closer to a solution.
5 On November 28, 2002 the LTTE’s leader declared: “We can’t ignore the realities of 
today’s world. We have to realize this and adjust our path to freedom” (quote from 
Höglund and Svensson 2007, 107).
6 The eventual reescalation of violence transformed SLMM from a peace­ monitoring 
mission to a war monitoring one. A further complication came in the summer of 2006 
when the EU listed the LTTE as a terrorist organization, requesting its member states 
to freeze the existing and prohibit further direct or indirect provision of funds and other 
financial assets to LTTE (Council of the European Union 2006). The LTTE reacted by 
insisting that all EU countries leave the mission. The SLMM terminated its operations 
in January 2008, when the government of Sri Lanka abrogated the cease­ fire agreement 
(SLMM 2008).
7 The US conveyed this message using various channels: formally through Norwegian 
delegation which was officially facilitating the talks, secretly through Tamil diaspora in 
the US, and even publically. In a speech delivered in February 2003, Armitage 
announced: 
If the LTTE can move beyond the terror tactics of the past and make a convincing 
case through its conduct and its actual actions that it is committed to a political 
solution and to peace, the United States will certainly consider removing the 
LTTE from the list of Foreign Terrorist Organizations.
(Armitage quoted in Lunstead 2007, 16)
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8 That prediction proved true. The new kid on the block, offering unconditional finan­
cial, military, and diplomatic support, has been, since early 2007, a player with straight­
forward – and certainly strategic – interests: China. After the March 2007 agreement 
that allowed China to build a US$1 billion port in southern Sri Lanka, allegedly to use 
as a refueling and docking station for its navy, Beijing appears to have significantly 
increased arms sales to Sri Lanka. China has also provided crucial diplomatic support 
in the UN Security Council, blocking efforts to put Sri Lanka on the agenda, and also 
boosted financial aid to Sri Lanka, even as Western countries have reduced their contri­
butions. A spoiler has indeed emerged.
8 Discussion and lessons for 
practice
This research departed from the assumption that cooperation between mediators 
is not only beneficial to the multiparty mediation process but also to them as 
rational actors who are driven by self- interests. Even despite the inevitable costs 
of mediation coupled with costs of cooperating, cooperation still proves to be 
more beneficial than defecting strategies. As the five case studies illustrate, 
cooperation between mediators is by no means exogenous to the process. First of 
all, cooperation changes in intensity according to the dynamics of the conflict 
and of the conflict management process. When outside parties do not have con-
verging interests on how the conflict should end they often resort to limited 
cooperation. Limited cooperation produces a limited result. When third parties 
are unwilling to use their full mediating potential – for instance, when a patron 
state is unwilling to use more directive strategies to move the partner party in 
conflict toward an agreement – this choice might send mixed signals to the con-
flicting parties which might produce lack of commitment to negotiate a settle-
ment. In other words, lack of cooperation within the mediating coalition directly 
gets transposed into a lack of cooperation between the conflicting sides and third 
parties.
 However when the situation on the ground changes and becomes unbear-
able to the outside actors they might decide to achieve full cooperation. 
Cooperating in these circumstances becomes more cost/benefit efficient and 
effective than previous strategies. Sometimes these changes do not induce all 
parties to engage in cooperative manner. As the case studies suggest, the party 
which has the strongest interest in resolving the conflict will most likely be the 
one that will try to encourage the other side to establish a more cooperative 
mutual relationship. Ultimately, it is worth noting that coordination might also 
be related to a much bigger framework of relations and strategic choices an 
outside party has and makes. As most (self ) interests are interrelated into a 
network of strategic interests, developments on the regional and global level 
which might endanger these strategic interests have the potential to induce a 
third party to radically shift its outlook on the actual conflict. In these circum-
stances cooperation again proves to be more cost/benefit efficient and 
effective, which allows the third party to explore the option of cooperating in 
order to preserve its self- interests.
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 As parties manage to achieve convergence of interests and become able to 
work from a common script, this sends a strong signal to the parties in conflict 
that they should also be more inclined to cooperate and compromise both with 
mediators and with other conflicting sides. Overall, this signaling helps the medi-
ating effort to move conflicting sides more smoothly toward an agreement.
Utility of cooperation
Reflecting back on the game- theoretical model presented in Chapter 2, the employ-
ment of cooperative strategies for external actors appears to be more beneficial than 
spoiling the process. In fact, even the cumulative costs of cooperating and mediat-
ing, complemented with potential benefits of acting as a spoiler, still do not manage 
to match the benefits generated by cooperative strategies. As the model shows, 
although the choice of non- cooperating at first might appear appealing to a third- 
party, spoiling the process might actually backfire. A third- party’s decision not to 
cooperate while the multiparty endeavor under way – thus implying that other 
mediators are engaged in the mediation in a cooperative manner – undercuts its 
own potential to exercise influence (or leverage) in the mediation and loses the 
potential to create expected benefits for itself and its partner side in the conflict. As 
long as a biased mediator is outside the mediating coalition, the conflicting party it 
is supporting might still remain in the process. In such circumstances the chances 
that potential solutions will be tilted to its partner’s advantage (i.e., conflicting side 
it supports) get reduced. Consequently, as a particular conflicting side is losing 
through mediation, so will its outside partners (i.e., biased mediators), even though 
they are officially not cooperating in the process. For instance, the international 
reputation of a third party might be undermined. At the same time their leverage to 
influence future developments in the process might be considerably undercut. 
Therefore, the model induces a conclusion that both the non- cooperative outside 
actor and its partner party to the conflict will face far smaller benefits than those 
who opt to cooperate and potentially (through constructive dialogue and exercising 
necessary leverage) move the proposed solution to their advantage.
 In light of a lower payoff, it is expected that a rational mediator will chose to 
alter its strategy and start cooperating with the rest of the group. Although the 
process of cooperation implies certain costs, and as such produces smaller utility 
that in cases when no party cooperates (point (a) in the model), the choice of 
altering the strategy and starting to cooperate will undeniably generate bigger 
benefits compared to those attained if a mediator remains outside the mediating 
coalition. By being a part of the mediating coalition, each mediator is able to 
exercise a certain influence over the process, and potentially negotiate a solution 
that is in favor of the side in the conflict that they have special relations with. 
Thus, (biased) mediators attain important utility as the conflicting side that they 
support actually starts gaining important benefits through mediation. Despite the 
costs of mediating and cooperating, the second outside actor still manages to 
create greater benefits through coordinated activities than if it opted to spoil the 
process and stay outside of the coalition.1 Therefore, the model prescribes a 
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dynamic that unequivocally remains in line with the initial statement and defini-
tion that cooperation implies the creation of new gains for each party that were 
unavailable to them by unilateral action, albeit at some costs (Zartman and 
Touval 2010).
 If interpreted through classical game theory, cooperation represents a 
dominant strategy in this model, and the Nash equilibrium is point (c) (2,2). 
ToM also provides a similar interpretation, given that once the multiparty medi-
ation starts, cooperative behavior produces higher payoffs than defection, and 
the final state is also in point (c). Overall, cooperation can be identified as a 
rational strategy that leads to nonmyopic equilibria. Once a party chooses to 
cooperate, short- term goals which induced a party to defect are no longer a pri-
ority. Rather, for a rational outside party that has received low payoffs from a 
defecting strategy, cooperation becomes a useful mechanism through which it is 
possible to limit the other side’s utility.
 As cooperation proves to be decidedly beneficial not only to the overall 
process but more importantly also to the parties themselves, it is also important 
to understand what mechanisms can deter a party from defecting from the group. 
Inducing a party to switch from defection to cooperative behavior is obviously 
not a simple process, as it directly implies interference in another party’s policy 
objectives. It would be too simplistic to assume that just by reproving party’s 
non- cooperative behavior, or warning that such behavior is not constructive for 
the overall process of mediation, would motivate a change in a defector’s 
strategy. This research departed from the rational choice assumption that in order 
to change its stratagem and pursue cooperative strategies the defecting party 
needs to realize the potential benefits of such a change. As third parties get 
involved in managing a particular conflict, not only for altruistic and human-
itarian reasons but also to gain something from it, the choice of cooperating also 
needs to be in line with each party’s self-interests. 
 In essence, a potential incompatibility of interests between mediators creates 
a conflict in the mediating coalition that requires management. If not managed, 
the mediators might start working at cross purposes by sending mixed signals to 
the conflicting parties, which greatly reduces the chances of success for the 
peacemaking process. Thus, prior to managing a particular conflict that brings 
them together in a mediating coalition, third parties first need to manage the con-
flict of interests between themselves. Managing the conflict between mediators 
depends on their ability to realize the inadequacy of unilateral action and recog-
nize the utility of cooperation. Following the logic of ripeness theory (Zartman 
1989a, Steadman 1991, Zartman 2001), this book has identified three distinct 
mechanisms that have the potential to induce convergence of interests between 
the third- parties and promote the spirit of cooperation within the mediating 
coalition.
 Exogenous geo- political shifts – significant developments on a systemic level 
caused by pivotal political, social, economic and/or natural events – might encour-
age a party to rethink its guiding principles. This is because no policy objective is 
ever self- motivated or independently strong enough to linger indefinitely; it should 
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rather be seen as a building block of a complex network of strategic choices 
developed by each actor in the international arena. Although such geo- political 
shifts are largely exogenous to the conflict that is being managed, they still have 
the potential to alter external actors’ interests in mediating the dispute. In some 
instances, these shifts may lead third parties to the point where their interests in 
managing the conflict converge. As the case of Tajikistan shows, Taliban storm-
ing of Kabul induced Russia and Iran to rethink their policies in the region, to 
put more pressure on conflicting sides in Tajikistan and to drive them toward a 
commonly acceptable solution. In Cambodia, two events had a similar impact. 
As Hampson and Zartman indicate,
Gorbachev’s accession to power in the Soviet Union in the mid-1980s  
brought changes in the interests and positions of major outside parties. As a 
part of its overall effort to normalize relations with China, the Soviet Union 
began to step up its own efforts to resolve the conflict, by encouraging 
Vietnam to withdraw its army unit from Cambodia and threatening termina-
tion of its military and economic aid to Vietnam.
(Hampson and Zartman 2011, 137)
In fact the secret warning that the USSR delivered to Vietnam, in which they 
indicated their intention to stop supporting Vietnam’s military presence in Cam-
bodia and confrontation with China, resulted in Vietnam’s announcement of 
troop withdrawal (which initially did not produce the results needed to move the 
process toward an agreement) that on the long run contributed to Sino- 
Vietnamese rapprochement. In Namibia, the advent of Gorbachev to power also 
proved to be of crucial importance for the achievement of rapprochement 
between the USSR and the US, and their subsequent convergence of interests in 
managing the conflict by linking together the issues pertinent to the conflicts in 
Angola and Namibia. In the case of Kosovo, changes on the systemic level also 
had an effect, however this time negative. When Russia started restoring its 
global relevance in the late 90s, its policies shifted from implicit compliance to 
implicit confrontation with the West, especially with the US. For Levitin this 
“deterioration has to be understood in the context of more general and long 
standing trends in Russian foreign policy” (Levitin 2000, 138). Finally, in the 
case of Sri Lanka, the 9/11 terrorist attacks on Twin Towers in New York 
strongly affected US foreign policy. The war on terror doctrine reduced the 
possibilities for US diplomats to engage in direct talks with an organization such 
as the LTTE. This lack of flexibility had a dual impact: on the one side the US 
was unable to employ all of its leverage in the peacemaking process, which 
limited the effectives of the mediating coalition; on the other, the LTTE saw this 
as a signal that it was not treated fairy in the peace process, and as a consequence 
opted to walk away from the talks.
 Changes in conflict dynamics might induce those outside actors that are 
directly involved in the conflict – for example by providing logistical and/or 
military support – to consider using mediation as a viable option for ending the 
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conflict. While exogenous geo- political shifts create a trickle- down effect (i.e., 
the mediators’ decision to re- evaluate their interests in the conflict is induced by 
factors that are external to it), the more the third parties expand their degree of 
involvement in the conflict, the more their interests become susceptible to the 
dynamics of the conflict. Even though formally they might act as mediators or 
external actors supporting the mediation process, these actors could still employ 
violence as an off- the-table tactic in the same way conflicting parties do. In cases 
where external actors provide logistical and/or military support to one of the 
conflicting parties, they may experience mounting costs and losses more directly. 
As the conflict dynamics on the ground start to take their toll, the desirability of 
continuing the conflict may start to wane. Consequently, as the confrontational 
strategies start yielding higher costs than expected benefits, the non- cooperative 
third party may opt to explore cooperative engagement with other external actors 
as a suitable way of achieving greater benefits. In the case of Tajikistan, each 
time the parties failed to come to an agreement, they would resort to violence. 
This was especially problematic for Russia that had stationed troops there. As 
such violent dynamics produce unwanted costs in lives and military equipment, 
Russia begun resorting to more active strategies in order to push the government 
to accommodate the opposition and find a commonly acceptable solution. In the 
case of Namibia, the achieved stalemate between Cuban and South African 
troops was an indication that a military victory in the conflict was unfeasible and 
that the existing non- cooperative strategy in the peace process was not produc-
ing any substantial results that would outweigh the military stalemate. In the 
case of Cambodia, the Soviet decision to stop financing the Vietnamese ‘tug of 
war’ with China and change the strategies toward Beijing induced a more 
cooperative strategy both between the Soviet Union and China, and between 
China and Vietnam. In the case of Kosovo, the new reality on the ground, 
created by UNMIK’s presence, prompted Russia to agree with the rest of the 
Contact Group on independence as a viable solution to the problem. However, 
this convergence did not last for long, and chances of acting in concert faded. 
Finally, in the case of Sri Lanka, the conflict had a very limited impact on the 
mediators’ strategic interests. As the external actors did not experience the pain 
(both material and non- material) of an escalating conflict, they had less reason to 
alter their policy preferences and act more assertively in managing the conflict.
 Both exogenous geo- political shifts and changes of conflict dynamic imply 
that the defector will change their strategy through their own initiative. However, 
a third trigger of cooperation is also feasible – the initiative might come from the 
rest of the coalition, through bargaining for cooperation. In view of the fact that 
defection is often a direct expression of a party’s self- interested goals, another 
way of encouraging change is to engage a defecting party in a bargaining 
process, where an alternative to their current behavior can be found by offering 
them sufficient incentives to make participation an attractive option. As the like-
lihood of negotiating a cooperative arrangement increases with the number of 
participants, a series of measures conducive to effective negotiation may be 
taken: the issues should be narrowed down to the most relevant ones; the 
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negotiating process should be conducted by a selected group of actors that have 
a direct stake in those particular issues that are being discussed; and additional 
actors should be included only if they can contribute to the establishment of col-
lective effort.
 The choice to pursue a non- cooperative approach will not only have an 
impact on the mediating coalition, but also on the overall peacemaking process, 
as it might encourage at least one conflicting party to stop cooperating in peace 
talks. When cooperating with other mediators, biased mediators are useful inso-
much as they can use their special relationship with one conflicting side to influ-
ence its behavior, positions and perceptions and consequently move it toward an 
agreement. However, when these actors decide not to cooperate with the rest of 
the group, the conflicting side that they have a special relationship with might 
suffer in the negotiation process. In such circumstances, the party to the conflict 
might find the agreement less attractive, and consequently refuse to accept it. At 
the same time, a conflicting party may understand their partner’s non- cooperative 
attitude to be an acceptable and recommended form of behavior. Thus, by 
cementing their positions, non- cooperative external actors produce significant 
complications for the bargaining process and put mediation efforts at risk. As the 
case studies show, the transposition of non- cooperative behavior from an exter-
nal actor onto a conflicting party may take different forms, and range from a 
mere stalling of the process, to the use of violence as a beyond- the-table tactic, 
to the complete abandonment of the peacemaking process.
 At a certain point, the coalition members might pick up this signal, approach 
the defector and bargain for a new arrangement which will create new benefits 
for both. However, it is not always clear who should take responsibility for steer-
ing a party off a non- cooperative course. As experience shows in these situ-
ations, the responsibility for encouraging a mediator to develop a common idea 
about a final solution and opt for cooperative strategy might rest with others in 
the mediating coalition. In the case of Cambodia, the US managed to create 
momentum within the P5 and negotiate an acceptable solution for USSR and 
China which was crucial for the success of the peace process. Nonetheless, as 
noted by Solomon, “ultimately, the success came when the two major protagon-
ists in the region’s conflicts of the 1980s and 1990s – China and Vietnam made a 
secret, bilateral deal to reconcile their differences and support the United Nations 
peace plan for Cambodia” (Solomon 2000, 4). A similar dynamic was also tried 
in the case of Kosovo with the last attempt by the Troika, when the EU not only 
tried to find a solution to the conflict but also to mediate a solution acceptable to 
other mediators (the US and Russia). However, as this effort eventually failed, 
the process was driven to a deadlock.
 In sum, although each of the three reasons to change policy objectives seems 
to work on their own, success is most guaranteed if they are combined. The case 
of Cambodia proves this point, as
the combined effects of a military stalemate among Cambodia’s political fac-
tions, diplomatic efforts to construct a settlement during the preceding decade 
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by a number of interested parties, and the desire of the major powers to disen-
gage from Indochina’s travails created a context for successful diplomacy.
(Solomon 2000, 4)
Achieving and implementing coordination
All five case studies also show that coordinated efforts between mediators are 
strongly related to their strategic interests in the conflict. The case of Sri Lanka 
indicates the significance of strategic interests for a coordinated endeavor 
between multiple mediators. As the co- chairs lacked strategic interests in the 
conflict, they were unwilling to employ their leverages to guide the parties in 
conflict toward an agreement, taking the Norway- led mediation efforts to a dead-
lock. Similarly, in case of Tajikistan, strategic relevance of the area for both 
Russia and Iran, especially in light of a perceived threat coming from Afghani-
stan and increasing costs of supporting the warfare for Russia which was not 
yielding expected results (i.e., victory through military means), allowed for a 
well- coordinated mediation activity under the UN leadership. The UN leadership 
was perceived as legitimate by both Russia and Iran as its involvement was not 
incompatible with their interests in the conflict. A somewhat different dynamic 
was observed in the case of Namibia, where the US – generally perceived as a 
powerful state – had a clear set of interests to promote in the conflict, and was 
certainly biased toward particular conflicting sides; it still managed to be an 
effective coordinator of mediation activities. First of all, its mediation activities 
were gradually accepted and publically stated by all conflicting sides as ‘indis-
pensable,’ allowing the US to acquire the necessary degree of legitimacy. At the 
same time the US managed to generate converging interests with the USSR (a 
patron state of MPLA and Cuba) which in turn, allowed for a successfully coord-
inated multiparty mediation effort by a powerful (and biased) state. Similarly, in 
the case of Cambodia, the US managed to successfully coordinate mediation 
activities even though it was quite clear to all the parties involved that it had an 
agenda it was trying to promote. However, in this case the success was more 
related to the fact that the US was able to ‘borrow’ the needed degree of legiti-
macy from the UN, as it skillfully transferred the bargaining process between 
mediators (with incompatible interests) to the UN bodies. Again, just as in the 
case of Namibia, the US was able to take the leadership role once the powerful 
states managed to reach an agreement and reach a convergence of interests 
amongst themselves. Finally, in the case of Kosovo, the strategic interests of key 
patron states were not moving towards a convergence point (as was the case in 
Tajikistan, Cambodia and Namibia). In fact, every time the parties signaled read-
iness to work together and transfer the responsibility of coordination to a par-
ticular party, such as the UN, the conflicting sides were moving toward reaching 
an agreement. However, the necessary degree of legitimacy, that the UN initially 
enjoyed (most likely do to its reputation and credibility) was gradually chal-
lenged by those third parties (in this case Russia) who saw UN’s agenda and 
proposals for conflict resolution as incompatible with their interests.
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Lessons for practice
Reflecting on what was previously stated, for all case studies it could be con-
cluded that a successfully coordinated multiparty mediation activity is directly 
dependent on the compatibility of interests between the party that coordinates 
and the third parties that have strong vested interests in the conflict and leverage 
to influence the behavior of the parties in conflict. Consequently, while coordi-
nator’s legitimacy is an important ingredient for a successfully coordinated 
effort, it cannot be put into effect before the third parties have reached the 
needed convergence of interest. This, in other words, supports the initial premise 
of this book: that the first step of a successful multiparty mediation effort is the 
achievement of third- parties’ willingness to cooperate (convergence of interests), 
which opens the doors to the second stage of coordination where the parties split 
the task of leveraging the parties toward an agreement.
 When designing a peace process it is not only important to know which 
parties in the conflict should participate in the negotiations, it is also crucial to 
know which external parties should be included as well. The choice to exclude 
an external actor that has the capacity to leverage one or more conflicting parties 
toward an agreement, just because that particular external actor has diverging 
interests with the rest of the mediating coalition, will have detrimental con-
sequences for the peace process. On the one side, the mediating coalition will 
have limited capacity to incentivize the parties to negotiate a mutually accept-
able solution. On the other, those parties in conflict that have established partner-
ships with the excluded external actors might also have less reason to 
compromise as they might fear that their interests are not well protected within 
the mediating coalition. Therefore, before starting a peace process (and if faced 
with an incompatibility of interests between external actors) it is essential that 
the external actors realize how important it is that they reach a convergence of 
interests in managing a conflict, speaking from a common script. Moreover, it is 
not only important to affirm the convergence of interests between likeminded 
actors, but to find ways to achieve this convergence with other international 
actors that have the capacity to improve the overall effectiveness of the peace 
process. Numerous cases, including the ones analyzed in this book, show that 
this convergence of interest is often a product of dynamics that are external to 
the conflict being managed. Thus, the ability to establish cooperative relations 
between rival international actors may not only contribute to the effectiveness of 
a particular conflict management process, but create multiplying effects by estab-
lishing pact- building relationships and a sense of shared decision making on the 
international level that can accelerate the achievement of cooperation in future 
conflict management processes.
 Also, just as the parties in conflict may be inclined to explore negotiations 
and cooperation with their opponents once their unilateral confrontational strat-
egies start yielding higher costs and lesser benefits, external actors that provide 
logistical and military support to one of the conflicting parties may have a 
similar reaction to the mounting costs and loses in an ongoing conflict. So, 
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another possible way of achieving convergence of interests between relevant 
international actors is to increase the costs of supporting an ongoing conflict and 
promote the benefits of collaborative international efforts. This will send a strong 
signal to specific conflicting parties that they are losing an important source of 
sustenance for their belligerent activities, and induce them to seek gains through 
peaceful compromise with their rivals. Evidently, external actors should be 
aware that their attitudes have an extraordinary impact on the conflicting parties’ 
behavior. If external actors maintain their confrontational relations, conflicting 
parties will pick up the signal that compromising and negotiating a peace deal is 
not in their interest. Therefore, the promotion of a spirit of cooperation and 
coordination among the relevant international actors will directly contribute to 
an equivalent tendency between conflicting parties, and as a consequence a more 
effective and expedient management of their conflict.
Note
1 This is true only if the assumption from ToM – that mutual defection is not an option 
any more – continues to hold.
Annex I
The model1 prescribes two choices (X) for each actor involved: to cooperate (1) 
or not to cooperate (0). That is: XA, XB, X1, X2, X3 = 0 or 1. All other values in the 
model also range from 0 to 1.
 In case parties are unable to engage in mediation, payoffs of resolving the 
conflict through fighting are described through expected utility functions:
Where, Pw is the probability that a conflicting party will win by fighting; Uf is the 
utility of winning through fighting, which is supposed to be very high (Uf  ≈ 1) 
given the fact that through fighting a party can either win or lose; Cf represents 
the costs of fighting, which are supposed to be also high (Cf  ≈ 1) in order to make 
the option of fighting not appealing; finally, as third parties are not involved 
directly in the conflict their payoffs are related to the probability of winning by a 
side they support and the utility of that victory (U 1Aw, U 3Bw); obviously party 2 
does not have any utility if the fighting continues.
 If there is agreement to conduct mediation, each actor has a payoff. The 
payoffs are still described through an expected utility function which for each 
conflicting side is:
Where, Pm is the probability of winning through mediation for a conflicting side; 
Uag represents the utility each conflicting side has from an agreement achieved 
through mediation (Uag < Uf ); Cm is the cost of mediation; i is the influence a biased 
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mediator has on a conflicting side. This relationship represents a cost that biased 
mediators face in order to influence their partners in conflict – it should not be too 
high, otherwise mediation is not very attractive for outside actors.
Pm has a function: ;
(Pm)(0) stands for a fixed probability of winning through mediation; Qm indicates 
the influence an outside party has on the mediation process – it comes into play 
only if X = 1; the probability has a negative Qm of the opposing side since an 
outside player by increasing chances of winning for their partners also decreases 
the probability of winning for the other conflicting side.
 The cost of mediation Cm has a function: Cm = C (0)m  + C (1)m  (2 – X1 – X3); C (0)m  indi-
cates the fixed costs of mediation; the other part of the formula stands for addi-
tional costs of mediation that A and B face each time an outside actor does not 
participate in mediation – this refers to biased mediators 1 and 3, as the model 
assumes that neutral mediator 2 will always be engaged in the mediation process.
 The model prescribes that mediators also benefit from participating in the 
mediating process. Biased mediators have a utility from what their partner state 
in the conflict wins through a reached agreement (U 1Aag, U 3Bag) – multiplied by the 
probability of them winning – which comes at a cost of their influence/relation 
with the conflicting side (i). Thus the payoffs for biased mediators are:
Fighting occurs unless both conflicting sides agree to mediation. For mediation 
to occur, both of these inequalities must be satisfied:
 (1)
Case 1: Neither mediator cooperates
If neither mediator cooperates, the conditions for mediation (1) become:
 (2)
If conditions (2) fail, fighting continues. The mediators receive their expected 
payoffs:
 and 
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If conditions (2) hold, mediation takes place under mediator 2, without 
cooperation from 1 and 3. The mediators receive their expected payoffs:
 and 
Case 2: One mediator cooperates
In the case where mediator 1 cooperates but mediator 3 does not, the conditions 
for mediation become:
 (3)
If conditions (3) fail, fighting continues, and the mediators receive their expected 
payoffs:
 and 
If conditions (3) hold, mediation takes place under mediators 1 and 2, without 
cooperation from 3. The mediators receive their expected payoffs:
 and 
The case where mediator 3 cooperates and mediator 1 does not is similar.
Case 3: Both mediators cooperate
If both mediators cooperate, conditions for mediation are:
 (4)
If conditions (4) fail, fighting continues. The mediators receive their expected 
payoffs:
 and 
If conditions (4) hold, mediation takes place under all mediators. The mediators 
receive their expected payoffs:
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Finally, if both:
then mediation is so good that the parties agree to it no matter what. In this case, 
the actions of mediators are determined by weighing their costs of cooperating 
against the utility they gain from influencing the mediation.
 Thus, mediator 1 will cooperate if
and mediator 3 will cooperate if
Note
1 This model was originally developed during the 2009 YSSP research at IIASA, Laxen-
burg, Austria, and further expanded to its current state together with Dr. Ben Allen 
(Harvard University).
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